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Abstract 
Following Politics: Russian Youth Activism in Post-Socialist Latvia
By
Alexandre B Beliaev
Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology
University of California, Berkeley
Professor Lawrence Cohen, Chair 
My dissertation is based on fieldwork conducted in Latvia. Latvia is frequently 
introduced with a demographic statistic which characterizes 60% of its population as 
Latvian and 40% as Russian. The ensuing discussion focuses on nationalism and ethnic 
tensions—terms central to scholarship on Eastern Europe.  Below, I problematize the 
ubiquity of these terms in accounts of post-socialist politics. Drawing on ethnographic 
research with Latvia's Russian youth organizations, I argue that these terms obscure a 
phenomenon that has an important empirical bearing: the fact that actors, who are by no 
means marginal in electoral politics, have a stake in remaining legible within a sphere of 
action characterized by ethnic division; and, at the same time, challenge forms of action 
based on ethnic solidarity.
Recent events in Ukraine have once again brought to the fore the problematic role of 
ethnic Russians in post-Soviet republics.  In much of political commentary Russians 
living outside of the Russian Federation appear as pawns of Kremlin's attempt to regain 
its dominance over the post-soviet world; as subjects injured by nationalizing elites' 
attempt to undo effects of Soviet Russification; and, fundamentally, as reactionary 
supporters of a (pro-) Russian autocracy.  In fact, over the last decade policy makers from 
the European Union have spent a great deal of effort working with Russian activists in 
Eastern Europe in a hope to shift their political allegiances; to teach them the value of 
national sovereignty; and, fundamentally, to get them to differentiate between democratic 
freedoms (inherent in European institutions) and selective privileges (held over from the 
Soviet period). 
In my dissertation, I challenge the assumption  that Russians living outside the Russian 
Federation are pawns of Muscovite expansion, and, in the same vein, critique the hope 
that they make become agents of European democratization. Analyzing Latvia's Russian 
youth activists' ambitious for meaningful elected office, I argue that despite having 
different geopolitical and ideological orientations, EU- and RF-programs are equally 
likely to perpetuate parliamentary gridlock, voter apathy, and anti-political sentiment. In a 
related vein, I explore how youth activists turn to late-socialist practices in an attempt to 
create viable alternatives to both “pro-Russian” and “pro-European” positions; and how 
these alternatives have immense potential to draw together young people of different 
ideological persuasions, ethnic identities and life styles. 
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
My dissertation is based on fieldwork conducted in Latvia. Latvia is frequently 
introduced with a demographic statistic which characterizes 60% of its population as 
Latvian and 40% as Russian. The ensuing discussion focuses on nationalism and ethnic 
politics—matters which dominate scholarship on Eastern Europe. In many respects, this 
dominance is well-founded. On the most general level, it reflects a historical concern 
with violence enacted by or in the name of what, today, we refer to as minorities.1 On the 
more immediate level, this discussion speaks to a particular empirical situation: the rise 
the rise of nationalist discourse and ethnic parties throughout the former socialist bloc.  
Many intellectuals interpret post-socialist nationalism in terms of “resurgence,” as a 
(possibly belated) reaction against the socialist states’ attempt to suppress ethnic 
particularism in favor of class solidarity (e.g. Gray 2007). This interpretation has been 
challenged in two ways. First, a significant number of Soviet historians argue that 
socialist states aimed to cultivate rather than repress ethnic identity; and that, in fact, 
post-socialist nationalism is continuous with the socialist investment in ethnic difference 
(e.g. Slezkine 1993).   Second, a number of contemporary-oriented political theorists 
interpret post-socialist nationalism as a symptom of a global shift from a class-based 
pursuit of economic equality a status-based pursuit of formal equality; or, to use Nancy 
Fraser’s (1996) phrase—a shift from a politics of redistribution to a politics of 
recognition (Gille 2010; c.f. Taylor 1994).
My dissertation is indebted to various critiques of (to this day, widespread) understanding 
of post-socialism as characterized by ethnic-national “resurgence.” At the same time, my 
work suggests that these critiques continue to treat ethnic difference as the most notable 
feature of Eastern Europe and to reproduce a geopolitical imaginary that casts the region 
as the privileged site for studying ethnic politics (c.f. Wolff 1994). This imaginary is not 
false: ethnic solidarity remains crucial for various—quite possibly most—forms of 
political action. At the same time, it is empirically limiting: it obscures how particular 
actors attempt to challenge nationalist discourse while simultaneously ensuring that they 
remain legible (and possibly become successful) in the sphere of action characterized by 
sharp ethnic-national divisions.
There are many reasons to speak about “ethnic politics” and “nationalism” in Latvia, 
where I conducted my fieldwork in 2008-2009. Following the collapse of the Soviet 
1        Here, I mean violence enacted against / in the name of (religious, ethnic, linguistic) groups 
following: (a) the reconfiguration and the eventual breakdown of the Holy Roman Empire in the 
aftermath of the Reformation; (b) the breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian 
Empires in the aftermath of World War I; and (c) the breakdown of state socialism in the aftermath of 
1989. Post-socialist states that were once a part of the Austro-Hungarian, the Ottoman, and/or the 
Russian Empire include: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary,  Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
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Union, most of Latvia’s Russians became disenfranchised and could not participate in 
electoral politics. Their gradual naturalization entrenched, rather than reduced, ethnic 
divisions in the context of electoral and parliamentary institutions.  Today, most people 
cast their votes for candidates who share their ethnic background; the parliament is 
divided between Russians (who sit to the left) and Latvians (who sit to the right); and the 
cabinet of ministers (the government) has never had a Russian member.  More than two 
decades since Latvian independence, many  Russians remain disenfranchised; they are 
not recognized as a group entitled to collective rights; the use of Russian language in the 
public sphere is regulated by state institutions; and Russian cultural production is not a 
policy priority. 
There are also reasons to speak about “ethnic politics” and “nationalism” in the context of 
my fieldwork. This ethnography is an account of young people who seek a career in 
electoral politics; and, given the structure of parliamentary institutions, need to capture 
Russian votes. Most of these young men and women are registered as “Russian” in their 
Soviet-era birth certificates; they speak Russian as their native language; they are 
graduates of secondary schools where Russian is the primary language of instruction. 
They belong to organizations routinely glossed as “Russian”; and, arguably with good 
reason: in addition to having mostly Russian membership, these organizations seek funds 
distributed under the aegis of ethnic minority and Russian compatriot programs.  
However, much of this ethnography is prompted by an attempt to challenge the 
dominance of “ethnic politics” and “nationalism” in accounts of post-socialism. One of 
my central arguments is that these terms obscure a phenomenon that has an important 
empirical bearing: the fact that actors, who are by no means marginal in electoral politics, 
have a stake in remaining legible within a sphere of action characterized by ethnic 
division; and, at the same time, have a stake in challenging forms of action that appeal to 
ethnic solidarity.  This empirical phenomenon has a conceptual bearing: it challenges the 
way that many anthropologists—as well as other stakeholders—engage questions of 
difference and politics. My dissertation aims to develop an analytical vocabulary 
necessary to understand that challenge. 
*
I came to Latvia for the first time in the summer of 2007. Like many foreign researchers, 
I was particularly interested in ethnic politics and nationalism. Before setting foot in 
Latvia, I knew about its peculiar demographic situation: the fact that only 60% of its 
population was Latvian, while the other 40% was Russian and/or Russian-speaking. I 
spent most of my first summer in Riga reading about how this situation came about—
how it contrasted with the “unsurprising” demography of Latvia’s interwar years, when 
ethnic Latvians comprised 75% of the population, Russians—10%, Jews—5%, and Baltic 
Germans—3%. 
Looking through history books, encyclopedia articles, museum brochures, I read about 
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resettlement of Latvia's Baltic Germans to German-occupied Poland in 1939;2 
deportations and executions of Latvians following the Soviet annexation of independent 
Latvia in 1940;3  annihilation of Latvian Jewry during World War II;4  exodus of Latvians 
fearing the return of Soviet troops in 1944; deportations of Latvians during Soviet 
collectivization of 1948; and the massive inflow of Russians and Russian speakers as a 
result of Soviet economic and demographic policies between 1944 and 1989.   
*
Pursuing my interest in post-socialist ethnic politics, I was particularly keen to know 
more about Russians who moved to Latvia between 1944 and 1989 to partake in post-war 
reconstruction, industrialization, and militarization.  Following the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, the majority of these Russians found themselves without Latvian 
citizenship.  In contrast to most Soviet republics, which declared their independence 
based on a national right to self-determination, Latvia claimed to restore its already-
existing independence—i.e., a state continuous with the interwar republic. Restoration of 
independence was followed by the restoration of citizenship. One could obtain Latvian 
citizenship only insofar as one was either born in or had a cognate kin relation in the 
inter-war republic. This had the effect of excluding most of Latvia’s Russians from 
holding  citizenship5: most of them either moved to, or descended from those who moved 
to, Latvia during the Soviet period. 
  
After the collapse of the USSR, Latvia’s Russians had an indeterminate status: they were 
“citizens of the former Soviet Union.”6   By 1995, the Latvian government yielded to the 
2        Most of these Germans were the descendants of the Livonian Brothers of the Sword—subjects of 
Teutonic Knights—which settled on the Eastern seaboard of the Baltic Sea in the 13th century in order to 
Christianize the native heathens; who, in the process of their Christianization, became serfs to the 
Western colonizers.  In the 16th century, Brothers of the Sword were defeated during the Livonian Wars 
and, consequently, became tributaries of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Kingdom of 
Sweden. In the 18th century, when the Russian Empire defeated Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and 
the Kingdom of Sweden in the Great Northern War, the Baltic Germans pledged allegiance to Peter I 
thereby managing to retain  their  dominance over the Latvian peasantry. Having lasted for nearly seven 
centuries, their power came to an end when Latvia became a nation state in 1920.   
3        There is significant disagreement as to whether or not Latvia was “occupied,” “annexed” or 
“incorporated” in 1940.   
4        The war between Germany and the Soviet Union began on June 22, 1941. Germans entered Riga a 
week later, on July 4th. Three days later, they burnt down Riga's central synagogue with several 
hundred Jews locked in the basement. On November 30th and December 8th of the same year, 24 000 
Latvian Jews and 1 000 German Jews were shot in Rumbula, a forest on the outskirts of Riga. This was 
the second largest machine-gun massacre after Babi Yar.
5        In Lithuania, restoration of citizenship was immediately followed by an extension of automatic 
franchise to all registered residents. In Lithuania, ethnic Russians comprised 8% of the population.  In 
Estonia, Russians were also denied franchise.
6        People with a status of “citizens of the former Soviet Union” could stay in Latvia for as it was their 
registered place of residence on the eve of the Soviet collapse.  Soviet citizens were required to register 
their place of residence in internal passports; this practice was known as propiska. In other words, not 
all of Latvia’s residents had this status: in addition to citizens and citizens of the former Soviet Union, 
there were foreign (predominantly, Russian) citizens who were temporary residents.  It is unclear 
whether or not Citizens of the former Soviet Union were stateless persons; however, their possibilities 
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pressure exerted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation and Europe and the 
European Council, and transformed “citizens of the former Soviet Union” into “Latvian 
noncitizens.”  Over the decade that followed, the status of “noncitizenship” became an 
object of some elaboration. Jurists and legislators specified that Latvian noncitizens 
should not be confused with those who were not citizens of Latvia or those who were 
permanent residents in Latvia. Rather, noncitizens were subjects of the Latvian state, 
issued a state passport7 (called “Alien’s Passport”), and encouraged to  naturalize8. 
In addition to emphasizing the distinction between “noncitizenship” and a lack of 
citizenship, the Latvian government sought to underscore the distinction between 
citizenship and ethnicity; to explain that, in Latvia, citizenship is a matter of where one’s 
ancestors lived rather than who one’s ancestors were. This explanation reflected Latvian 
policy-makers’ attempt to demonstrate Latvia’s readiness for membership in the EU; the 
need to implement the so-called “conditionality requirements” (Pridham 2009). In other 
words, this explanation reflected Latvian politicians’ anxiety about flauntingly violating 
the ideal of universal citizenship by limiting electoral franchise to a particular ethnic 
group— by creating a sharp distinction between ethnic nationality and state citizenship 
and thereby institutionalizing a boundary between subject members and self-governing 
citizens of a body politic (c.f. Rogers Smith 2002). 
It is difficult to keep track of these (ethnographic) distinctions—particularly in light of 
multiple cross-disciplinary attempts to move away from using “citizenship” as a 
shorthand for a certain legal status and towards using “citizenship” analytically,9 as a 
heuristic for thinking about contingent relationships between various kinds of actors, 
institutions, and processes (Isin and Turner 2002).10  Since the 1990s, these attempts had 
for travel were limited and their future was uncertain.
7        Today, Latvian noncitizens are similar to Latvian citizens insofar as they are not allowed to apply 
for (or hold) citizenship status outside of Latvia. Unlike Latvia’s permanent residents, Latvian 
noncitizens  have an option to apply for Latvian citizenship when they wish to do so: to take a test 
(which would examine their knowledge of Latvia and assume a rudimentary knowledge of Latvian); to 
swear an oath of allegiance; and become
8       Since 1998, bureaucratic process involved in naturalization has been progressively eased; 
furthermore, in the early 2000s, a major “benefit” of noncitizen status—freedom from military service
—became irrelevant (since obligatory military service for citizens was abolished). However, most 
Latvia's Russians refuse to take part in this process; they argue that Latvian citizenship should be given 
to them automatically; that their lack of enfranchisement, following the restoration of Latvian 
independence, is an injustice which must be remedied.
9       In addition to gaining analytic purchase, the term “citizenship” has become important in cultural 
production; some important examples include: Starship Troopers (1996, Paul Verhoeven, dir.) where 
people can get citizenship only through military service; Elysium (2013, Neill Blomkamp) where people 
fight to gain citizenship in order to secure medical treatment and procedural justice;  and, perhaps, most 
famously, The Hunger Games Trilogy where one nation (Panem) has two classes and thirteen categories 
of citizenship (the former—between the authoritarian Capitol and subdued districts; the latter—among  
the thirteen districts).
10        This move reflects new forms of geographic and economic mobility (e.g., an increase in the number 
of people who can enjoy citizenship of more than one nation-state), emergence of new geo-political 
units (e.g., ability to move / draw benefits from member states of the European Union), as well as the 
effect of the post-1960s social movements: formal recognition of  difference within a given body politic 
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tangible effects: contemporary scholars rarely speak of “citizenship” in terms of 
participation in electoral politics; and, in fact, are fairly anxious to use the term in order 
to analyze differentially-positioned actors within a particular body politic—to talk about 
ethnic, sexual,  or cultural citizenship.11   
Anthropologists have made a significant contribution to using “citizenship” analytically 
(Lazar 2013); in part, because the concept builds upon the discipline’s long-standing 
engagement with  questions of difference and belonging; in part, because the concept 
partakes in a cross-disciplinary challenge of formalist reductions of citizenship to 
statutory law (Neveau and Fillipova 2012). Scholars of Europe have focused on 
citizenship in order to foreground struggles around identity and  difference, particularly in 
light of Europeanization (e.g., Borneman and Fowler 1997), migration (Werbner 1998) 
and multiculturalism (Mandel 2008).12
 
Given academic investment in “citizenship” as a category of analysis, the Latvian 
situation seems to call for an investigation of ethnic citizenship.  Contemporary Latvian 
state-makers' claims aside, institutionalization of noncitizenship can be clearly linked to 
an anxiety about ethnic difference.  Activists who protested against Soviet domination in 
the 1980s were deeply concerned as to whether or not Latvia could ever be independent 
given that Russians accounted for 50% of Latvian population. This concern was an 
underside of a hope—to some extent encouraged by glasnost and perestroika—that 
electoral process could once again be a site of meaningful action.  Many pro-democracy 
activists feared that they would end up shooting themselves in the leg: that, once won, 
freedom from foreign (Soviet) domination, would be quickly jeopardized by Latvian 
Russians support of the Russian Federation which would lead to or legitimate foreign 
policy that would put Latvia closer to Russia than Europe13 
and advocacy of group rights. When it comes to Anthropology, this move reflects many anthropologists’ 
skepticism of formal, or to quote Veronique Benei, “coldly constitutional view of citizenship… [that] 
has led to an overemphasizing of the study of explicitly political sites of manufacturing of citizenship 
such as electoral and other institutionalized processes” ; and resonates with anthropological interest in 
“practices and representations of political subjectivitation that are not the sole production of the state” 
(Neveau and Filipova 2012:189).
11         Furthermore, “citizenship” is a term that is increasingly used to discuss specific ideological 
formations (e.g., liberal citizenship), privileged spheres of action (e.g., economic citizenship), new 
regimes of sovereignty (e.g., flexible citizenship), and dominant modes of governance (e.g., biological 
citizenship).  This is a voluminous literature—partially anthologized by Lazar (2013); some particularly 
influential accounts include Berlant (1997), Ong (1999), Petryna (2002).
12        In Eastern Europe the focus has been more on matters of redistribution—perhaps, not surprising 
given that, under socialism, state legitimacy was based less on the rule of law (and equality under the 
law) than on being equally dependent on centrally-planned distributing scarce resources  (Verdery 1996) 
among complexly differentiated and hierarchically-organized bodies politic (Anderson 1996).  Thus, 
anthropologists of post-socialism use the rubric of “citizenship” to analyze hierarchies among newly 
unmoored (and rapidly reconfigured) bodies politic (e.g., Berdahl 1999), tensions among various 
processes of political incorporation and economic exchange (Humphrey 2002), and, perhaps most 
influentially,  relationships between ecological disasters, collapsing welfare system, and state building 
(Petryna 2002).
13        The pro-democracy activists' concerns about the Russian Federation's interference in domestic 
electoral politics were not unfounded. The Russian Federation has been passively supportive of 
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However, ethnic citizenship is not my primary object of inquiry.  There is little doubt that 
institutionalization of noncitizenship reflected many Latvian activists' concern about 
potentially deleterious effects of ethnic difference on Latvian sovereignty (i.e., Latvia's 
place in post-Soviet geopolitical order). However, institutionalization of noncitizenship 
also reflected widespread concerns about parliamentary democracy. Central to these 
concerns was the late-socialist suspicion of formal politics: a desire to be free from a field 
of action constituted or regulated by a party apparatus (communist or otherwise).  In this 
context, Russians figured less as a group that was likely to jeopardize freedom from 
Russia than as a group that was likely to jeopardize freedom from politics.  In other 
words, institutionalization of noncitizenship reflected post-socialist desire to limit the 
domain of “politics” no less than an anxiety about ethnic difference. 
1. THE PROBLEM OF 'POLITICS'
For me, the category of “post-socialism”  has less to do with a dynamic particular to post-
socialist states (i.e., the rise of ethnic parties  nationalist discourse) or with a world-wide 
emergence of new objects of political action (i.e., the rise of identity politics) than with a 
new anxiety about the limits and nature of “politics.”
To illustrate this anxiety, I turn to the Latvian Institute, an organization tasked by the 
government with promoting Latvia internationally. The Institute makes no mention of 
“ethnicity” in its web portal’s entry on Government & Politics.  Evidence that this 
omission is not accidental can be found in the Institute’s web portal’s entry on Society. 
After claiming that “there is little if no outward manifestation of otherness in the 
nowadays society,” the Institute’s writers bemoan “attempts to turn the ethnic issue into 
a political one and to connect it with the issue of non-citizenship” (Mežs 2010).
It is easy to dismiss the Latvian Institute’s warning against turning ethnicity into politics. 
To some extent, this ease has an ethnographic basis. During my fieldwork, I met many 
social activists who argued that, in Latvia, the distinction between citizenship and 
ethnicity is “purely formal”  (chisto formal’no). According to these activists, one had to 
look at “facts” (smotret’ po faktu) which clearly demonstrated the close link between 
citizenship and ethnicity which, in turn, showed that, in Latvia, “ethnic” and “political” 
were one and the same.  In fact, since the restoration of Latvian independence, the 
concept of “ethnocracy” has gained much currency among Latvia’s Russian intellectuals 
(cf. Verdery 1996, Hayden 1992).
However, it would be dishonest to credit my fieldwork with the temptation to dismiss the 
Latvian Institute’s attempt to separate “ethnicity” and “politics.”  Here, far more 
influential than fieldwork are three disciplinary issues: an expansive understanding of 
“politics”;  approach to “ethnicity” as a political rather than “cultural” phenomenon;  
autocratic regimes in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; and, 
actively opposing electoral upheavals in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine.
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anxiety about “anti-politics.” 
Anthropology of Politics
The great majority of contemporary anthropologists use “politics” as a shorthand for a 
network of power-structured relationships pervading every aspect of life rather than as a 
term denoting an institutionally-bound practice limited to specific kinds of organized 
action (c.f. Fisher 1997). While currently mainstream, this understanding of  “politics” is 
by no means inherent to Anthropology which, in postulating “the primitive” as its original 
object of inquiry, focused on study of social rather than political organization:14 an 
inquiry into variable forms of kinship rather than variable forms of government.15  
Anthropological approach to “social” and “political” as distinct spheres of human 
organization lost much of its valence when anthropologists shifted their research sites 
from (supposedly) stable to rapidly changing contexts. While this shift produced an 
expansive understanding of “politics,” it did not lead to an  investigation of discrete 
14        Usually, this distinction is represented as a consequence of anthropological engagement with 
evolutionism; and, indeed, its two main proponents—Maine and Morgan—were deeply influenced by 
Darwin.  Central to Maine’s [1861] work is an inquiry into the progression from societies based on 
consanguinity (blood and descent) to societies based on continuity (territory).  While Morgan’s [1877] 
distinction between society (societas) and state (civitas) aimed to promote research into variable forms 
of government—the first being based on inter-personal relations (such as family, tribe, and nation), the 
second being based on  relationships of property and territory (such as the city and the state)—it did not 
compel anthropological study of “politics” until much later, when, in the 1960s, anthropologists turned 
to Marx and discovered Engels’ (1884) debt to Morgan (see Bloch 1983, Roseberry 1997). 
       However, it seems to me that the focus on evolutionism obscures the early anthropologists’ debt to 
Classics—particularly, the classical opposition between barbaros and polities (barbarians and citizens). 
For a discussion of  this debt, see Kluckhohn 1961; and, in an innovative vein, Detienne 2005.
15        By the first quarter of the 20th century, Durkheim replaced Darwin as a source of anthropological 
inspiration. As evolutionism gave way to what, later became known as  “structural functionalism,” 
broad social typologies gave way to a comparative analysis of specific (albeit hypothetically 
interrelated) institutions.  Combined with  new ethnographic methods, this shift questioned the assumed 
identity between a given institutional form (e.g., a court system) and a particular social function (e.g., 
the maintenance of justice); and,  by the 1940s, this  challenged  the commonplace reduction of 
“politics” to specific institutions (such as the parliament and, more broadly, the state apparatus).  
 By the 1960s, another shift was on the horizon—this time conceptually underwritten by an 
increased engagement with Marx and prompted by anti-colonial struggles. Anthropologists critiqued the 
previous generation’s hypothesis that most social institutions function to maintain the overall stability 
(as being complicit with the colonial domination) and, instead, increasingly focused on havoc wrought 
by violence and conflict—either implicit in institutions formally separated from the state (e.g., the 
market); and/or exercised in contexts where no single institution exercised monopoly over the means of 
violence. 
            The next shift in anthropological use of “politics” reflected an attempt to make sense of post-
colonial conflict following the formal withdrawal of colonial powers; and, to a lesser degree, to analyze 
contested, if not failed, legacies of revolutionary Marxism.  These attempts questioned equations of 
politics with violence; and, particularly in the case of anthropologists influenced by Foucault and 
Bourdieu, led to a focus on disciplinary apparatus and domains of life previously taken to be a matter of  
personal freedom, choice, or habit rather than targets of governance.
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political processes—such as, for instance, democratic elections—on their own terms. In 
fact, many scholars dismissed these processes  as “formal”; and, instead, focused on their 
failed implementation (c.f. Apter 1999); their re-appropriation by “native traditions” (c.f. 
West 1998); and their legitimating effects (c.f. Coles 2004).16
Anthropology of Ethnicity
Any attempt to separate ethnicity and politics is bound to become an object of 
anthropological ire also in light of the discipline’s approach to ethnicity.  The very 
emergence of “ethnicity” as an object of anthropological analysis reflected a new 
ethnographic research agenda (Williams 1989, Lentz 1995, Eriksen 2002): a shift away 
from focusing on isolated groups and their supposed cultural uniqueness towards 
examining inter-group relationships, and focusing on efforts to communicate difference 
placed under the sign of “culture” (Barth 1969).   In a related vein, many anthropologists 
found “ethnicity” a  necessary term for making sense of migration, industrialization and 
urbanization—processes which unsettled “tribal,” kinship-organized, or, alternatively 
“non-state,” societies which, until 1940s, were the primary object of ethnographic 
research (Cohen 1974).
Critiques of Anti-Politics
Finally, any attempt to separate “ethnicity” and “politics” — particularly an attempt that 
seems to originate with a government-sponsored agency (such as the Latvian Institute)—
is likely to be dismissed in light of anthropological concern with “anti-politics”; perhaps, 
most forcefully articulated in James Ferguson’s (1993) analysis of development projects 
in Lesotho.  According to Ferguson, the discourse of “development” routinely takes the 
country’s economy and society “as lying within the control of a neutral… government” 
and represents the state apparatus “as an impartial instrument for implementing plans…
providing social services and engineering growth” (Ferguson 1994:178). Ferguson takes 
these claims as effects of “the anti-politics machine” which disguises interested 
interventions and disguises them as universal.  Anthropological task is to challenge the 
disguise of universality; to expose the government as “a relatively small clique with 
narrow interests” (Ferguson 1994:1980); and—especially in light of calls for barefoot 
anthropology (Scheper-Hughes 1995) — attend to grounded struggles against these 
interests.  
16      General accounts of Anthropology’s involvement with the question of “politics” display much 
anxiety over other disciplines’ purported tendency to approach politics “formally”: either in terms of 
specific institutions (e.g., parliamentary debate rather than, say, religious ritual), particular actors (e.g., 
an NGO rather than, say, mafia), or certain domains (e.g., legislative reform rather than, say, sexual 
intercourse).  However, anthropologists, and, more generally, social scientists, are not the only ones who 
classify certain dimensions of the world as “formal” (apparent, artificial, explicit) or “informal” 
(substantive, genuine, tacit).  This classificatory scheme has significant currency in many post-socialist 
states— a testament to what was, perhaps, an even greater purchase in the past.  Yet, much academic 
analysis does not attend to how various actors argue about what’s “formal” and what’s “substantive.” 
Instead, it adopts this scheme; and, then quickly dismisses “the formal” in favor of the “informal” or 
“the substantive.”
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*
Here, however, I’d like to argue against dismissing the Latvian Institute’s injunction not 
to confuse ethnicity with politics (which, needless to say, is not to the same as taking this 
claim at face value).  This argument is prompted less by scholarship than by fieldwork. It 
responds not so much to the Latvian Institute’s warning against placing ethnicity under 
the sign of politics, than to my attempt to understand my informants’ arguments about 
what gets to count as “politics.” 
During my fieldwork, I frequently came across a claim that the parliament was the only 
place where one could find Latvians and Russians sitting on the opposite sides of the 
same room. At stake in this claim was a conviction that formal political institutions 
presented a profoundly skewed perspective on Latvia’s Russian question, which, in turn, 
meant that if I were interested in posing this question “objectively,” I had to go as far 
away from the parliament as possible and “leave politics behind.”
In other words, a prerogative to analyze (much less to reveal) the “anti-politics machine” 
is not limited to an anthropologist; other actors may be no less engaged with this task 
than anthropologists.  While their engagement may sit uneasily with an expansive 
understanding of “politics,” it should not be dismissed.  If these actors argue that 
disengagement from formal politics (i.e., from institutions associated with parliamentary 
democracy) is “anti-political,” then it does not follow that they have a narrow 
understanding of “politics.” In fact, as my research shows, it is entirely possible to 
bemoan “voter apathy,” and “parliamentary politicking” at the same time.  
An Ethnographic Approach
Matei Candea is one of a few anthropologists who argues for taking claims about 
“politics” seriously. During carrying out fieldwork on Corsica’s bilingual education, 
Candea came across a school principle who urged him “not to confuse education and 
politics.”  Candea points to how difficult it is to take this claim seriously, given the 
expansiveness of anthropological approach to “politics.” Yet, he is hesitant to interpret his 
informants’  not to confuse education and politics as an effect of politics. 
Instead of dismissing the distinction that his informant attempts to create, Candea wants 
to render it intelligible. This leads him to argue for retaining “politics” as an ethnographic 
category: to inquire into local and situated debates around the political (where it is, where 
it ends, what it does, how its supposed to do it, etc) rather than to dismiss any claims 
about something being “outside of politics” as political in and of themselves.
In Candea’s case, the postulation of the the distinction between “politics and education 
(or political decision and pedagogical science)—leads him to argue against taking “non-
political” as an effect of politics; but, rather, to argue that “non-political” is a site that is 
produced by teachers in order to ensure that their students successfully mediate the arena 
of formal politics (which, quite importantly, is by no means given). In other words, by 
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allowing his informants to deploy their own controversies, Candea is able to argue that 
the distinction that some of them posit (i.e., the distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘non-
politics’) is not a ploy (which has a purpose of presenting something partial as universal) 
but, rather, an attempt to produce something that’s necessary but by no means assured: 
adequate citizens. 
 
Socialist Anti-Politics
 
To understand “political anxiety” — anxiety about the limits of politics—it’s important to 
attend to a specific empirical context. In this case, it’s Eastern European “anti-politics.” 
My interlocutors’ claim about the “non-political” nature of their pursuits resonates with 
late socialist suspicion of formal politics. This suspicion was both elaborate and 
elaborated—most famously in the works of Vaclav Havel, Gyorgy Konrad,  and Adam 
Michnik. While significantly distinct from each other (Renwick 2006), all three activist 
authors shared a profound distaste for a world constituted by the communist party—
despite the fact that, several decades before, when socialist came to power, intellectuals 
had key positions in the state apparatus. 
Late-socialist intellectuals’ distaste of formal politics took two forms. According to Gil 
Eyal (2000), this turn took two distinct forms. On the one hand, there were humanist 
intellectuals who, no longer able to pursue their vocation within the state apparatus, 
developed underground or dissident fields of cultural production, limiting their 
interaction to a closed circle of friends.  On the other hand, there were technical 
intellectuals who sought to turn away from party hegemony by retreating into a private 
sphere—something that became possible following the growing rise of consumer industry 
following WWII (c.f. Fehervary 2002).17 
However different, humanist and technical intellectuals’ strategies both illustrated and 
deepened a widespread marginalization of formal politics. This led to an ethical change 
as well. In cases where ‘the polis’ had an intrinsic value, there was an emphasis on the 
‘honor ethic’ –- pursuit of distinction in the public realm (Taylor 1990, 2004). In places 
where this was not the case, emphasis shifted to “sacrifice” associated with and referring 
to and other-worldly place rather than something held in common.  
Post-Socialist Reforms 
Post-soviet constitutional reforms sought to create conditions that would prevent any 
political party from attaining the kind of power that characterized the Communist Party.  
It is possible to distinguish between three sets of these reforms. The first set sought to 
distinguish between “government” (an organ of the state constituted as a result of an 
electoral process) and “political organizations” (associations formed by individuals 
17      While specifically speaking to the Czech situation,  Eyal’s distinction between humanist and 
technical intellectuals is no less fitting to the Soviet context (see Constanzo 2000 on the debates 
between “the lyricists” and the “physicists”).  For a classical account of the Soviet “middle class” see 
Durham 1976; for a recent, and a highly innovative account, of Soviet privacy see Kaspe 2009.
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interested in gaining temporary control of the government). The Communist Party lost its 
monopoly on political organizations: from 1991, political parties could be formed freely. 
More importantly, no single political organization was to have permanent control of the 
government. Political parties had to compete in elections with a hope of gaining a limited 
term in the government.
 
The second set of post-soviet constitutional reforms sought to create institutional 
boundaries between the government (an organ of the state constituted as a result of an 
electoral process) and the state apparatus (civil service). The party (or parties) which 
gained temporary control of the government had to respect the integrity of the state 
apparatus. Civil servants could not be recruited or let go based on their political 
affiliation. More importantly, certain functions of the state were guaranteed (either 
constitutionally or through various international treaties) and could not become an object 
of government policy spearheaded by a particular party; in other words, matters of 
“politics” had to be distinguished from matters of “state.” 
 
The third set of post-soviet constitutional reforms sought to reduce the state apparatus: to 
withdraw and/or reconstitute domains of actions as “free from state control.” Not only 
political parties, but also “commercial” and “public” organizations could be formed at 
will.  While the state apparatus retained regulative functions, it could not directly 
interfere in these organizations' spheres of action; in other words, matters of “politics” 
had to be distinguished from matters particular to “the market” (in case of commercial 
organizations) and “civil society” (in case of public organizations). 
These reforms promoted a classificatory scheme that differentiated between various roles, 
actions, and organizations.  One could be a party politician, a civil servant, a social 
activist, or an entrepreneur. One could belong to a political party, work in a state 
apparatus, be a member of an activist organization, or partake in a business concern. One 
could advocate a particular policy or a program of action, execute assigned tasks in a 
professional manner, pursue a particular cause or advocate on behalf of a particular 
group, or attempt to make money. 
It may be easy to dismiss the significance of this classificatory scheme; particularly, for 
those who are acquainted with and critical of parliamentary democracy.  Yet, in the post-
Soviet context, this dismissal would be shortsighted. During the Soviet period, the 
Communist Party was the only political party which participated in elections; members of 
the Communist Party staffed key positions in the state apparatus; activist and commercial 
organizations were, for the most part, illegal. 
The reformers recognized that political, bureaucratic, social, and commercial forms of 
action were interrelated; and, to this end, designed mechanisms that enabled 
organizations to change their status. Furthermore, they promoted a variety of institutions 
to ensure interaction between different kinds of social actors; to this end, they sponsored 
the development of chambers of commerce, public consortia, and state advisory 
committees. At the same time, the reformers recognized that the categorical separation 
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between different kinds of actions and actors was necessary to ensure that one form of 
action—particularly the one that could be classified as “political”–did not subjugate 
others. 
*
On a broader scale, it is important to attend to the importance of arguments over the 
nature of “politics” given these arguments’ imbrication with the problem of revolutionary 
change (which, arguably, has foundational significance for the modern world). In fact, the 
very possibility of a revolution as a phenomenon distinct from a rebellion (c.f. Arendt 
1963), that is, the very possibility of events that radically transform the exercise of 
authority and power rather than challenge those who happen to partake in a given 
exercise of authority and power, calls forth arguments over the limits of politics. As 
Taylor (1991) points out, rebellions—which were not uncommon in the early modern 
period—were legitimate only insofar as they were carried out by a duly constituted 
subordinate authority; in fact, only revolutionary change adopts the language of “the 
people” and “the nation” as entities distinct from a contingent political order. 
2. ETHNOGRAPHY OF 'POLITICS'
Much of what follows rests on taking “politics” as an object of ethnographic investigation 
which involves attending how how particular kinds of actors speak about politics. First, 
this means putting aside any temptation to define “politics”—whether institutionally 
(e.g., politics as something that happens in the parliament) or functionally (e.g. politics as 
something that has to do with authority). Second, this means taking seriously claims that 
are all-too-easy to dismiss (or place under the sign of “false consciousness”): claims 
about the “non-political” nature of ethnic identity, cultural production, state bureaucracy, 
market circulation, and intimacy.  Third, and more immediately, this means struggling 
with how to describe actors whose talk about politics prompts this inquiry in the first 
place (for, if one describes particular actors in terms of gender, then, one is tempted to 
talk about feminist politics, etc.). 
*
During my fieldwork, I came across a group of young people—most frequently described 
as Russian political activists18—who did not share the anti-political sentiment. Unlike 
18       Most of the work that follows springs from my unease with this description. On the most immediate 
level, this unease reflects my immediate fieldwork experience: my informants’ claim that if I came to 
Latvia to study Russian youth activists, then I had no business working with them. Both of these 
descriptions use Russian word russkie. As I explain in CHAPTER 1, the use of the word russkie –which 
is used in the phrase russkaia molodezh (Russian youth)—is an object of much contention when it 
comes to formal politics. From the 19th century onwards, there have been various attempts to 
distinguish between russkii (an adjective used in the phrase “Russian language”) and rossiiskii (an 
adjective used in the phrase “the Russian state”). This attempt reflects an emphasis on the multi-ethnic 
dimension of Russian statehood—whether in the period of Rossiiskaia Imperia (Russian Empire), 
Rossiiskaia Sovetskaia Federativnaia Sotsialistickaia Respublika (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic), or Rossiiskaia Federatsia (Russian Federation). Politically-engaged actors outside the 
Russian Federation cannot describe themselves as rossiiskie politiki: this denotes belonging / loyalty to 
the Russian Federation. However, they are hesitant to describe themselves as russkie politiki: this 
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most people, they did not use the category of “politics” in order to refer to a domain of 
action motivated by corrupt intentions and/or doomed to failure. These young people 
wanted to partake in post-Soviet political institutions. They did not shy away from 
professing their vocation for politics, which is one of the reasons that I call them 
“aspiring politicians.” According to aspiring politicians, the post-socialist predicament 
was that of politikanstvo (politicking) rather than politika (politics). 
For aspiring politicians “politics” has to do with getting a seat at the table where policy 
issues are being debated and decided. This means a possibility of getting a seat in the 
government (the cabinet of ministers) rather than being elected in the parliament.19 
Correspondingly, this means being concerned with forming a governing coalition with 
Latvian politicians just as much—and at the same time—as thinking about gaining the 
support of the Russian voters.  As far as these young people are concerned, everything 
that jeopardizes getting a seat at that table is a matter of “politicking” rather than 
“politics.” 
Most of my informants were born in the 1980 and were registered as “Russian” on their 
Soviet-issued birth certificates. Everyone spoke Russian as their native language; the 
majority received their secondary education in the so-called “Russian” schools. Everyone 
had a good command of Latvian—due to personal ambition; dramatic increase in quantity 
and quality of language instruction in post-secondary schools; and/or, the desire to pursue 
post-secondary education at a state institution (which did not offer instruction in Russian 
but was far more prestigious and affordable then a private counterpart). Everyone was 
born in Latvia; however, most could not trace their ancestry to the period of inter-war 
independence. Yet, by the time I began my fieldwork, everyone underwent naturalization
—due to personal conviction, an increased ease of naturalization requirements, and/or the 
abolition of mandatory military service.20   
connotes a particular agenda (often criticized as “nationalist” or nastsional’no-ozabochennaia 
“preoccupied with nationality”) and, furthermore, misrepresents what they consider to be their ethnic 
nationality (which may be “Ukrainian” rather than “Russian”).
19       Russians have been in the Latvian parliament since the restoration of Latvian independence. In fact, 
there have been several Russians in key administrative positions. (Perhaps, the most notable case was 
that of Alekseijs Loskutovs, the head of Latvia's Anti-Corruption Bureau between 2003 and 2009). 
However, Russians have not had a successful track-record with respect for being a part of parliamentary 
government coalitions.The first time that a Russian politician played a significant role in governing 
rather than deliberating or administrating (i.e., being in the government rather than the parliament or the 
state apparatus) happened in 2009. Following municipal elections in Riga, a home to half of Latvia's 
total population, Nils Ušakovs became the mayor. Like most of Latvia's Russians, he could not trace his 
ancestry to the interwar republic; inf act, his paternal and maternal grandfathers were in the Soviet 
military and settled in Latvia following WWII. Following the restoration of Latvia's independence, 
Ušakovs underwent naturalization. He had a successful career in the media and eventually entered 
politics by way of a party-block called “The Harmony Center.” 
20        This reflected the fact that, during the Soviet period, the party apparatus was dominated by 
Russians. However, Soviet-era Russian domination of the party apparatus should not be interpreted 
solely in terms of inter-ethnic tension.  Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CPSU ensured that 
the upper echelons of the party--in a given national republic--were staffed by "national cadres" (i.e., 
party members who had a "titular nationality": e.g., Latvian CPSU was headed by an ethnic Latvian, 
Georgian CPSU was headed by an ethnic Georgian, etc.) Russians dominated the party not as "ethnic" 
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Most of my informants were university students in their early 20s.  Nearly all worked at 
the same time as they studied: most—in order to pay tuition and ensure a certain life-style 
(a cell-phone, an internet connection, a new computer, an occasional ability to go out, 
and, perhaps, a once-a-year trip somewhere in Europe); a few—in order to support a 
widowed parent or a younger sibling or to pay rent for their own apartment.21 Yet, the 
majority lived in the same place where they grew up, did not plan to move out / to start a 
family, and had parents who did not depend on them for supplementary income. While 
recent university graduates were likely to make more money then those who currently 
studied, there were no significant class distinctions among them.22
It is quite easy to interpret this as “power-driven politics”: i.e., a form of action which 
strives for power for its own sake rather than for a particular purpose (such as bringing an 
end to a particular injustice, advocating for particular policy measures, etc.). This 
interpretation is short-sighted23 for three reasons; it ignores aspiring politicians’ unique 
organizational form and their engagement with questions central to debates about Latvia’s 
Russian question over the last decade.
Forms of Organizing 
To begin with, aspiring politicians have an uneasy relationship with organizational forms 
central to the post-socialist distribution of power: political parties and activist 
organizations. 
Latvian law distinguishes between “political” and “social” organizations.   The former are 
but rather "Soviet" beings. In fact, as Dzenovska's (2009) work suggests, post-Soviet Latvian politics 
sought to create de-Sovietize Russians and other ethnic groups. .
21 During the Soviet period it was quite unusual—and usually economically prohibitive—to move 
out upon reaching a certain age. University and college dorms were reserved for students whose 
families did not have a nearby residence.  A newly-wed couple was likely to move in with either the 
groom's or the bride's parents. Up until the 1980s, there was no real estate market: living quarters were 
typically provided through one's place of work, following a lengthy waiting period.
22 Speaking of “class” in the post-soviet context is challenging—not least because it implies a fairly 
stable position in the economic system (something that arguably still lacks in much of the post-socialist 
world which, as I discuss in my concluding chapter, offers many 'from rags to riches to rags to riches' 
stories).
23 One variant of this interpretation, which can be found in the field, revolves around dismissing 
these young people as “party careerists.”  The Russian original—partiinye karieristy—carries 
connotations of duplicity often projected onto, or said to be characteristic of, the Soviet period.   The 
Soviet Union was a one-mass-party state.  Membership in the Communist Party was necessary for 
organizational advancement regardless of one’s profession (i.e., managerial roles were typically held by 
party members; e.g. school principles had to be members of the CPSU; school teachers did not). 
However, advancement through the party ranks could lead to a total change of one’s occupational field 
(i.e., a school principal could be offered a position as a head of a scientific laboratory).  Soviet residents 
who were not avid communists often took party membership to be part and parcel of one’s own 
professional development and, thus, morally legitimate. At the same time, they took advancement 
through the party ranks as driven by a desire to encroach on someone else’s life and, thus, morally 
illegitimate.
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parties: organizations which explicitly partake in the electoral process during which they 
typically make explicit claims about society-at-large and/or the body-politic. The latter 
are activist groups: organizations that make issue- or group-specific claims which quite 
often rest on a critique of electoral politics; particularly, a claim that political parties are 
unable or unwilling to represent a particular constituency or advocate for a particular 
goal.24 
Distinction between “party politicians” and “social activists” is an object of great 
emotional and intellectual investment (which, in fact, prompts my insistence on taking 
“politics” as an ethnographic category). At the same time, the very law that mandates this 
distinction—not to mention political theories which legitimate and elaborate on it further
—acknowledge its artificial and provisional nature. 
The organizations within I conducted fieldwork can be easily taken as a testament of this 
artificiality. While they are registered as “public organizations,” most of their leaders 
belong to other (second) entities which are registered as “political organizations.”  
However, it would be shortsighted to take my informants' organizations as an illustration 
of a failed attempt at institutional differentiation. This failure—or, rather, a structural 
impossibility of institutional differentiation—is neither hidden from plain view nor 
specific to my informants' organizations.  What makes these organizations specific—and, 
thus, merits ethnographic investigation—is an impasse of categorization. My informants 
cannot be characterized either as “party politicians” or “social activists.” In other words, 
what’s unique about their organizations is not that they challenge the distinction between 
“the public” or “the political” (or, alternatively, between social organizations and political 
parties) but that neither category does justice to their particularity.
Political Parties 
Aspiring politicians are members of political parties. This membership allows them to 
participate in electoral politics; particularly, it holds a promise of being included on the 
party ballots during the election.25 However, my informants do not have a good 
relationship with party elites. Their movement through party ranks is limited; it would be 
mistaken to describe them as party functionaries or subsidiaries.  During my fieldwork 
24      The distinction between “political” and “public” organizations is very much colored by the ethnic 
situation. Noncitizens' “political rights” were limited: they could not participate in the electoral process 
(i.e., either run or vote). However, their “civic rights” were not limited: they could establish and actively 
work within public organizations (i.e., NGOs).
25      This promise was realized: my key informants were included on the party ballot.  I suspect that 
Latvia’s electoral system is a structural factor that (however marginally) contributed to this inclusion. 
Latvia is a unicameral parliamentary republic. Elections are based on proportional representation with 
preferential voting. During elections to the Parliament, electoral districts coincide with four Latvian 
regions: Kurzeme, Vidzeme, Latgale, and Zemgale. In each region, voters receive a separate ballot for 
every contending party. Party ballots contain a long, ranked list of candidates which voters’ may seek to 
amend by offering their own ranking. In other words, contending parties do not incur any cost for listing 
as many candidates on the ballot as the ballot’s space allows; and the candidates may hope that, even if 
they are not ranked highly by their parties, the voters will rank them higher.
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there hasn’t been a single event co-sponsored by a political party: space for meetings, 
media resources, and permits have always been obtained through non-party, usually 
personal, affiliations.  In part, this antagonism is a consequence of the incumbent 
parliamentarians’ wish to ensure their re-election by limiting the pool of potential 
competitors. More importantly, this antagonism is a consequence of my informants’ 
unabashed criticism of incumbent parliamentarians as pseudo-political. As I will explore 
in greater detail below, this criticism is quite unique. On the one hand, it does not rest on 
a disengagement / refutation of the parliamentary system and/or parliamentary 
democracy.26  Unlike many groups who turn away from electoral politics—including 
activist organizations who often pursue their aims through non-parliamentary channels 
(e.g. the relatively independent judiciary, international pressure, the court of public 
opinion)—my informants have faith in the parliamentary system.  On the other hand, as 
one of the proceeding chapters shows, it does not rest on an ideologically-driven 
refutation of incumbent parties’ political programs or on an empirically-driven critique of 
parliamentarians’ conduct. In other words, my informants do not critique promises made 
by political parties (e.g. as ‘reprehensible’) or elected officials’ ability to deliver on these 
promises.  
Activist Organizations 
As I wrote above, my informants’ organizations are registered as “public organizations.”  
This registration is important for two reasons. First, it opens a possibility of applying for 
international funding. Youth agencies sponsored by the EU and the RF are hesitant or 
plainly unwilling to fund youth wings of political parties. Second, this registration opens 
a possibility of gaining access to stakeholders that are very hesitant to associate with a 
political party (e.g., schools, orphanages, etc.). However, my informants do not have a 
good relationship with social activists. Co-sponsored events or get-togethers at third 
parties’ events never lead to long-term alliances are marked by bitter arguments.  Often, 
this results in aspiring politicians’ exclusion from non-partisan state-sponsored 
organizations, such as the Youth Advisory Council, which rely on pre-existing alliances.  
In part, this antagonism is a consequence of social activists’ wish to gain access to scarce 
resources by limiting the pool of potential competitors. More significantly, this 
antagonism is a consequence of my informants’ explicit criticism of social activists as 
anti-political. This criticism rests on the former’s valorization and the latter’s suspicion of 
the electoral process. It is also a consequence of my informants’ dismissal of social 
activists as “parochial” and/or as catering to specific interest groups rather than showing 
concern with the larger polity. 
Common Problems: Problem Sociality 
 
The antagonism between my informants’ and party politicians, on the one hand, and 
social activists, on another, is one of the reasons that I am hesitant to place them under 
26      Quite often this refutation involves a pun on Russian cognate of “democracy.”  The first two 
syllables of demokratia are resonant with the word der’mo which means “shit.” The resulting neologism
—der’mokratia—can be translated as “shitocracy.”
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the sign of “political activists.” This antagonism has practical effects. My informants do 
not do the kinds of things that party politicians do: they do not organize based on a desire 
to get elected in order to implement a particular program or represent a particular 
constituency. Similarly, my informants do not do the kinds of things that social activists 
do: they do not organize based on a commitment to a particular issue or to a particular 
interest group. 
 
Instead of sharing a concern with a certain issue or a desire for a particular future, my 
informants share a problem. At various points of my dissertation, I describe them as 
partaking in “problem sociality.”  The term “problem sociality” resonates with Michael 
Warner’s term “stranger sociality”.27 This resonance is accidental. Warner describes a 
form of sociality closely intertwined with processes of subject-formation produced 
through identification with (or, alternatively, interpellation by) public address. My 
informants find themselves in a place marked by competing forms of address. Each of my 
subsequent chapters shows the tension between EU-sponsored attempts to address 
Latvia’s variously Russian residents as “national minorities” and RF-sponsored attempts 
to address them as “compatriots” and/or as Latvia’s “co-constitutive nation.”28 However, 
my informants do not identify with these forms. 
It may be tempting to interpret an absence of identification as a refusal of identification. 
Yet, this temptation ought to be resisted. If one were to interview random passersby about 
local Russians’ attitude to the category of “national minority,” then one would likely hear 
descriptions of Russians’ attitudes to Jews, Poles, and Belorussians. In other words, most 
respondents would assume that the category of “national minorities” cannot describe 
Latvia’s Russians. Some respondents—the ones those who follow formal politics—would 
say that the Latvian state’s attempt to institutionalize this category in an insult to 
Russians’ historical significance in the region. A few respondents—those who are 
involved in political activism—would say that Latvia’s Russians must be officially 
recognized as a national minority either because this category corresponds to their actual 
position or because it opens certain possibilities for future action. If one were to interview 
random passersby about local Russians’ attitude to the category of “compatriots” or “co-
constitutive nation,” most respondents would be at a loss for any answer whatsoever. 
Some—the ones who follow formal politics and who are involved in political activism— 
would either express dismay with these categories (on the ground that they index loyalty 
to the Russian Federation) or express their support for their greater institutionalization.  
 
Each of my chapters presents political activists deeply invested either in adopting or 
disavowing the category of national minority or the category of Russian compatriot as 
well as programmatic positions on issues associated with these categories. However, my 
closest informants are not political activists. They do not adopt programmatic positions 
which are associated with these categories. In fact, what makes my informants unique is 
27      This work develops Nancy Fraser’s (1992) argument that Habermas (1989) does not pay sufficient 
attention to how gendered forms of expression betray the public ideal of an inclusive debate.  
28      Both terms are recent innovations of Russia’s foreign and domestic policy. Their meaning is 
intentionally ambiguous. 
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that they do not have a position; and, while they are quite intent on working out a position
—something to which they refer to as “ideological work” (ideologicheskaia rabota)—
these intentions do not mask their willingness to admit that no such position is currently 
available. It is this willingness to articulate a problem—rather than to offer a solution—
that gives rise to what I provisionally call “problem sociality.”
The proposed term—as well as my argument about lacking interpellation—has some 
resonance with Serguei Oushakine's work on “communities of loss.”  Oushakine argues 
that disintegration of the Soviet Union led to a near-total collapse of symbolic order. This 
argument rests on taking the state to be a guarantor of this order and emphasizes the 
significance of communist ideology for everyday life: navigating urban environment, 
burying a family member, procuring identification documents.29 The failure of the post-
soviet state to guarantee any sort of symbolic order atrophies political language and 
results in what Oushakine (2002) elsewhere terms “post-soviet aphasia.”30 According to 
him, this situation leads to: the increased importance of “transitional objects” —
fragments of life past that make the present bearable; and prompts the rise of  
“communities of loss”—forms of solidarity based on a shared sense of trauma. 
Oushakine's purposive emphasis on “community” does not seem to be accidental or 
anachronistic: he is writing about groups that could be described as hostile to strangers. 
Unlike Oushakine, I am not writing about groups hostile to strangers. In fact, my very 
ability to conduct extensive fieldwork with these organizations rested on their openness. 
As the subsequent chapters make clear, this openness should not be confused either with 
friendliness or inclusiveness.  My informants were not even friendly with or inclusive of 
each other: both organizations where I worked were marked by personal antagonisms. 
However, my informants were all deeply invested in having an organizational following, 
in recruiting what they referred to as “adequate people.”  Furthermore, unlike Oushakine, 
I am not writing about a lack of symbolic order: my informants lived in the world marked 
by tensions among various forms of symbolic order. Even though they could not be 
located in this field—either as “national minorities” or “Russian compatriots”; either as 
party-subsidiaries or social activists—they did not find its topography disorienting. 
Rather, they perceived it as producing an inevitable series of dead ends which they sought 
to avoid.  They did not organize based on a shared experience of traumatic loss. And, 
while they drew on various aspects of Soviet experience they did so less in an attempt to 
tether themselves to an anchor (e.g., to solve the problem of symbolic classification) then 
29     This resonates with recent historiogrpahy of the Soviet Union; for example, Kotkin's (2005) argument 
that even though the Communist Revolution was staged in the name of the proletariat, Soviet Russia did 
not have its own proletariat (since it was not industrialized). Kotkin interprets Stalinism as a civilizing 
process which, among other things, taught Soviet citizens “how to speak Bolshevik.” Following 
Althusser's (1971) emphasis on an eminently practical and embodied nature of ideology and Foucault's 
1979 move from ideology to knowledge/power, Kotkin  emphasizes the productive aspect of Soviet 
rule. Incidentally, it is important to note that Oushakine puts Althusser in dialogue with Lacan rather 
than Foucault; and, thus, emphasizes symbolic order rather than technology of power.  
30     Oushakine's interest in aphasia can be productively contrasted with Nancy Reis's (1996) interest in 
lament; whereas the former describes a loss of language, the latter focuses on the language of loss. 
Oushakine's diagnosis is more grave that Reis's.   
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to index their sense that it is shortsighted to think of “politics” as something that requires 
an identifiable position. 
Sites of Contention: the Russian Federation and the European Union 
The second post-Soviet decade led to an intensified elaboration of the Russian question. 
This elaboration resulted from a growing tension between the European Union and the 
Russian Federation; as well as from the growth of Latvia’s Russian activism.  Three 
issues became central: status, culture, and language.
In 2004, the Baltic republics became the first post-Soviet members of NATO and the 
European Union.31 The Russian government took this as an offense to  its attempt to 
maintain influence across the former Soviet states—referred to as “the near abroad” 
(blizhnee zarubezh'e).32  In its foreign policy, the Russian Federation increasingly 
positioned itself as a guarantor of peace in the former Soviet republics33 as well as the 
supporter of those who suffered in the hands of the new political elites.  The latter 
position had particular relevance in Estonia and Latvia, given their disenfranchised 
Russian populations. The Russian government advocated on behalf of these populations 
in various EU institutions, threatened and/or implemented economic sanctions,34 and 
supported social activism through various institutional channels. 
The two channels that exert most influence today are the Russian compatriot program and 
the Russian World Foundation. Concepts at the center of both initiatives—i.e., concepts 
of “compatriots” (sootechestvenniki) and “the Russian World” (russkii mir)—seek to 
address and provide some collective and institutional basis for Russians living outside the 
Russian Federation. However, they invariably draw upon and attempts to legitimize a 
dominant position of Russians in contemporary Russian Federation and the Soviet Union. 
The category of “compatriots” does this by casting Russians as a state-bearing or a “state-
founding” nation (gosudarstvo-obrazuushchaia natsia)—something which reasserts the 
importance of multi-ethnic or multi-national or federated political structure; and, at the 
same time, explains or calls for Russian political leadership.  The category of “the 
31      The Baltics joined several post-socialist states (all of which were under the Soviet zone of influence 
during the Cold War): the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.  The Czech 
Republic and Poland joined NATO in 1997. 
32      The tension between the EU and the Russian Federation reached an apogee in early 2005 over 
elections in Ukraine: when Viktor Yanukovich, a pro-Russian candidate in presidential elections, had to 
give up his pretensions to the highest office in favor of Viktor Yushchenko, a pro-Western presidential 
candidate (who managed to survive a dioxin poisoning). Ukraine was not the first non-Baltic post-
Soviet republic which sought to ally itself with the European Union. In 2003, a very similar situation 
unfolded in Georgia when pro-Russian Eduard Shevarnadze was replaced by Mikheil Saakashvili who 
promised to seek membership in the EU.
33      Given post-Soviet patterns of violence, this meant Russia's willingness to partake in ethnic politics 
within a particular nation-state. This was dramatically illustrated in the August of 2009, when Russian 
troops entered Georgia in order to protect Georgia's Ossetians. 
34      It is suspected that the Russian government promoted cyber-terrorist attacks against Estonia in April 
2007, following massive arrests of Russian activists who protested the decision to desecrate / relocate 
the remains of Soviet soldiers who died during WWII. 
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Russian World” does this by casting Russian “culture” as something that has world-wide 
relevance: i.e., as something that is significant precisely because its not particular to 
“Russians,” and especially Russians living in Russia; and, at the same time, calls for the 
patronage of Russian cultural industry. 
  
Policy makers from the European Union attended to Latvia’s Russian question no less 
than their colleagues from the Russian Federation. Highly critical of Russia’s attempt to 
get Latvia’s Russian to identify as compatriots and / or pursue recognition as a state-
founding nation, European policy-makers promoted the status of “national minorities” 
and by pledged to protect minority rights, including the right to enjoy one’s culture.   
However, policy-makers in the EU approached culture more as a set of traditions specific 
to a circumscribed place within a particular nation-state. This approach to “culture” 
reflected the policy-makers’ attempt to discourage regionalist secession.  
By the 2000s, EU minority rights policies came to focus on “participation.”  This focus 
reflected a growing recognition that Europe’s minority populations were being consigned 
to the private sphere; whereas they sought to participate in public life. According to 
Kymlicka (2005:211), it reflected the recognition of the “political dimension of minority 
aspirations.”35  This led to a growing availability of various funds. However, these funds 
were not accessible to political parties. Electoral politics was considered to be too much 
of a domestic issue; and explicit support of a political party—interference with national 
sovereignty.36  
The third issue central to formulations of Latvia’s Russian question revolved around 
language.  In 1998, the Latvian parliament initiated the education reform which, to quote 
my interlocutors, sought to “Latvianize Russian schools.” For the most part, these schools 
had Russian teachers who did not speak Latvian fluently. However, according to the 
minority education reform, which was to take effect in 2004, they would have to begin 
35      I turn to Kymlicka because of his emphasis on specifically political dimension of national minority 
rights.  Kymlicka’s contribution appears in a collected volume titled Ethnic Politics after Communism 
(Barany and Moser 2005). Like much work on ethnic politics and nationalism in Eastern Europe, the 
volume makes it a point to investigate  contingency of “ethnicity.” For example, David Laitin argues 
that, in some contexts, ethnic identity is a consequence of habitually accumulating different cultural 
repertories rather than consciously identifying with one culture; Zoltan Barany points to the 
contingency of of ethnic mobilization on a series of factors (e.g. organizational capacity, financial 
resources, communications, etc); Robert Moser attempts to explain why, in some multi-ethnic states, 
ethnicity is not politicized, yet in others it is etc. Indeed, not one of the volume’s contributors can be 
charged with reifying ethnicity.  Even though attentive to “ethnicity” as a category of analysis and 
practice, the volume’s contributors are not particularly attentive to “politics.” Yet, as my turn 
Kymlicka’s may have already illustrated, “politics” remains an important category for all.  Sometimes, 
“politics” denotes “electoral politics” (and invites questions of political programs, etc); sometimes, 
“mass politics” (and invites questions of legitimation and image, etc.); sometimes “public life” (and 
invites questions of inter-ethnic cooperation, etc.).
36      This critique of participation discourse is quite unusual. European policy is often blamed for 
dismissing particular forms of engagement as “apathy” (Greenberg 2010); or, alternatively, failing to 
understand the relationship between politics of aesthetics which seems to be of a particular relevance in 
post-socialist states (Buck-Morss 2000, Yurchak 2008).  
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teaching their disciplines in Latvian. As the reform was about to take effect, massive 
protests took place. During the protests, the organizers called upon school students to 
come out onto the streets. Furthermore, the organizers recruited students for various 
leadership positions within their organizations.
Terms and Questions 
Aspiring politicians’ discussions of “what is to be done” revolves around three clusters of 
questions.  The first had to do with naming—organizations, conferences, events, etc. 
Here, I attend to how aspiring politicians argue about: (a) why it may be unwise  to 
explicate ethnicity (e.g., why it may be better to call one’s organization “The Way 
Forward” rather than “The Russian Youth Alliance”); (b) what are the advantages and 
disadvantages of having a name that’s a cognate in Latvian, Russian, and English (e.g., 
“The Loyalists”) or using an English word that cannot be easily translated into Russian or 
Latvian (e.g., “empowerment”); (c) whether it’s appropriate to use latin alphabet in a 
cyrillic text; and, relatedly, whether to use Latvian naming conventions when composing 
a text for the Russian audience (e.g., whether a surname that appears as “Ivanovs” in 
Latvian should be transliterated letter-for-letter into cyrillic or, instead, reverted back to 
its Russian original which wouldn’t have an “s”). 
Another cluster of questions concerns identification. Here, I attend to how aspiring 
politicians argue about: (a) advantages and disadvantages of registering their organization 
on the Latvian registry of “ethnic minority” organizations and/or partaking in the 
Association of Russian Compatriot Organizations sponsored by the Russian Federation;  
(b) appropriateness of listing one’s ethnic nationality (tautiba / natsional’nost’) in their 
Latvian passports even though this is no longer required by law;  (c) appropriateness of 
listing one’s ethnic nationality on voter information cards if they run in elections; (d) 
answering questions, in Latvia, Russia and abroad (in Latvian, Russian, and, typically 
English), about their background. 
The third cluster of questions concerns public events. Here, I attend to how aspiring 
politicians: (a) partake in major holidays (e.g., Midsummer, Independence Day, Victory 
Day, etc.); (b) participate in more mundane forms of public programming (e.g., public 
lectures, other organizations’ events, academic and activist conferences, party congresses, 
etc); and (c) develop their own organizational programming (clubs, demonstrations, 
debates, lectures, conferences, youth outreach, etc.). 
It is possible to dismiss aspiring politicians’ discussions for a variety of reasons: 
remoteness from party politics and daily life; lack of a scholarly apparatus; and, perhaps 
most importantly, an inevitable failure to delineate and commit to a specific position.37  
37       One group of my informants established “an ideological division” within their organization. The 
goal of this division was to produce an “ideology” (ideologia)—a statement of the organization's 
members worldview as well as goals and aims based on that worldview. After several months of work, a 
statement was indeed produced. However, it did not gather support sufficient support among the general 
membership in order to become publicized / circulated.
22
However, it is precisely these discussions' openness—their attempt not to reproduce 
widely available positions—that attracts young people.  
3. STRUCTURE OF ARGUMENT 
I develop my argument in three chapters.  At the center of each chapter is an encounter 
between several youth organizations. Two of them appear in every chapter. One is called 
Loyalisty (the Loyalists); another one—Gumanisty (the Humanists). The third 
organization is different from chapter to chapter: in CHAPTER II, it is the Lithuanian 
Alliance of Russian Youth; in CHAPTER III, it is the youth steering committee of Latvia's 
Russian Compatriot Organizations Union; in CHAPTER IV, it is Klassika (the Classicists). 
All of the encounters are spurred by the diagnosis of the present moment as marked by 
factionalism and nationalism; and a call to promote unity among Russians in order to 
ensure harmony between Russians and Latvians (i.e., to end factionalism in order to 
overcome nationalism).  Each chapter deals with how representatives of various youth 
organizations attempt to find consensus on three issues which frame public discussions of 
Latvia's Russians: status (CHAPTER II), language (CHAPTER III), and culture (CHAPTER IV). 
CHAPTER II focuses on the pursuit of unity in the name of a shared Russian “identity” 
(identichnost'). CHAPTER III focuses on the pursuit of unity in the name of a shared 
investment in Russian language as a site of “value” (tsennost').  CHAPTER IV focuses on 
the pursuit of unity in the name of a shared understanding that cultural production 
constitutes a foundation aspect of public life. 38
Every chapter analyzes how the search for a common ground (re-)produces certain fault-
lines. CHAPTER II describes the tension between actors who argue that Russians are 
Latvia's ethnic minority and actors who argue that Russians are Latvia's co-constitutive 
nation. CHAPTER III describes the conflict between actors who argue that Russian 
language is an untapped economic resource and actors who argue that Russian language 
is a guarantor of one's moral values. CHAPTER IV describes the opposition between actors 
who argue that there is something specific about Latvia's Russian culture and actors who 
deny this specificity and take Russian culture as a global force which transcends state 
boundaries. These arguments are not limited to a narrow circle of intellectuals.  They are 
informed and supported by policy-makers from the European Union and the Russian 
Federation; in the former case—operating under the aegis of youth programs specific to 
the recent signatories of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities; in the latter case—operating under the aegis of programs for Russian 
compatriots who living in the post-Soviet states.
Every chapter analyzes how actors escape these fault-lines by drawing on various Soviet 
38        I place “identity” in quotation marks in order to emphasize the novelty of this term and to 
distinguish between between identihnost' (identity) and lichnost' (personality). I place “cultural” in 
quotation marks in order: (i) to suggest that the meaning of “culture” (which ought to be distinguished 
from its importance) is an object of much contention; and (ii) to suggest that the category of “culture” 
has a particular, and unique, importance in much of Central and Eastern Europe.  
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practices. CHAPTER II describes how some actors challenge the prevailing form of identity 
politics by approaching ethnicity as something that ought to be “kept on one's person,” 
and accounted for in a particular social situation, rather than something that can be 
claimed by a particular individual. CHAPTER III describes how some actors challenge the 
prevailing form of language ideology by approaching language as a force that structures 
political consciousness rather than as a site of moral or economic value. CHAPTER IV 
describes how some actors challenge the prevailing form of cultural politics by lending 
their support to public events emphasizing intellectual competition rather than displaying 
aesthetic competence. These challenges do not emerge from a scholarly debate; rather, 
they are implicit in reproduction of particular Soviet forms: in CHAPTER II—certain 
aspects of the Soviet nationality policy; in CHAPTER III—certain aspects of the Soviet 
concern with political education; in CHAPTER IV—late-Soviet trivia competitions and 
festivals of humor and satire. 
Actors who support or partake in the reproduction of these forms are not “united” in a 
recognizable way.  Their turn to particular Soviet forms is not a consequence of a shared 
nostalgia for days gone by. These forms enable aspiring politicians to approach difference 
as a force which constitutes the field of action sometimes qualified as “political.” This 
approach is unique: activists supported by Russian and European policy-makers approach 
difference and politics as mutually exclusive. Some take politics as a force that destroys 
difference (and, to give an example that will be elaborated in CHAPTER III, argue that the 
Latvian state is assimilating its Russian population because it does not do enough to 
support Russian schools).  Others take difference as a force that destroys politics (and, to 
give another example from CHAPTER III, argue that Russian narcissism of minor 
differences—the activists' inability to reach a compromise—leads to impotence).  Yet 
both take difference as a collective property: as something primarily characteristic of 
groups. 
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CHAPTER II
Looking for Politika 
“Ethnic politics” and “nationalism” continue to be dominant heuristics for analyzing 
collective action in Eastern and Central Europe (e.g. Csergo 2007; Hayden 2007; Wanner 
1998). These heuristics suggest that political alliances are based on a shared commitment
—either ideological or instrumental—to the maintenance or cultivation of ethnic 
difference. In academic and popular discourse alike, this commitment is often contrasted 
with “civic” activism, assumed to be more broad, inclusive, and democratic than its 
“ethnic” counter part.   (e.g. Kymlicka 1995; c.f. Canovan 1996; Miller 1996; Tamir 
1993) Even though the distinction between “ethnic” and “civic” activism has been 
criticized (e.g. Brubaker 1996, 1998; Dzenovska 2009, 2010), the concepts of “ethnic 
politics” and “nationalism” continue to exert a broad appeal. In what follows, I question 
this appeal by analyzing arguments between leaders of political organizations often 
glossed as “ethnic” and “nationalistic” by outside observers. In particular, I study these 
leaders’ arguments—made over and against these outside observers—that their alliances 
are based on a shared commitment to what they call politika  rather than a shared sense of 
ethnic identity.  
My study takes place in Latvia—a former soviet republic which underwent the most 
dramatic shift in its ethnic composition of any post-Soviet or Eastern European country.1  
As a result of wars, deportations, and Soviet demographic policies, on the eve of Latvia's 
independence from the Soviet Union, Russians accounted for 50% of Latvia's population.
When Latvian independence was regained in 1991, most of these Russians were not 
enfranchised. In several years, they were given the status of “noncitizens.” 
“Noncitizenship” was meant to be an intermediary stage between a complete lack of 
citizenship and full citizenship which would follow naturalization. However, most 
noncitizens did not naturalize since they felt that citizenship was theirs by right. Since 
then, popular and academic analyses of Latvian politics have analyzed Latvian political 
landscape in terms of the standoff between “Russians” and “Latvians.” This standoff is 
said to be particularly characteristic of Latvian electoral politics with ethnic Russians 
1 Before Latvia achieved national independence (declared in 1918, recognized in 1921), it was a 
part of The Russian Empire between 1710 and 1918. Russia made its first attempt to gain access to the 
eastern shores of the Baltic in the XVI c., after Ivan IV proclaimed The Grand Duchy of Muscovy to be 
a Tsardom and had himself crowned as a tsar (a Slavic cognate of “caesar”). Ivan initiated a series of 
expansionist campaigns not least of which attempted to gain control of the Baltic shores. The Livonian 
Wars (1558-1583), which followed the disintegration of the Livonian Confederation, which included the 
modern-day territories of Latvia and Estonia, were fought between Russia, The Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth and Sweden. Russia lost. The North-Western part of Livonia went to Sweden; the 
South-Eastern part – to The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Neither Sweden nor The Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth displaced Livonian nobility: Baltic German descendants of Teutonic 
Knights who conquered the eastern Baltic in the 12th century. Russia did not gain access to the Baltic 
Sea until Peter The Great's involvement in The Great Northern War (1700-1712). As a result of the war, 
Sweden lost territories spanning modern-day Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Western Russia. (For 
historical analyses see: Eglitis 2005; Kurlovičs and Tomašuns 2005; Nollendorfs 2002; Misiunas and 
Taagepera 1995; Ryzhakova 2010.)
25
voting for “Russian parties” and ethnic Latvians voting for “Latvian parties” (E.g. 
Bogushevitch and Dimitrov 2010; Galbreath 2003; Ijabs 2006, Muižnieks 2006; Schmid 
2008.)
Yet, not long after I began fieldwork in Latvia in 2009, my assumptions about ethnic 
bases of political organization were challenged.  Whenever I said that I studied “Russian 
youth political organizations,” my interlocutors—members of these organizations—
would often tell me that what I thought I was studying did not and could not exist. Their 
organizations, they insisted, were “social-political” (obshchestvenno-politicheskie) rather 
than “Russian.” Their appeal to politika (politics) over Russianness seemed paradoxical. 
If it were addressed to the Latvian audience, then it could have been interpreted as an 
attempt to create a “civic nation” by relegating “ethnicity” into the private, or the “non-
political,” sphere. Instead, this appeal was addressed to people who, supposedly, were 
already politically organized based on their ethnic identity. 
 
Grappling with this paradox in the chapter that follows, I show how youth activists' 
appeal to politika results from a lack of consensus—among “Russians” themselves—as to 
the diacritical factors that can be used to maintain difference between “Russians” and 
“Latvians.”  Political activists glossed as “Russian” by external observers often do not 
recognize each other as Russian.  For some activists, Russianness is a matter of kul'tura 
(culture)—a set of practices which, in English, would go under the sign of “high culture.”  
For other activists, Russianness is a matter of natsional'nost' (nationality)—a familial 
genealogy in need of constant accounting.  Yet for others, Russianness is a matter of 
having an ethnic minority status—a recognition of certain rights predicated on ties to 
one's  place of origin.  
Many political activists find kul'tura, natsional'nost' and ethnic minority to be 
incommensurable with each other. Yet, however incommensurable, the first two 
understandings of Russianness, the ones that evolve around the concepts of kul'tura and 
natsional'nost', share a dynamic view of a political subject: a subject who, instead of 
remedying a wrong, attempts to create a world anew. Hence, organizational actors who 
are committed to these two concepts—and who, insofar as these concepts are perceived 
to be incommensurable, cannot ally based on a shared sense of Russianness—may ally 
based on a shared commitment to what they call politika (politics).
Factions and Brooms 
In June 2009, a joint committee of Latvia’s Russian organizations hosted a conference. 
The main goal of the conference was to discuss conditions that would favor 
“consolidation” of Latvia's Russian organizations2.  The conference began with an 
2 The split between Russian NGOs was mirrored by the split between Russian political parties. 
During my fieldwork, these parties were organized into two blocks: The Harmony Center (THC)and 
For Human Rights in United Latvia (FHRUL).  I heard two accounts of how the Russian vote came to 
be “split” between these blocks; here, I present both (yet primarily for contextual considerations; I am 
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address from the Russian ambassador who rather unexpectedly began his speech by 
forcefully and vigorously chastising the organizers.  He wondered aloud how they could 
not know that there was another group of Russian organizations conducting another 
conference on the very same day?  How could one hope for “consolidation,” he asked, if 
people could not even coordinate their schedules?  How could these organizations 
achieve any goals if factionalism was this rampant?  Why could not all the Russian youth 
in Latvia remember their shared origins?
Several days after the ambassador’s talk, an acquaintance offered an allegorical account 
of Russian factionalism.  “There is a father who calls up his sons to his deathbed,” he 
began. “He asks them to bring two brooms – you know, the old kind, with handles made 
of tree branches which are tied together.  He unties one broomstick and breaks all the 
branches—one by one, for maximum effect.  Then, he takes the other broom and tries to 
break it.  Of course he can't: when the branches are tied together, the broom is 
unbreakable.”  The point of the fable was not difficult to see. Unity, conceived in the 
idiom of kinship, was a guarantee of strength.  The fable illustrated an assumption that, 
insofar as they were Russian, Russian organizations had to be united.3
The two Russian organizations with which I did my fieldwork seemed to embody the 
proverbial sons.   The Humanists, according to their articles of incorporation, were 
dedicated to promoting humanistic education.  The Loyalists  according to their  articles 
of incorporation, were dedicated to promoting civic engagement of youth.  Despite these 
hesitant to give credence to either one). The first story emphasizes the tension between two popular-
front organizations during perestroika: “The People's Front” and “The International front.” The People's 
Front supported Latvian independence, and consisted of Latvians and Russians. The International Front 
did not support Latvian independence, but, purportedly, sought grater republican autonomy and a new 
agreement among Soviet republics; its members were ethnic Russians and Latvian communists. 
Following the restoration ofLatvian independence, activists of the People's Front's, who felt betrayed by 
their Latvian colleagues' decision to limit electoral franchise, formed their own parties, which, in due 
time, coalesced into THC.  Activists of the International Front, still filled with animosity towards the 
activists of the People's Front (and blaming them no less for Russians' disenfranchisement than Latvian 
independence activists), formed their own parties which eventually congealed into FHRUL.  
The second story emphasizes the tension between Russian NGO activists and Russian party 
apparatchiks.  The apparatchiks, this story goes, kept quiet during perestroika, trying to figure out how 
the dice would roll. Meanwhile, Russian activists, alarmed by the rise of Latvian nationalism, founded 
The International Front. According to this story, the International Front supported internationalism 
rather than communism.  Following the restoration of Latvian independence, activists of the 
International Front found themselves out of favor with the new political elite; and founded a variety of 
political parties which eventually congealed into FHRUL which fought on behalf of Russians who 
found their political and civil rights curtailed.  Meanwhile, Russian apparatchiks, anxious to exploit new 
material opportunities, formed their own parties which eventually congealed into THC. Insofar as their 
primary goal was personal enrichment, Russian political and civil rights were never their priority.
3 The Russian source is Lev Tolstoy’s 1875 translation of Aesop’s fable “The Father and His Sons.” 
Tolstoy made this translation for a textbook designed to teach peasant children how to read. Tolstoy's 
book has never been out of print—hence the poetic reference.  The English source is George 
Townsend's 1867 translation of Aesop’s fable; but In Townsend’s translation, branches are “sticks” and 
brooms are “faggots.”
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seemingly similar objectives, the two organizations had a very uneasy relationship. 
Leaders of one organization thought poorly of leaders of the other organization; only a 
handful of the Loyalists members visited events that the Humanists organized (e.g. 
training seminars, discussion clubs); and  almost no one from outside the Loyalist 
organization visited events that the Loyalists organized (e.g. field-trips, demonstrations, 
volunteer projects).
 
My key interlocutor among the Loyalists was Pavel. When I met him at a public lecture 
and shared my research interests, he immediately congratulated me on my good luck.  
Dressed in a green cotton cardigan, light brown khakis and greying black shoes (he wore 
this outfit for most of our three-year acquaintance), he explained that no one could speak 
as thoroughly and as interestingly about youth politics as he could. Even though he was 
still working at a bank, he had his heart set on going into politics; this is why he joined 
the Loyalists. Politics was the only true source of power, he explained. When I asked 
about his career at the bank, he responded that even the weakest government could bring 
down the strongest business. If I did not know that already, I had to read The Prince as 
quickly as possible; as for him, he had a copy next to his bed. 
My key interlocutor among the Humanists was Kristina. Several years older that Pavel, 
she was in many ways his opposite. With a penchant for knit mittens and vintage hats, she 
was always immaculately, if anachronistically, dressed. She founded the Humanists 
primarily to promote Russian education in Latvia.  She was educated in Latvia and 
Germany; in addition to Russian, Latvian, and German, she spoke fluent English and was 
learning french. Having graduated with a degree in law, she argued before the Latvian 
supreme court before she turned thirty. She became interested in electoral politics once 
she realized that jurisprudence was not what people hoped it would be—even in a EU 
state like Latvia. Not fond of Machiavelli, she frequently repeated that there was nothing 
as depressing as having political power without knowing what to do with it. 
What's the name of the game?
Several months after the ambassador’s address, I participated in the event which made me 
question the salience of ethnicity as a basis of organizational alliances. The event was a 
meeting between three organizations: the Loyalists, the Humanists, and the Lithuanian 
Russian Youth League. The League received a large grant from a European funder to 
organize a “Forum for the Empowerment of Ethnic Minority NGOs in the Baltic 
Region.” Since all three Baltic states were involved (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), the 
League needed to build an inter-organizational network. The head of the League, a 
twenty-year old Justinas, met Kristina, the head of the Humanists, at an international 
conference several years prior; and asked her if the Humanists would be willing to 
participate. When she answered in the affirmative, Justinas asked her to invite another 
“Russian organization” from Latvia to their joint meeting: so that they could plan the 
events of the forum. Kristina invited Pavel.
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On a rainy October afternoon Justinas drove from Vilnius to Riga.  Although the purpose 
of the meeting was to discuss the program for the forum, most of the conversation 
revolved around the forum’s title. Justinas wanted to keep the same title that the League 
used in their project proposal: “Forum for The Empowerment of Ethnic Minority Youth 
NGOs in The Baltic States.” Kristina and Pavel vehemently disagreed with him. “There 
were no ‘ethnic organizations’ in Latvia,” Pavel insisted. Dumfounded, Justinas asked if 
the government maintained a registry of ethnic minority organizations. When Kristina 
answered in the affirmative, Justinas asked why she couldn't personally invite participants 
using the registry. Kristina explained that this would not help: almost nobody was on the 
registry. Growing surprised, Justinas asked whether the Loyalists and the Humanists were 
on it. Both Pavel and Kristina responded with a resolute “no.”  They did not indicate 
“Russianness” in their articles of incorporation—something one needed to do in order to 
be listed on the registry. Justinas protested, saying that he knew for certain that there were 
Russians in Riga who were “political” and had to be on the registry. With an added note 
of gravitas in her voice, Kristina asked Justinas what he meant by politika.  Before 
Justinas got a chance to answer, Pavel interjected once again. There was no way, he said, 
that any organization listed on the registry had anything to do with politika.   
On that rainy afternoon, Justinas, Kristina and Pavel did not manage to reach an 
agreement. However, this was the first time that I witnessed Kristina and Pavel adopt a 
shared position.  Didn’t this  show that, at times, consolidation of Latvia’s Russian 
organizations was indeed possible? That, when an antagonist entered the picture, 
organizations would unite?  Perhaps, the Loyalists and the Humanists remembered their 
Tolstoy after all, and knew when to tie their disparate branches into one broom?
I found it curious that Kristina and Pavel argued that the problem with organizing based 
on the ethnic minority status was “the lack of politika.”  I had never heard this argument 
before. What I had heard was that the problem with the ethnic minority status was that 
Russians did not “identify” with it.4 This seemed to be true.  On two occasions, I was a 
party to fairly dramatic instances of dis-identification.  The first was in the summer of 
2008, during Latvia's Song and Dance Festival. The festival lasted a week; one day was 
declared to be an “ethnic minority” day. Yet, the only Russians that I saw were the ones 
on the stage; in the audience, I heard only Latvian.  When I asked a self-identified 
4 For a scholarly analysis of the contingency of the “ethnic minority” form, see Jennifer Jackson-
Price (1997). The question of “minorities” appeared concomitantly with the emergence of sovereign 
territorial states in the 17th century and the new international order established at The Congress of 
Westphalia in 1648. Its most immediate context was the doctrine of cuius regio, eius religio which 
maintained an identity between the religion of the sovereign and the religion of his subjects. Following 
the territorial redistribution in the wake of The Thirty Years War (1618-1648), the sovereign, at his 
discretion, could grant the freedom of religion to his new subjects. N other words, what was at stake in 
emergence of “minorities” was a sovereign gesture of goodwill.  Once “the people” replaced “the 
prince” as the locus of sovereignty, “natural right” replaced “goodwill.” The “nation” displaced 
“religion” as the politically salient category by time of The Congress of Vienna (1815). Furthermore, 
the emergence of “great power” politics – particularly after Napoleonic Wars and The Congress of 
Berlin (1878) – resulted in international treaties' minority clauses becoming preconditions of 
membership in the new international order. 
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Russian acquaintance why she did not attend the ethnic minority day, she responded that 
she did not like Roma choirs: it did not occur to her that most of the performers on the 
ethnic minority day actually were Russian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian. The second 
instance of such dis-identification happened during my extended fieldwork when, during 
the Loyalists' meeting, Pavel referred to “ethnic minority” schools. A girl sitting in the 
room asked, in all seriousness,what these schools were. When Pavel answered, “Russian 
schools,” she asked, without a note of jest or irony  in her voice, whether or not this 
meant that she was an ethnic minority. 
However, if Kristina and Pavel wanted to argue that the problem with the ethnic minority 
status was that “Latvia's Russians did not identify with it,” they would have to explain 
Justinas how “Latvia's Russians” self-identify.  From their previous experience with each 
other, they knew that they could not provide the same answer to this question. This had to 
do less with the fact that they did not have any empirical data than with the fact that they 
each held very passionate views as to how Latvia's Russians should identify and, more 
generally, as to what “Russianness” was.  
Kristina and the Humanists argued that Russianness was a matter of kul'tura, an ideal that 
could only be achieved and cultivated through various practices identified as cultural and 
dissociated from the conception of nativity and ethnic ancestry: education, conduct, 
morality, etc.  Insofar as they placed a great emphasis on personal cultivation, the 
Humanists did not think that Russianness was a matter of genealogical descent; rather, it 
was a question of cultural achievement. People among the Humanists cared deeply about 
this ideal; once, I saw a girl break down in tears because she felt that everyone around her 
had more kul'tura.
One was Russian insofar as one accomplished something—a point the Humanists 
illustrated by talking about the famous poet Osip Mandelstam. Mandelstam, I was told, 
was a Russian (russkii) poet despite the fact that according to the Soviet system of 
registered nationalities, Mandelstam was a Jew.  However, to say that Mandelstam was a 
“Russian (russkii) poet of Jewish origin” would sound anti-Semitic; and to say that 
Mandelstam was a “Russian” would be, strictly speaking, incorrect. In other words, all 
you could say was “Mandelstam was a Russian poet.”  Furthermore, kul'tura was not 
something that one could achieve once and for all; it had to be maintained.  On several 
occasions I heard people express dismay at not having time to read, go to the theater, 
learn a language, etc., and say that they have grown feral (odichali).
In contrast, as far as Pavel, and a good portion of the Loyalists, were concerned, 
“Russianness” was a matter of natsional’nost: genealogical descent. In the Soviet period, 
natsional'nost' was registered in a number of documents. However, this registration was 
characterized by several discrepancies. In particular, there was a discrepancy in the way 
in which natsional'nost' was indicated in one's birth certificate (issued at birth) and one's 
passport (issued upon reaching 16). The birth certificate indicated natsional'nost' of the 
newborn as well as natsional'nost' of his or her parents; when the parents were not of the 
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same nationality, they had to chose one for the child.5  Unlike the birth certificate, the 
passport indicated only natsional'nost' of the passport-holder; it did not have a record of 
familial descent. As far as some of the Loyalists were concerned, passports were not 
documents one could trust. Yulia, one of the organization's leaders once told me, “People 
say ‘I’m Russian,’ or ‘I’m Latvian’ or ‘I’m a Jew’ and then they add, ‘It’s written in my 
passport. Well, things are written on the fence as well. It doesn’t mean they are true.”   
Furthermore, Yulia argued that nobody had a pure natsional'nost'; people were mixed and 
had to own up to it and to account for their lineage in fractions; to say that one was  ½ of 
this, ¼ of that, and a ¼ of something else.   If people were not willing to enumerate their 
lineage, then they had an option of keeping their natsional'nost' “nearby” (pri sebe). One 
of Pavel's favorite pieces of advice would be to “approach Russianness like one approach 
Orthodoxy.” Just as one had to wear one's crucifix near one's body, one had to keep one's 
ethnic nationality “near oneself.” 6
Yet, however different, both kul'tura and natsional'nost' rested on a dynamic sense of 
personhood. The self-cultivating person of kul'tura was future-oriented; the self-
accounting person of natsional'nost' was past-oriented. In contrast, the concept of “an 
ethnic minority” implied a static person, oriented around oneself.  Both the Humanists 
and the Loyalists characterized people promoting Russianness based around the ethnic 
minority status as “assuming a pose” and “beating themselves on the chest.” These 
people were not interested in envisioning the future or respecting the past; rather, they 
were too busy “pumping rights”: seeking remedies against nationality policy which, they 
felt, had hurt them. These people were stuck in obida, an sense of hurt, injury and insult, 
which was the very opposite of politika.  One of the Humanists' and the Loyalists' 
favorite proverbs was “The ones who hurt are made to haul water” (na obizhennyh vodu 
voziat').  For members of both organizations, showing obida was an invitation for further 
marginalization rather than a way to be involved in politika. 
Kristina and Pavel's claim of politika as a basis of their alliance was not purely rhetorical. 
On the one hand, this claim rested on prior knowledge of each other's notions of  
Russianness; as well as an understanding of kul'tura and natsional'nost' as 
incommensurable. On the other hand, this claim rested on privileging a dynamic sense of 
5 The decision which nationality to register could be influenced by personal convictions and 
perceived  opportunities. A Ukrainian mother and a Russian father, both of whom were factory 
workers, may not have cared one way or another how their child was registered. A Russian mother and 
a Jewish father may have wanted their child to be registered as Russian to limit the chances of possible 
discrimination. A Latvian father, who worked in the party apparatus as one of the “national cadres,” 
and a Russian mother may have wanted to register their child as Latvian (even if they did not speak 
Latvian at home). Upon coming of age, the child could request to change her nationality to match the 
nationality of the other parent. This said, along with the passport – received on one's 16th birthday – 
one continued to use one's birth certificate (which, to repeat, had parents' nationalities) at various 
points of one's life.
6 The Orthodox tradition maintains that the personal crucifix needs to be worn underneath one's 
shirt, right next to one's body. Pavel's point reflects a widely propagated message of the 1990s during 
which, according to the representatives of the Church, crucifixes – worn on the outside – were worn for 
show (na pokaz).
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personhood, and a desire to move beyond obida. There was, however, an additional 
dimension to politika: the question of electoral politics.  
Politika versus Politikanstvo  
Those self-identified Russians who could trace their ancestry to independent Latvia 
(1920-1940) were automatically enfranchised and were eligible to run for office as well 
as to vote.  Consequently, self-identified Russian politicians have been in the Latvian 
parliament since 1991, even though their number was not proportional to the number of 
Russian residents in Latvia (since most of these residents did not have the right to vote). 
However, as far as Pavel and Kristina were concerned, “proportional representation” was 
not the main issue. For them, as well as for the members of the Humanists and the 
Loyalists who aimed to have a political career, the main issue was the capacity of Russian 
politicians to be a part of a governing coalition (i.e., a cabinet of ministers headed by the 
prime minister). 
The emphasis on “coalition,” which emerged around 2008, contrasted sharply with the 
emphasis on “integration,” which has been a  staple of Latvian political discourse since 
1998. The question of “coalition” was limited to the conversations about electoral politics 
and the formation of the ministerial cabinet. These conversations were very focused: they 
concerned the electorate, strategies of particular parties, behavior of specific politicians, 
etc.  In contrast, the question of “integration” was far more expansive: it concerned state 
and society at large. Conversations about integration aimed to address the relationship 
between Latvians and Russians, the rivalry between Russian parties and Latvian parties, 
the organization of public space, etc. Furthermore, it was the idiom of “integration” 
which rested on the division of the Latvian population into “minorities” and “majorities.”  
In fact, the Program for the Integration of Society in Latvia went into effect shortly after 
Latvia signed the Framework Convention on Ethnic Minority Rights and began talks 
about joining the European Union. 
Insofar as the Loyalists and the Humanists were concerned, Russian politicians who 
understood Russianness to be a matter of ethnic minority status; who emphasized 
integration and pursued ethnic minority rights; and who sat in the parliamentary 
opposition and never aimed to become a part of the governing coalition, had nothing to 
do with politika. Instead, they were mired with politikanstvo (politicking), an 
oppositional stance emergent in the feeling of obida (hurt).  These politkany (politicos) 
were busy “pumping rights” (zaniaty kachaneim prav) rather than pursuing politika.  The 
image of the pump was derogatory: it suggested doing something purely for one's private 
benefit rather than the well-being of the entire polity.  
Politkany had a grasp on the Russian electorate because they pandered to their feeling of 
obida (hurt). Furthermore, politikany had access to media networks, public relations 
specialists, foreign capital, etc. Most importantly, politikany controlled the electoral 
ballots: they had the power to pick candidates who would run during the elections. 
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However, aspiring politicians like Pavel and Kristina —who considered themselves to be 
true politiki—felt that they had one significant advantage over politikany: they could 
convince the Latvian political elite that they could be their allies. If Pavel and Kristina 
could do this, then they could achieve what no politicians achieved before them: they 
could be invited to be members of the governing coalition. 
Concerned with “coalition” rather than “integration,” Pavel and Kristina understood the 
notion of “Latvian parties” to be an abstraction. Following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the Latvian popular front fragmented into a multitude of parties which were 
competing with each other. No single party could ever attain parliamentary majority; the 
only way to form the government was through building a coalition. While since 1991, a 
coalition never included self-Russian politicians, Pavel and Kristina, like many other 
aspiring young politicians, did not feel that this would have to be the case in the future. If 
members of a Latvian party were reasonably sure that, in the next round of elections, 
their electorate would not punish them for forming a coalition with a “Russian party,” 
then Latvian politicians could very well form such a coalition. To be reasonably sure that 
this would not happen, they had to be certain of two things. First, they had to be certain 
that their potential Russian allies were not set on fighting for minority rights; that, in 
other words, they did not promote an agenda based on “ethnic minority” status. Insofar as 
both the Humanists and the Loyalists did not subscribe to the notion of Russianness as 
based on the ethnic minority status, they satisfied the first requirement. Second, Latvian 
politicians had to be certain that their potential Russian allies were not allied based on a 
shared sense of Russianness among themselves. Insofar as the Humanists and the 
Loyalists maintained that kul'tura and natsional'nost' were incommensurable with each 
other, they satisfied the second requirement.7  As far as Pavel and Kristina were 
concerned it was only a matter of time before they would succeed where no one else had 
succeeded.  The political future was theirs.
The Future
The Humanists' and the Loyalists' aspirations for the future were challenged by more than 
the Russian electorate's feeling of obida and the Russian politicians politikanstvo. An 
equally significant challenge was posed by various European Union institutions which, as 
far as Kristina and Pavel were concerned, pandered to both obida and politikanstvo. For 
these institutions, the only legitimate form of Russianness was that of “ethnic minorities”;  
the only legitimate political objective was social integration; and the only legitimate 
activism was the pursuit of rights.  
7 During elections, the candidates are asked to fill out the questionnaire which is then made 
available to the voters. The questionnaire includes fields like age, education, income, and ethnic 
nationality (tautiba in Latvian; which is the Latvian translation of Russian natsional’nost’). When 
Kristina and Pavel ran for office, neither one indicated ethnic nationality. (In contrast, older politicians, 
Russian and Latvian alike, did.) Kristina did not indicate it because, as far as she was concerned, 
Russianness was a matter of kul'tura. Pavel did not indicate it because natsional'nost' could never be 
ascertained through self-identification on a government form. 
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Several months after meeting Justinas, Kristina told me that it was actually the 
Humanists' idea to have a forum which would bring together representatives of Russian 
organizations in the Baltic states. However, when the Humanists applied for the grant, 
their proposed title for the forum was “The Future of Russian Culture in Europe.” Insofar 
as the Humanists were based in Riga, they had to apply to the Latvian office of the EU 
granting agency in order to get money for the forum.8 They did not get the funds. When I 
heard this story, I assumed that the Humanists did not get the funds because of 
“nationalist tensions”: because “Latvian employees” of the European granting agency 
discriminated against “Russian projects.” Yet, when I made a remark revealing this 
assumption, I was immediately corrected. According to the Humanists, they did not get 
funding because of “the EU's lack of interest in projects that have to do with the future.” 
When I made a remark revealing my assumption that Justinas's organization got money 
for their project because Lithuania did not have many Russian residents, I was once again 
corrected. The League got the money because “they could translate Russian into 
European.” The comment was ironic: everyone among the Humanists spoke at least two 
languages. What this remark indexed was conceptual language, particularly the concept 
of “ethnic minorities.” Whereas the Humanists talked about “Russians,” “culture,” and 
“the future” in their project proposal, the League talked about “ethnic minorities.” 
Indeed, who would fund a project titled “The Future of Russians in Europe”?  The 
concept of Russianness embedded within it is not palatable to the funders committed to 
the values of tolerance, multiculturalism, individualism, etc.  Self-cultivation, which the 
Humanists emphasize, is a long and painstaking process. Kul’tura has a profoundly elitist 
dimension: it was not uncommon for the Humanists to talk philosophy with some people 
while relegating others  to cleaning up.  Yet, it was precisely insofar as it was elitist that 
kul'tura could never work as a basis of social organization. There could be no mass 
politics organized around understanding Russianness as a matter of kul'tura. The same 
can be said about understanding Russianness to be a matter of natsional'nost'.  Insofar as 
it is an exclusionary concept—which discriminates on the basis of descent—it cannot be 
a basis for mass politics. 
In contrast, “ethnic minority” status is far less exclusionary then kul'tura and 
natsional'nost'. Yet, it is precisely because of its more encompassing nature that it 
promotes Russianness as a basis of social organization and enables what goes under the 
sign of “ethnic politics.” In contrast to those organizations that were allied on the basis of 
seeking recognition as “ethnic minorities,” the Humanists and the Loyalist were allied not 
because of a shared sense of Russianness but because of a shared sense of political 
subjectivity.  In the context of their alliance, Russianness was a pathway for considering 
the nature of political action rather than a basis of social organization. 
Conclusion
8 Many EU granting agencies distribute funds through subdivisions located in the EU member-
states' capitals rather than through a central office in Brussels. 
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I began this chapter with the Russian ambassador's address to Latvia's “Russian” 
organizations. The ambassador decried what he understood to be these organizations' 
factionalism and urged the people whom he addressed as “Russian community leaders”  
to remember their shared origins and come together; or, to use an allegory shared by one 
of my informants, to tie their thin branches into a thick broom. 
The ambassador's appeal to consolidation based on recognition of shared origins fell on 
deaf ears. The Humanists and the Loyalists, two youth organizations representative of 
other so-called “Russian” youth organizations,  did not feel as though they had  shared 
origins. They claimed to be working with each other insofar as they had a shared 
commitment to politika (politics). This claim had merit for two reasons.  First, because 
the Humanists and the Loyalists drew on significantly disparate notions of Russianness.  
The former understood Russianness to be a matter of kul'tura and self-cultivation.  The 
latter understood Russianness to be a matter of natsional'nost' and accounting for familial 
genealogies. Insofar as both maintained that kul'tura and natsional'nost' were 
irreconcilable, members of neither organization recognized each other as “Russian.”  
Second, the claim to politika had merit because the Humanists and the Loyalists shared a 
vision of a dynamic political subject.  This became clear during Kristina and Pavel's 
meeting with Justinas, the representative of the Lithuanian Russian Youth League.  
Justinas called on Pavel and Kristina to come together under the banner of “ethnic 
minority organizations,” yet they refused.  Surprisingly, this refusal was not accompanied 
by the claim that in Latvia, Russians and Russianness have nothing to do with “ethnic 
minority” status,  even though this claim could have been easily justified, either 
empirically (by pointing to the fact that most of Latvia's self-perceived Russians did not 
identify with the category of “ethnic minorities”) or ideologically (by insisting that 
Russianness is a matter of kul'tura or natsional'nost' rather than ethnic minority status).  
Instead, both the Humanists and the Loyalists argued that the problem with understanding 
Russianness as a matter of ethnic minority status was that it promoted a political project 
revolving around a sense of obida (injury and hurt). 
Over the last two decades, Russian politicians pandered to their electorate's feelings of 
obida and engaged into a fruitless pursuit of rights. This was the reason why these 
politicians were always stuck in the parliamentary opposition. As far as the Humanists 
and the Loyalists were concerned, these politicians, politkany (politicos), had little to do 
with  politika.  People oriented towards politika had their hearts set on something other 
than just being elected into the parliament; they hoped one day to be invited to form a 
part of a governing coalition.  This hope had merit. Insofar as Kristina and Pavel 
maintained a sense of Russianness based either on kul'tura or natsional'nost', they 
satisfied those members of the Russian voting public that would vote on the ethnic 
principle. However, insofar as they maintained kul'tura and natsional'nost' to be 
irreconcilable, they could not unite based on a shared sense of Russianness. This, as well 
as their refusal to orient their political programs around the question of rights, made 
them, in their own eyes, possible candidates for a governing coalition. However, insofar 
as various EU actors promoted institutionalization of difference under the aegis of the 
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“ethnic minority status,” they threatened this possibility.
In conclusion, I want to address three concerns which may arise in light of the above 
analysis. The first arises from the very focus of my narrative: electoral politics.  Am I not 
writing about (and implicitly defending or legitimating) a position of “ethnic elites” or 
“ethnic entrepreneurs”  who seek to manipulate rather than to represent their electorate?  
Indeed, The Humanists and the Loyalists were deeply invested in the question of votes.9  
However, this investment was never hidden; instead, it was a matter of day-to-day 
conversation.  Most of my interlocutors argued that the fact that the older generation of 
politicians (i.e., politikany) pandered to the electorate's sense of obida did not make them 
“representative.”  Obida was only one dimension of Latvia's body politic; it had plenty of 
others.  As members of the Humanists and the Loyalists never tired of telling me, the only 
room in Latvia where one could find Latvians and Russians sitting on the opposite sides 
of the same room was the parliamentary chamber.10 If a new generation of politicians—
the ones committed to politika— would be invited to become a part of a governing 
coalition, then they would remedy what was seen as a dramatically non-representative 
situation in the parliament.   
Another concern that I would like to forestall deals with my informants' appeal to politika
over and against “Russianness” as a basis of their alliance.  Anthropological work on 
ethnicity suggests that, in fact, such an appeal may entrench rather than destabilize ethnic 
difference. The possibility of ethnic boundaries depends not only on arbitrarily chosen 
cultural diacritica but also on structural differentiation of institutions. While already 
present in Barth's ground-breaking essay (1969), this argument is made more explicit by 
Ronald Cohen (1978) a decade later, when he writes that the differentiation of the 
political sector “allows for culturally distinctive groups to retain their ethnic differences 
as long as they accept sovereignty of the central government.” In other words, claiming a 
specific sector or a set of institutions as “political” may strengthen rather than weaken the 
salience of ethnic identity.  The use of “politics” as a category of practice—my 
informants' constant appeal to politika—may be but an ideological ruse which, in fact, 
perpetuates ethnic difference precisely at the time when it claims politika rather than 
ethnicity to be the basis of alliance. 
My response to this concern is twofold. First, the Humanists and the Loyalists never 
argued for the differentiation of the political sector. For them, politika was not about a 
particular set of institutions. This was well illustrated by their claim that the parliament 
9 I will address this concern in greater detail when I will analyze the tension between piar (Russian 
transliteration of “Public Relations”) and ideologiia (ideology).
10 This did not mean that there were no “separate rooms” for Latvians and Russians. The most 
significant example of these “separate rooms” were Russian and Latvian schools.  This said, there were 
no rules limiting parents' choice of possible school for their child. Russian parents could easily choose a 
Latvian school and Latvian parents could choose a Russian school. While I did not hear about these 
kind of choices being made, I did repeatedly hear about “Russian” parents choosing to enroll their 
children into a Latvian kindergarten and “Latvian” parents choosing to enroll their children into a 
Russian kindergarten to “lay the foundations” for future language proficiency.  
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was not a space for politika because it bred opposition. Rather, politika was about a 
certain attitude to life; an attitude which was not based on obida. Further, politika was 
about  a highly specific configuration of one particular institution: a coalition-based 
government. In other words, there was nothing intrinsic about a particular institution 
which made it “political.”
Second, and more importantly, the Humanists and the Loyalists actively opposed 
understanding of politics in terms of a particular sphere. The older generation of Russian 
politicians claimed that in 1991, the Latvian political elite “politicized” Russianness 
when they did not automatically enfranchise Russians who could not trace their lineage to 
the interwar republic.  Often, these politicians presented their lives in politics to be less of 
a vocation than of a necessity.  They were “unwilling politicians” fighting for minority 
rights and and adopting the ethnic minority paradigm insofar as they wanted to remedy 
what they called “politicization” of Russianness in the early 1990s.  In other words, these 
politicians conceived of the sphere of “rights” as limiting the sphere of “politics.”  In 
contrast, the younger generation never understood politika in the idiom of excess, as 
something that had to be limited by “law.” At stake in their distinction between politika 
and politikanstvo was not a separation of spheres but a possibility of a different world (a 
thesis I prove in subsequent chapters).  
The third and last concern that I want to address concerns the relationship between 
politika as my informants' emic category (i.e., a category of their practice) and “politics” 
as an etic category (i.e., a category of anthropological analysis).  Following the example 
of many anthropologists, I find it important to investigate ethnographic categories 
precisely insofar as they promise to challenge disciplinary categories.  The Loyalists' and 
the Humanists' use of politika was far more targeted than the anthropological use of the 
term “politics.” Following anthropological engagement  with an argument that power is 
all-pervasive, anthropologists have started to see “politics” everywhere (Candea 2011). 
While this expansion of “politics” may forewarn a nearsighted confusion of emic and etic 
categories, it may add little to developing a sense of perspective. 
Searching for this perspective, I turn to Evans-Pritchard's (1940) study of the Nuer. 
Towards the end of his ethnography, Evans-Pritchard wonders whether or not he was 
justified in using the category of “politics” to explain social organization of a people who 
neither have formal political institutions nor the very concept of “politics.” He decides 
that he was justified, because the category of “politics” allowed him to do something that 
has not been done before: to see the difference between lineages and tribes. This was no 
small task since tribes and lineages were often referred to by the same name even though 
they were not, in fact, the same; and the Nuer, even though using one name for both 
tribes and lineages, were acutely aware of the difference between them. 
When reading The Nuer, it would be shortsighted to confuse what “politics” does as an 
analytic tool with what “politics” happens to denote as a descriptive term. As a 
descriptive term, “politics” is Evans-Pritchard's shortcut for “being organized on the basis 
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of tribes rather than lineages.” As an analytic tool, “politics” allows Evans-Pritchard to 
distinguish between two seemingly interchangeable, yet very different, phenomena: tribes 
and lineages.  The stakes of making this distinction are high: it is insofar as the Nuer are 
politically organized into tribes, rather than lineages, that they can move from place to 
place and find allies.  In other words, as an analytic tool, “politics” allows Evans-
Pritchard to identify that aspect of social organization which happens to matter most for 
the people that he studies. 
Unlike Evans-Pritchard's informants, my informants had their own concept of politics; I 
referred to it as politika. Throughout the paper, I made certain not to confuse politika with 
“politics.” Yet, now, I would like to offer some thoughts as to the merit of their 
juxtaposition. Insofar as I took my informants' claim to be organized on the basis of 
“politics” seriously, I investigated the meaning that they attach to the word politika. As a 
descriptive term, “politics” or politika was my shortcut for “not being organized on the 
basis of hurt” and “pursuing coalition government.” However, attentiveness to politika 
also allowed me to challenge the concept of “ethnic politics” which, over the past two 
decades, became the dominant frame for thinking about Eastern Europe.  It allowed me to 
see “Russianness” not as a basis of social organization—which, in my case, concerned 
the nature of inter-organizational alliances—but rather as mode of questioning the nature 
of the political subject.  The fact that the Loyalists and the Humanists self-identified as 
“Russian” did not mean that their alliance was based on a shared sense of ethnic identity. 
Here, ethnicity was a flourish rather than a basis of social organization. “Ethnic politics” 
was indeed a misnomer. 
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CHAPTER III
Language Values
This chapter explores the significance of “language” in conversations about Latvia’s 
Russian politics.   Despite being a native language for about 40% of Latvia’s residents, 
Russian does not have any sort of official recognition. In fact, from the 1990s onwards, 
the Latvian government has undertaken a series of policies to limit the use of Russian in 
the public sphere: the state apparatus functions exclusively in Latvian; all private sector 
employees engaged with customer relations are obligated to speak Latvian; Latvian is 
increasingly the dominant language of instruction in secondary and post-secondary 
education.  
Below, I analyze various actors’ engagement with language activism.  In most cases, 
these actors have a very concrete and pragmatic understanding of language, taking it to 
be a means of communication and expression increasingly threatened by the government. 
However, this understanding exists alongside a more philosophical approach to language 
as an intrinsic dimension of thought of action, and, thus, a privileged site for diagnosing 
predicaments expanding far beyond formal politics.  In fact, the acuteness of debates 
concerning language is evident in my interlocutors’ reliance on, and continued invention 
of, a meta-linguistic vocabulary which includes terms like slovobludie (“prodigal 
speech”), slovofon (“word aura”), and iazykovye shtampy (“word stamps”).  It is further 
evident in various actors’ approach to language as a symptom of the post-socialist 
condition; that is, a widely-shared understanding that the stakes of the current moment 
can be revealed by analyzing how, why, and where people speak, read, and write. Thus, I 
discuss how, for some people, bad spelling becomes symptomatic of moral corruption 
and wayward sexuality;  how others take free speech as a sign of economic abundance 
and procreative virility; and, how yet others, worry about a sudden appearance of words 
powerful enough to turn people into zombies.  
*
Focusing on debates about the relationship between language and politics, I draw on 
anthropological work on language ideology—a relationship between, on the one hand,  
specific representations of language, and, on the other hand, various social positions, 
vested interests, and sites of contestation (Woolard and Schieffelin 1994).  Taking 
language ideology to be an interactional resource  rather than a set of unconscious 
postulates (c.f. Briggs 1992), I analyze how various actors seek to mobilize support by 
arguing about language.  The question of mobilizing support is particularly crucial in 
light of  various attempts to “consolidate” Latvia’s Russians (discussed in Chapter 2); 
and, thereby, to overcome what’s understood to be Latvian “nationalism.”  
*
Over the last decade, Latvia’s Russian activists have increasingly turned to the idiom of 
“value” to explain, justify, and further their efforts around the promotion of Russian 
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language. According to them, Latvian policy makers have repeatedly failed to appreciate 
“the value of language” (iazykovye tsennosti).   Yet, the nature of this value—like the 
nature of language itself—is a subject of intense debate and disagreement which is often 
taken as an indication of Russian “factionalism.”   
In the first part of this chapter, I analyze Russian language activists’ arguments about the 
kind of “value” that Latvian language reformers fail to appreciate. Here, I delineate the 
tensions between  language activists who charge Latvian reformers with failing to 
recognize economic benefits of promoting Russian, and activists who accuse Latvian 
reformers with failing to recognize social benefits of promoting Russian.  
 
In Section 1, I introduce Leonid, a full-time businessman, who approaches “value” in a 
narrowly economic sense and charges post-soviet language policy—particularly, state-
mandated regulation of language in private enterprise—with with stultifying economic 
growth. Like many activists, he argues that the value of Russian lies in in its ability to 
improve commerce: to lower transactional costs among Latvia’s Russian-speaking and 
Latvian-speaking businessmen; to attract entrepreneurs from the European Union who 
lack linguistic skills necessary to pursue business opportunities in the Russian Federation; 
and, in the same vein, to attract entrepreneurs from the Russian Federation who lack 
linguistic skills necessary to pursue business opportunities in the European Union. 
In Section 2,  I introduce Feodor, a teacher and a historian who approaches “value” in a 
social sense. Like many language activists, Feodor argues that the value of  Russian lies 
in its ability to ensure inter-generational continuity, strengthen kinship ties, and deepen a 
sense of self.  Focusing on post-soviet educational reforms (often referred to as 
“Latvianization of Russian schools”), Feodor argues that Latvian language policy 
threatens generational continuity (because children no longer speak the language of their 
parents), undermines parental authority (because parents grow alienated from their 
children’s education), and threatens individual autonomy (understood to be based on 
one’s capacity to speak for and about oneself).
In Section 3, I show how young social activists attempt to reconcile the tension between 
economic and social approaches to language values (represented by Leonid’s and 
Feodor’s positions respectively). Their attempt draws heavily on the metaphor of the 
“bridge”—taken as a symbol of social and economic mediation (and valuation) of 
linguistic difference. At the same time, I show how other actors—the ones to whom I 
refer to as aspiring politicians— refuse to partake in their colleagues’ attempt to to 
hammer out a shared understanding of “language values.” In contrast to most Russian 
language activists, aspiring politicians do not compel Latvian policy-makers to recognize 
the value of Russian language — either in the economic or social domain. Rather, they 
argue that the very approach to language in terms of “value” — regardless of how it is 
construed—leads to a political impasse. 
In the second part of the chapter, I analyze aspiring politicians’ sometimes (admittedly) 
abstract and quasi-philosophical reflections about about the relationship between 
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language and politics.  Section 3 links these reflections to growing concerns about 
Latvia’s youth supposed willingness / inability to develop a vocabulary necessary both 
for making sense of and partaking in political life; or to use one of my interlocutors’ 
idioms—to acquire language that will allow them to address and to be addressed by 
others. 
Section 4 links my interlocutors’ reflections on language and politics to their anxiety that 
that, in today’s world,  language no longer “passes through”—that is, genuinely 
influences and transforms—one’s consciousness; but, instead “spins around.”  Somewhat 
unexpectedly, this anxiety coexists with a fear that contemporary politics heavily relies 
on  “neuro-linguistic programming”: a use of particular verbal, syntactic, and 
grammatical structures to transform others’ behavior on the subconscious level. 
In Section 5, I contexutalize my informants’ anxieties about words that lack direction, 
weight, and cognizability in a broader conversation about the relationship between 
language and politics after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Much of this conversation 
emphasizes the distinction between Soviet politicians’ use of ideologia (ideology) and the 
post-Soviet politicians' turn to piar (Russian transliteration of “PR”).  Whereas ideologia 
is imagined as a set of concepts and narratives capable of producing a long-term change 
in one’s pattern of thought and action; piar is imagined as empty language—potentially 
leading to short-term gains yet undermining one’s trust in language in the long-run. 
Section 6 discusses aspiring politicians’ attempt to undo pernicious effects of piar and 
find a conceptual vocabulary that can inspire, inform, and critique political action. Here,  
I analyze how my informants’ host weekly discussion sessions—ironically referred to by 
a Soviet neologism “politlikbez” (a shortened form of “liquidation of political illiteracy”)
—in a hope to involve young people in conversations about contemporary politics.
1. Stilted Entrepreneurs
The city of Riga is cut in two by Daugava River. Beginning in the Valdai Hills, an upland 
half way between Moscow and St. Peterburg, Daugava crosses north-Western Russia, 
Belarus and Latvia before flowing into the Baltic Sea. A legend tells of a time when a tall 
man, called Big Kristaps, made his living carrying people on his shoulders across the 
river. One night, during a ravaging thunderstorm, Big Kristaps was visited by a child who 
pleaded to be helped crossing over. Unable to refuse, Kristaps braved the stormy waters 
and, even though the child grew heavier and heavier with each step that Kristaps made, 
he persevered and delivered him safely to the other shore.  When he woke up the next 
morning, the child was gone. In his place there was a chest filled with gold coins. 
Overcome by mystery of the event, Kristaps never spent a single coin and continued his 
hard work for the rest of his life. After his death, this money was spent on building the 
town in the place where Riga was eventually established.  
Medieval chroniclers tell of Riga’s founding by the Teutonic Knights in the early 13th 
century, as they colonized the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea subjugating and 
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Christianizing the indigenous population: the Baltic-speaking Curonians, Latgalians, and 
Semigalians tribes and the Finno-Urgic speaking Livs. Located 30 km from the shores of 
a gulf which offered a respite to the ships crossing the Baltic’s windy waters, Riga was a 
safe harbor. Growing as a trade post on route from Scandinavia to the Byzantium, the city 
soon became a member of the Hanseatic League:a union of merchants and guildsmen 
keen on increasing and protecting their trade across Northern Europe. 
Riga’s commercial past is not only the stuff of textbooks and guidebooks.  It is, rather, 
constitutive of the very materiality of the city. The Old City’s architectural landmarks are 
guild halls and warehouses (some of which still remnants of rope— suspended from the 
attic for lifting up the ware from the ground floor).  On a cold winter night—when the 
stores are closed and the tourists gone—the only thing that disturbs Old Riga’s fairy-like 
medievalism is the absence of city walls. As the expansion of Latvian industry made Riga 
the third largest city in the Russian Empire, the walls, which encircled the Old City for 
seven centuries, were demolished. As protestant ethic (or engineering initiative) would 
have had it, the rubble from the demolition was not wasted. It was used to create a 
landscaped park which stretched along the length of the Old City and connected it to 
neighborhood which became known as the city “Center.” 
It was this park that Leonid—a self-identified Russian activist to whom I was introduced 
a week earlier—offered as a meeting point, when I asked him for an interview. In his 
early forties, Leonid finished his post-secondary education as the Soviet Union collapsed. 
Like most people of his age cohort, “he went into business” (something linked to 
construction); and made a decent living. Sitting down on a bench next to me, he put aside 
the traditional businessman paraphernalia— the cell phone belt buckle and a briefcase-
shaped handbag—got a pack of “Russian Style” out of the inside pocket of his jean 
jacket, and lit up. 
As I shortly found out, Leonid became politically active when he took part in 2004 
protests against what was widely referred to as “Latvianization of Russian schools.” 
During the Soviet period, like other Republics, Latvia had two types of schools. First, 
there were “all Union” or “Soviet” schools where the language of instruction was 
Russian, explicitly defined as the language of international (i.e., Union-wide) 
communication. Second, there were “titular,” “national,” or “Republican” schools where 
the language of instruction was that of a nation holding a titular status within a particular 
republic (i.e., Latvian schools in the Latvian SSR, Armenian schools in the Armenian 
SSR, Georgian schools in Georgian SSR, etc.).  Students in the national schools had very 
intense instruction in Russian language. When they graduated, they were typically fluent. 
Fluency in Russian was particularly important for those students who wanted to pursue 
scientific and technical training: engineering textbooks, machine manuals, production 
guidelines were all in Russian. The only area where fluency in Russian did not have day-
to-day importance was the cultural sector: painters, musicians, artists, actors had to speak 
in Russian only when touring or training outside Latvia; their day-to-day activities did 
not require fluency. 
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Students in all-Union schools had negligible instruction in the titular language of a 
republic where the school happened to be located. Students studying in an all-Union 
school located in Latvian SSR had only a few hours of Latvian instruction a week (just 
like students in an all-Union school located in Armenian SSR had only a few hours of 
Armenian instruction a week). When these students graduated, they were not fluent in the 
republican language. Unless they wanted to pursue a career in the cultural sector (and 
they typically did not, since their parents were engineers, workers, and soldiers), they had 
no problem pursuing their post-secondary education and finding lucrative careers in 
Russian.  
Over the four decades of Soviet rule, the two-track schooling system contributed to 
creating unequal bilingualism: a situation wherein Russian-speakers did not have to speak 
much Latvian; whereas Latvian-speakers had to speak good Russian. After the restoration 
of Latvian independence, Russian was not recognized as an official language (either on 
state or municipal level): commerce with state institutions—hospitals, courts, internal 
revenue service, immigration ministry—had to happen in Latvian. If someone did not 
speak Latvian and could not provide their own translator, all they could do was hope that 
they will be able to find a civil servant who will not mind speaking Russian; they did not 
have a right to receiving civil service in Russian.  Insofar as granting of citizenship lay in 
the domain of the state, one had to speak Latvian to apply for citizenship: not only to fill 
out paperwork, but to pass the test (which included a test of Latvian). 
Furthermore, in addition to language requirement for citizenship, the state instituted 
language requirement for employment. The state instituted an elaborate language 
certification system: it created a hierarchy of professions, mandating that an aspiring 
employee had to demonstrate a level of Latvian proficiency judged to be appropriate for a 
particular profession (doctors, for example, had to be more proficient than cab drivers).   
Thus, some professions—for example, a firefighter—demanded from an aspirant to pass 
both the citizenship test (since emergency services were one of the sectors where only 
citizens could work) and language certification (since firefighters would find themselves 
in a situation where they had to assist Latvian speakers). 
School reform was a crucial site for changing unequal bilingualism: Following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the all-Union schools became, legally speaking, “ethnic 
minority schools,” and, colloquially speaking, “Russian schools.” In the 1990s, the 
government began the educational reform which sought to increase the level of Latvian 
instruction: Latvian language and literature were now taught extensively; class hours for 
Russian language and literature decreased. However, while having lost its status as a 
separate discipline, Russian continued to be the dominant language of instruction across 
all disciplines.  
In 2004, the government attempted to implement the bill that would end this: that would 
require that the general curriculum (i.e., Math, Chemistry, History, etc.) be taught in 
Latvian. The government's attempt to increase the dominance of Latvian in Russian 
schools led to significant social unrest. Parents of the students studying in these schools, 
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the students, and the teachers were opposed to the change. Self-identified Russian 
parliamentary politicians sought to capitalize on their discontent and helped organize 
massive demonstrations. Students from all over Latvia came out on Riga's streets to 
struggle against the reform; they succeeded in preserving the status quo: Russian 
continued to be the language for 60% of the general curriculum. It was during and after 
these protests that activists like Leonid became civically engaged. 
Among the activists, the protests were framed as a matter of limiting the state’s 
interference; in fact, one of the most popular slogans among people on the streets was 
“Hands off Russian Schools!” While this slogan was chanted by people of all ideological 
persuasions, it drew heavily on the liberal concept of negative freedom: i.e., freedom 
from interference (rather than freedom to do something). As many of my interlocutors 
reflected, the protests were successful precisely because they were framed in terms of 
limiting the state’s interference rather than compelling the state’s involvement in a 
particular normative project: only the first goal could create a broad basis of support. 
In fact, activism around matters of language was unique because it could be based on an 
attempt to limit state interference rather than to compel state involvement. In contrast, 
activism around maters of enfranchisement—the other major arena of activist work—
could not but attempt to compel the state to act in some way:  to offer automatic 
citizenship, to ease citizenship exam, to offer citizenship preparation classes, etc.
Leonid’s thoughts on activism, which he shared as his stick of Russian Style came to its 
ashy end, were informed by the desire to limit state interference. Blowing smoke in the 
direction of the Old City—the site of Latvia’s parliament—he said, “The situation with 
language is purely a political invention. If you go to the market,” he continued, now 
blowing smoke into the opposite direction, “You will see that everything is perfectly 
normal there. People can figure out for themselves which language to speak.”  
Indeed, the market (billed in tourist brochures as the biggest outdoor market in Europe) 
was a place where Russian and Latvian were used interchangeably. The sellers’ constant 
call for customers’ to come up and look at the available merchandize was “Ludzu! 
Pozhailusta!”: the Latvian and the Russian words for “please,” spoken in a breath 
saturated with a monosyllabic desire. 
For many activists—especially the ones without children—it was the market, rather than 
the school, which became paradigmatic of a site needing protection from state 
interference. The state’s attempts at “Latvianizing” the market place were most 
dramatically illustrated by language certification process and language inspection 
commissions. As far as activists like Leonid were concerned, it was one thing to require 
that public employees speak Latvian or to require that all interaction with state 
institutions happen in Latvian; it was quite another to make private entrepreneurs speak 
Latvian. Yet this is precisely what Latvian language legislation attempted to do: under the 
guise of protecting the interests of Latvian-speaking consumers in the market place, the 
state mandated that everyone who interacted with customers had to speak some Latvian. 
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Furthermore, it instituted language inspection commission which could inspect any 
private enterprise and fine entrepreneurs whose language skills were not up to the 
required standard.  
2. Fallen Women
Whereas Leonid had me meet him right by the Old City, Feodor suggested that we get 
together about a five minute walk up Freedom (formerly Lenin’s) Boulevard: by the 
Russian Orthodox Cathedral of the Savior. Right by the cathedral there was a statue of 
Barclay De Tolly. A German-speaking descendants of Scottish Barclays (purportedly 
related to the English Berkleys) who settled in Livonia in the 17th century, Barclay De 
Tolly was the grandson of one of Riga’s mayors—and one of the most distinguished 
generals of the Russian Empire, a key actor during the Russian victory over Napoleon in 
the early nineteenth century. Like the Jewish Mandelstam (discussed in Chapter 1), 
Scottish-Livonian-German De Tolly was an exemplary Russian—albeit, in his case, for 
military, rather than poetic, feats.  
Fedoor ran late; arriving—clad with shorts and a cap—he apologized: his neighbor’s fuse 
blew out; and they couldn’t fix it by themselves; so he had to help. 
Feodor, like Leonid, was a self-identified Russian activist; like Leonid, he also had a 
tangible basis of support behind him. However, he did not share Leonid’s idealization of 
the market. His activism was of a different variety: for him, the problem was not with 
state interference; but, with the expansion of the market logic to all domains of life. This 
was particularly true when it came to Russian. People were selling out, Feodor explained.
He talked at length about the new “type of person” who appeared in post-Soviet Latvia: 
“the Russian for hire”; the turn of phrase which explicitly linked these people to ‘girls-
for-hire.’ In Feodor’s eyes, the state was not so much an entity which interfered with the 
marked, than one extension of the market. Like Leonid, he also disliked the politicians. 
However, whereas for Leonid, the problem with the politicians was their nationalist 
ideology—their ‘nationalism’ was, in fact, an ideology which interfered with the market
—for Feodor, it was their money-grabbing. Therein, the two positions reached their most 
explicit contrast: the view of politicians as ideological (albeit wrongly so) [notice how 
this position is going to be criticized by the Loyalists; but what about their position about 
people who are in the parliament only to make money / to business; why do they care 
about individual biographies; i.e., why don’t they reduce everything to some sort of 
‘instrumentalism’—like Leonid does] and the view of politicians as instrumental. 
“Russians for sale” were people who traded in their Russianness—either to state or 
private enterprises. Both—the state and the private enterprise—had a demand for these 
Russians; its just that their customers were different. In the former case, the customers 
were the international community invested in making sure that Russians had some sort of 
representation; whereas, in the latter case, it was other Russian consumers. 
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The problem with being for “hire” was that it exemplified the lack of moral probity. This, 
in fact, was the major contrast between Leonid and Feodor. For Leonid, the market was a 
site where people could act ‘morally’; for Leonid, this was not the case. The problem 
with being “a Russian for hire” is that, if today, you sold out your Russianness; you could 
sell out anything. And besides, if you sold your Russian schools, who was to say that, if 
the market provided different incentives—if, say, it no longer privileged style (and 
reduced language to the means of communication; this story makes a mockery of a 
statement that ‘language is a means to communication’: because, obviously, the message 
is reduced by the girl who doesn’t know her suffixes)—people would follow.
The set of anxieties which Feodor shared was very well summarized in a piece of news 
which circulated among the activists. This was a piece about a female student’s inability 
to distinguish between two adjectives—padshii and pavshii—in an essay about WWII. In 
English, both words are translated as “fallen.” In English, the meaning of “fallen” 
depends on the context in which it is used.  In Russian, the meaning “fallen” is indicated 
by a slight modification of the word's root.  Pavshii (with a v) denotes an “honorable 
fall”; it's an adjective appropriate for the phrase “a fallen soldier” (i.e., a soldier shot in 
the line of duty). Padshii (with a d) denotes a “dishonorable fall” or “fall from grace”; it's 
an adjective appropriate for the phrase “a fallen woman.” The student's who confused two 
adjectives repeatedly wrote of a padshii soldat: a soldier who was fallen in a manner 
characteristic of a prostitute.  
The point of the story was not reducible to the deterioration of education: it could have 
been made with any example. What was particular about this example was that it 
concerned what has become a sacred topic: the self-sacrifice of soldiers; something which 
is often termed as ‘their gift of life.’ Making any mistake when writing about soldiers 
would be bad enough—partially because the phrase ‘fallen soldier,’ in Russian, like in 
English, has acquired a stock character and thus should be known by any child. However, 
making a mistake which confuses their gift of life (their disinterested sacrifice) with the 
self-interested sale-of-self characteristic of a prostitute is even worse. 
The older activists were afraid that there was nothing—including oneself–that could not 
be sold and bought at will.  It was important that the scandal around the student who 
could not distinguish between honorable and dishonorable falls happened at the time 
when Riga's streets were covered with posters of a blow-up sex-doll with the following 
message: “Sex Tourism? Sex Terrorism!”  It was important that the student was a young 
woman—still a girl, many would say—that, in confusing different kinds of falls, not only 
violated the memory of her ancestors but also fell herself; in other words, she was a sell-
out. 
3. Common Values?
In the preceding section, I described my encounter with two prominent Russian activists
—Feodor and Leonid. Even though Feodor and Leonid both oppose state involvement in 
the labor market and the educational system (which they subsume under the category of 
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“Latvian nationalism”), and, even though both are very concerned with the status of 
Russian language,  they are unable to work together. In fact, their different 
understandings of language and divergent diagnoses of the post-socialist condition are 
often used to illustrate the problem of “Russian factionalism” — something that is 
persistently blamed for failing to curb the effect of “Latvian nationalism.”
Many of my readers may feel that I take my informants’ approaches to language at face 
value. Some may charge me with reproducing rather than challenging Feodor’s sense that 
the current state of Russian in Latvia testifies to a widespread moral decay or, Leonid’s 
sense that it highlights economic stultification. In a related vein, some readers may charge 
me with reproducing Feodor’s and Leonid’s perspectives on the post-socialist condition 
—  particularly, their reduction of various problems either to moral corruption or 
economic retardation.  After all, these perspectives sit uneasily with many 
anthropologists’ attempts to emphasize a complex imbrication of economic and moral 
domains (often, against an assertion of their independence).   
Yet, like in previous chapters, I pause before turning to disciplinary insights; and, instead, 
study how Feodor’s and Leonid’s positions are taken up by other local actors. These 
actors are young men and women who meet at a round-table dedicated to problems of 
Russian youth and sponsored by the annual conference of Russian compatriots.  Yet, like 
in previous chapters, I am hesitant to speak of “Russian youth activists”; and, instead, 
continue to differentiate between actors who have a clearly identifiable position (in this 
section, young social activists of various ideological persuasions) and actors whose 
position and vision cannot be easily defined (young men and women to whom I refer to 
as “aspiring politicians.”)  As the proceeding account shows, the first set of actors 
challenge what they take to be the older generation’s unwise divide between “moral” and 
“economic” perspectives on the post-socialist condition. Instead, they appeal to an 
ambiguous notion of value in an attempt to, on the one hand, transcend Russian 
factionalism, and, on the other hand, to protect Russian values.  The second set of actors 
(which cannot be easily identified) does not support this effort. While they do not offer a 
clear-cut alternative, they challenge an understanding of language in terms of value—
moral, economic, or undefined. At stake in this refusal is a concern with “spinning 
words”; and an understanding of the current predicament as characterized by a lack of 
political and historical “consciousness” — and proper political lexicon—rather than 
political corruption or stultification of Russian values.
*
Shortly after I began my fieldwork, young social activists (some of whom were affiliated 
with Leonid, others with Feodor, and yet others with neither one) sought to unite forces.  
Articulated under the banner of “organizational consolidation,”  the activists’ pursuit of 
unity spoke to the anxiety that “Russian factionalism” perpetuated “Latvian nationalism.”
During one section of the Annual Compatriot Conference, a number of young activists 
distributed a document which called for consolidation based on shared “values.” The 
document read:
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We are conscious that Russian language and Russian culture constitute for us, the 
representatives of the new generation, a value. We, the youth of Latvia, count 
ourselves to be a conductor-translator [provodnik-perevodchik] between the East 
(Russia) and the West.
Like English “value,” Russian tsennost’ is ambiguous, referring both to the economic and 
the moral domain.  Whereas generally activists took care to specify which domain they 
were referring to when speaking about “values,” this time, section organizers’ left the 
word ambiguous in a hope to attract people of various persuasions  (or, to quote one of 
my interviewees, to unite “the pro-Russia socialists” with “the pro-Europe liberals”). 
The ploy did not work: the ambiguity of the word “value” immediately led to a heated—
and a well-trodden— argument. One camp argued that language is a “communicative 
resource”; and that Russians should unite in order to promote linguistic capitalization.  
Another camp argued that language  is an “inalienable good”; and that Russians should 
unite in order to prevent linguistic degeneration. 
Yet, not everyone fell into these camps. A number of young people took issue not so 
much with the organizers’ purposefully ambiguous notion of value than with their attempt 
to cast Russians in the role of “conductor-translators.” Keeping with the proposal’s 
figurative tone, these other—not easily identifiable—actors rebuffed the proposed figure 
by comparing it with a child stuck in a fairy-tale fantasy, a homeless construction worker, 
and a self-centered train steward. 
Milky Rivers
The first person countered the figure of the “conductor-translator” by exclaiming that, yet 
again, people were “talking about rivers of milk and shores of compote (molochnye reki i 
kisel’nye berega)!”1  This remark relied on the symbolism of “rivers” — their connotation 
of creating connections; that is, doing something akin to the proposed conductor-
translator.  In Riga, the symbolism of rivers is particularly strong because of city lore 
about Daugava as a commercial route—reinforced in popular historical discourse and 
daily sightings of ferries from Stockholm (the non-parenthetical “West” of the proposal). 
However, instead of an actual river, the young man talked of mythical rivers found in 
folk-tales.  His remark dismissed the supposedly visionary claim of the proposal, 
rhetorically denigrating it to an act of infantile imagination: milky rivers are found in 
Russian folktales, alongside flying roasted partridges. They are an image of an abundance 
which is illusory, childish, and potentially malignant. Comparing the conductor-translator 
to a child mesmerized with a milky river with compote shores amounted to suggesting 
that only children thought that value could be generated by mediation. These children 
were not only mistaken but also inattentive: if they read their fairy-tales carefully they 
1  The word translated as “compote” is kisel’. A traditional desert found in Baltic, Finnish, and Slavic 
cuisines, kisel' is a cold soup thickened with potato starch. The phrase “rivers of milk and shores of 
compote” appears in the fairy tale called “The Geese-Swans” (Gusi-Lebedi).
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would be suspicious of easy gains. 
Under the Bridge 
The second person rebuffed the figure of conductor-translator by using the figure of the 
bridge. Like rivers, bridges are symbolic of creating connections central to the task of 
conductor-translators. The use of this symbolism grew markedly over the past years: 
bridges appear on euro bills and a figured prominently in the names of EU-wide 
conferences, exhibits, etc. In Riga, this symbolism is particularly salient not only because 
the city is connected by bridges over Daugava, which crosses the city in half, but also 
because, over the last several years, there has been a lot of public discussion about 
corrupt contractors busy constructing a new bridge; and, because, one of the city’s major 
bridges had repeated “climbers”—people who presumably wanted to jump off into the 
river (or, as some Rigans claimed, to enjoy Riga's skyline which is a UNESCO heritage 
site).  
“When will we finally stop this incessant bridge-talk?” the young woman asked. “When 
will we remember that people who build bridges end up sleeping under them?” The 
question referenced what, to people in the room, was common-knowledge: the fact that 
Latvia’s economic collapse was in part brought on by the construction bubble. During the 
bubble, construction workers were very well-paid: one could make up to $1000 per 
month on a building site, while continuing to study part-time. Retrospectively, these 
salaries were seen as highly inflationary; not reflecting the true value of construction 
work. Furthermore, insofar as most young people did construction “on the side,” they 
spent their money on university tuition fees, vacation, and down payments on expensive 
cars (which, by the time I began fieldwork were reposed). In other words, the abundance 
brought by the construction boom turned out to be illusory: not much different from the 
abundance of milky rivers of fairy-tales. 
Moving Melons
The third person expressed his dissatisfaction with conductor-translators during a 
smoking break. “These Mikhalkovian conductors (mikhalkovskie provodniki)!” he 
exclaimed, “When will they be bone already?” The young man’s exclamation referenced 
one of the most famous, if episodic characters of the late-Soviet cinema: the train 
conductor in El’dar Riazanov’s 1982 film “A Railway Station for Two” (Vokzal dlia 
dvoih). The film makes use of one of the most important symbols of Soviet progress: the 
train. However, the person who is shown as effectively running the train is not a quasi-
mythical machinist of early Soviet literature, but, rather, a train-car steward (the 
conductor if one literally translates Russian provodnik), named Andrei. Andrei moves 
goods rather then progress: he traffics melons from southern to northern Russia and 
leaves them with a railway café waitress who, having to feed her elderly mother and son, 
sells them at a premium. Clearly not a hero, Andrei is too slimy and insignificant to be a 
villain; his appearance is episodic: the film’s plot is about the café waitress who meets a 
pianist riding in Andrei’s train car. The qualifier “Mikhalkovian” referenced the actor 
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who played Andrei: Nikita Mikhalkov. For many people across the political spectrum, 
Mikhalkov-the-person embodied Andrei-the-character: equally favored by Communist 
and post-communist governments, he was taken to be an ultimate post-Soviet turncoat. 
4. Spinning Words
What was at stake in aspiring politicians’ turn to these three figures—a child, a 
construction worker, and a train steward—over and against the conference organizers’ 
vision of conductors-translators mediating between the West and the West.  On the one 
hand, they all seemed to connote to a predicament of address: a child stuck in a fantasy, a 
worker stuck in abridge, and a steward stuck on a train all lacked a certain kind of 
personhood, often signaled by Russian words for  “consciousness” (soznanie) and 
“conscientiousness” (soznatel’nost’), and taken to be necessary for meaningful speech. 
On the other hand, these figures connoted an inability of being addressed by someone: 
shores of compote, undersides of bridges, and running trains were all non-places of sorts, 
inaccessible by major communication routes.
Daily conversations about language, which were not as figuratively elaborate as the 
conversation during the compatriot conference, drew much of their power from the idiom 
of “spinning.”  This idiom simultaneously marks a relationship between language, 
economy, time, and personhood.  To describe oneself as being in a state of “spinning” —
to say “I am spinning” (ia kruchus')—is to talk of one's sense of being like a rodent in a 
hamster wheel: moving at an incredibly high speed, yet remaining stationary; that is, 
achieving nothing. To describe oneself as performing “spinning” in a linguistic sense—to 
say “I spin it up” (ia rasskruchivau)—is to talk of one's attempt to use rhetoric in order to 
increase the perceived value of a particular object.  To describe oneself as doing 
“spinning” in an economic sense—to say “I spin” (ia prokruchivau)—is to talk of one's 
attempt to speculate. As the semantic connection between these three verbs—krutit'sia, 
rasskruchivat', and prokruchivat'—suggests, they all form an aspect of one activity.  
Once, when I asked an interlocutor how he was doing, he responded, kruchus', 
rasskruchivaiu, prokruchivaiu. He was: (a) running from place to place; (b) trying to 
convince people to buy something; (c) that he himself bought earlier but hoped to sell at a 
higher price; and (d) not being particularly successful.  
* 
According to Stas, language activists focused too much on the relationship between 
Russian and Latvian and not nearly enough on a general crisis of language.  Whereas his 
colleagues framed this crisis in terms of “address,” Stas talked about “words passing 
through.”  According to Stas, the major issue was “that nobody let words pass through 
them.” When I asked for an example of “words passing through,” he responded, 
“Reciting poetry.” This example was telling for three closely linked reasons. 
First, it emphasized that spinning could not be explained by the lack of correspondence 
between words and objects. The work of poetry was not that of accurately describing the 
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world. If reciting poetry was opposite of spinning words, then, attempts to limit spinning 
could not be exhausted by the pursuit of accurate description. 
Second, insofar as Stas’s explanation emphasized reciting, rather than composing, poetry, 
it indicated that the problem with spinning was not a lack of authorial originality. If 
reciting poetry was opposite of spinning words, then, attempts to limit spinning could not 
be exhausted by the pursuit of new ideas and a call to be an original author (to make sure 
that one never repeats what one has heard elsewhere). Similarly, Stas’s explanation 
emphasized that spinning could not be explained by the speaker’s lack of intentionality: 
nobody would ask of a person reading poetry whether or not he or she “really meant” 
what they said. If reciting poetry was opposite of spinning words, then attempts to limit 
spinning could not be exhausted by ascertaining the speaker’s intent.  
Third, insofar as Stat’s explanation emphasized recitation rather than reading, it 
emphasized the public aspect of poetic speech. If reciting poetry was opposite of spinning 
words, then attempts to limit spinning by withdrawing from public discourse into the 
privacy of one’s home or quasi-privacy of one’s friends’ homes would be faulty.
Stas’s argument that ‘spinning’ could not be prevented by the pursuit of ‘correspondence’ 
between words and objects resonated powerfully with the aspiring politicians’ distrust of 
conspiracy theories. One day, I was party to an argument between social activists and 
aspiring politicians. The object of discussion was the possibility of establishing some sort 
of a ‘media’ outlet. Social activists argued that the most significant problem faced by 
youth today was “inaccessibility of information channels” or to use the persuasive idiom, 
“information blockade.” I saw their point clearly: it was very difficult to get the 
journalists to cover youth events; and, when they did, they were likely to use ‘standard 
language.’ Also, events had to be clearly ‘political’ or ‘cultural’: something in the middle 
didn’t fit the formal. Finally, unless you had connections with businessmen and party 
members, it was very difficult. And, this of course, not counting the fact that it was 
almost impossible to get coverage if you decided to put something up without consulting 
people in the party (like Pavel did when the Mock City Council). However, I grew very 
surprised when aspiring politicians argued that the problem is not ‘information,’ but, 
rather, the fact that people don’t respond to it; or, respond to it, ‘inadequately.’ Once I saw 
Ludmila say that the problem is not that people don’t know what’s going on: she talked 
about the attendance of an event that she and the Humanists have organized: they had 
some funding which they spend on informing people; yet, nobody came. As far as she 
was concerned, the problem was with ‘consciousness.’  
Concern with consciousness recurred all the time. For aspiring politicians, one of the 
most nefarious forms that spinning could take was “NLP”: this is a theory, discredited in 
the Western academy, concerning the effect that words have on people. On the one hand, 
the interest in NLP reflected a characteristically socialist conviction that subjecthood is 
shaped through—rather than expressed by—language. (To a certain extent, it was this 
conviction which made it possible for language to be a ‘sign’ of moral worth: i.e., how 
you spoke was not separable from your person). However, the issue was whether or not 
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these words enabled the subject to speak back. The problem with NLP is that it produced 
people who were incapable of addressing. These were referred to as bydlo and 
molodniak: words which associated with animals. Thus, the anti-hero—the object of 
concern—for aspiring politicians was not a ‘stilted entrepreneur’ or the ‘fallen woman,’ 
but rather someone who wasn’t quite human at all. It was this that resonated with images 
of child, worker, and train conductor. 
The lack of subjecthood was expressed explicitly when people talked about political 
education; the purpose of the schools was to cultivate ‘consciousness.’ Yet, here 
‘consciousness’ was not individualized ‘psychology’ but rather one’s capacity to see one’s 
role in the world, to see how one occupies a position in the world. The conceptual crisis 
that aspiring politicians were so deeply concerned with was being able to see one’s place 
in the world—of being addressed; it was this sense that was expressed by the figures of 
the child, the worker, and the train conductor: a blindness of sorts; a lack of perspective. 
This was a very different predicament than that of the stilted entrepreneur and the fallen 
woman: in both cases, there was a very clear vision but just strayed from it. 
5. From Ideologia to Piar 
On a more abstract level, concern with spinning  leads to concerns over the substitution 
of “ideology” (ideologia) by piar (Russian transliteration of “PR”).  Ideology (ideologia) 
is a conscious commitment to a particular vision of the world. As far as my interlocutors 
were concerned, “real” political organizations had to be based on this commitment. The 
problem of their time was not that “nationalism was the dominant ideology” — and, as 
such, undermined language values (whether political or economic) — but, rather, that  
ideologia was becoming replaced by piar.  
In Russian, piar connotes an instrumentalist pragmatism rather than a principled 
commitment, a means-ends rationality, and malicious duplicity—all exercised in an 
attempt to subjugate another human being to one's own will rather than to “make them 
conscious of their role in the historical process” (something enabled by ideologia).  Here, 
the focus on individual will is of significant importance: whereas ideologia is imagined to 
be a basis of a conscious collectivity,  piar is understood to be a strategy for individual 
advancement. 
Another way to appreciate the difference between ideologia and piar it to approach them 
as various forms of relating language and personhood to political economy. Ideologia is a 
series of postulates which are “embodied” (in one's soul and consciousness) rather than 
simply “known” (held as “information” in one's brain and liable to become obsolete or 
useless).  Young political activists argue that ideologia is not subject to economic 
transactions. It is something that changes a person in his or her entirely, not something 
that  person can change at will.  However, as far my interlocutors are concerned, the 
problem with piar is not that it can be exchanged; but, rather, that it makes exchange 
itself impossible. If, for the older generation the post-socialist predicament has to do 
either with the fact that everything has a price and can be bought and sold at will, or, 
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alternatively, that the government interferes with private citizens' economic transactions; 
then,  for the younger generation, the post-socialist predicament is that meaningful 
circulation—including speech—has become jeopardized.  
To emphasize the difference between ideologia and piar further, I will attend to 
pedagogical projects implicit within them. Insofar as ideologia requires a conscious 
commitment to a series of postulates, it necessitates education (obrazovanie) or 
cultivation which the young generation of activists understand to be quite different from 
knowledge (znanie) and instruction.  The pedagogical project emergent in ideologia can 
change a person for the better rather than just make a person better at something.  In 
contrast, piar rests on what was referred to as “neuro-lingusitic programming” (i.e., 
advanced brainwashing) rather than cultivation of consciousness. It neither changes the 
person for the better or makes him or her better at something; rather, it destroys his or her 
very personhood: something suggested by the frequent argument that piar results in 
bydloizatsia (a word that can be translated as “making of a beast”); or, to use a phrase 
current among my informants, yet potentially lost on many Russian speakers, due to its 
complex wordplay, “turning youth (molodezh) into hatchlings (molodniak).”2 
6. Talking Politics 
In November, as Riga plunged into the coldest winter of the decade, Pavel and I waded 
through the snow towards the neighborhood known as “the quiet center.” At the turn of 
the twentieth century, when Riga became the Russian Empire's third most-industrialized 
city and the second-largest port,3 this was the neighborhood where the newly-rich set up 
lavish apartments in then just-built Jugendsil buildings.4 Following Soviet expropriation, 
the apartments underwent “condensation” (uplotnenie): they were turned into communal 
flats housing several families at once. After the restitution and privatization of property in 
the early 1990s, they once again transformed; now, becoming homes to successful 
entrepreneurs, foreign dignitaries, finance firms, and, in a few cases, political parties.
It was in one of these apartments that Kristina held her “Club of Practical Philosophy.” 
The purpose of the club was to remedy “the lack of political education,” which, according 
to Kristina, was endemic to post-socialism. Like Kristina, Pavel too was preoccupied 
with “political education” and has already developed his own initiative to remedy it: 
“Political School of the Loyalists.” Over the past two months, Pavel's school has been 
extraordinarily well attended. [ Kristina knew this and was interested in having Pavel 
comment on her Club and, perhaps, to offer advice. 
In what once must have been a living room—one of the walls was lined with blue and 
2  Molodezh is a noun used to describe humans; molodniak, which shares the same root, describes 
young animals.
3 When it came to industry, Riga followed St. Petersburg and Moscow; when it came to shipping—
Odessa (located on the Black Sea in the Ukraine).
4 Many of these buildings were designed by Mikhail Eisenstein, Sergei Eisenstein's father. 
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white porcelain tiles connected to the kitchen furnace—ten secondary school students sat 
along a slim plastic table. At the head of the table sat a young bespectacled man with a 
buzz, military-style haircut. Kristina introduced him as Valdis, saying that she invited him 
to give a guest lecture on “the state.” In the hour and a half that followed, Valdis covered 
the difference between divine and natural rights, monarchical and national sovereignty, 
discussed the treaty of Westphalia, and, last but not least, delineated Hobbes' s, Lock's, 
and Rousseau's theories of social contract. 
Valdis's ease with the material, command of voice, style of narration easily rivaled most 
university lecturers. Yet, praise for the lecture was not forthcoming. A young woman in 
the audience thanked Valdis for his lecture on “the state in general” (o gosudarstve 
voobshe). Then, she asked him if he could please say something about Latvia 
“concretely” (konkretno). Valdis shook his head, saying that this was not possible. He 
prided himself on speaking “concretely”: everything he talked about so far could be 
checked against specific sources; he was happy to provide citations, in case someone was 
interested. However, it was impossible to speak “concretely” about Latvia.  
Contemporary journalism was little but “white word noise” (slovofon). All the 
information was produced by PR-men (piarshchiki ) who “spun” (rasskurchivaiut) 
everything according to their clients’ wishes.  “If you read Latvian state documents, then 
you think that everything is OK. If you read Russian documents, then you think that 
Latvia is a state spawning nationalists and fascists. If you read Western documents, then 
we are somewhere in between,” he explained. 
The idiom of “spinning,” which Valdis used to justify his focus on “general history of the 
state” and to explain his refusal to “talk about Latvia specifically,” drew its rhetorical 
power from its ability to simultaneously mark a relationship between language, economy, 
and time. To describe oneself as being in a state of “spinning” —to say “I am spinning” 
(ia kruchus')—is to talk of one's sense of being like a rodent in a hamster wheel: moving 
at an incredibly high speed, yet remaining stationary; that is, gaining nothing. To describe 
oneself as performing “spinning” in a linguistic sense—to say “I spin it up” (ia 
rasskruchivau)—is to talk of one's attempt to use rhetoric in order to increase the 
perceived value of a particular object.  To describe oneself as doing “spinning” in an 
economic sense—to say “I spin” (ia prokruchivau)—is to talk of one's attempt to buy low 
and sell high, or, to use the English idiom, “to flip.” The three verbs—krutit'sia, 
rasskruchivat', and prokruchivat'—share the same root. Hence, when people talk of any 
one of these “spinnings,” they often refer to performing all three activities at once. While 
most often the connection between these three activities remains implicit and assumed, 
sometimes it is explicated. Once, when I asked Andrei how was doing, he responded with 
a grim smile, “Kruchus', rasskruchivaiu, prokruchivaiu.” He was madly running from 
place to place trying to convince people to buy something that he himself bought earlier 
and hoped to sell at a higher price. 
Valdis used this idiom to describe an interpretive activity: to “spin” various events—
potentially given to multiple interpretations—into a coherent narrative which legitimated 
a particular political agenda. However, it was clear to all of Valdis’s listeners that this 
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interpretive activity expanded far beyond the political sector; it was the major operating 
principle of post-socialist economy. For aspiring politicians, the market was neither a site 
where values of certain products (like language skills) could be realized, nor a site were 
moral values became transactional and therefore corrupted. Rather, it was the site where 
products were “spun”—or, to use an English equivalent, “flipped”—to realize a profit. 
Success of “flipping” depended on the success of “spinning”: i.e., convincing the buyer 
that there was some value-added to the product that they were considering to buy.  
However, this was an illusion: people who “flipped” needed people who “spun” (the PR-
men) precisely because they had to convince their audience that whatever object they 
offered had value while, in fact, it did not. In this frame, political parties were little 
different from, say, travel agencies: both were intermediaries who “flipped” rather than 
produced; both relied heavily on “spinning”—employing PR-men, advertising agencies, 
image-consultants—in order to create an illusion of value. Therein lay a significant 
distinction between aspiring politicians and social activists. Insofar as social activists 
understood their predicament in terms of corruption or stultification of value, they 
evaluated their current predicament against an idealized value. Insofar as aspiring 
politicians understood their predicament in terms of an illusory value, they had no easily-
available standard for (and therefore could not conduct) such an evaluation. 
The difference between aspiring politicians and social activists resonated with the 
difference among Latvia’s Russian-speaking residents. Some of them had a clear sense of 
values—either economic or moral—which became either stultified or corrupted; these 
residents were typically “tuned into” Latvia’s political discourse. However, many people 
did not partake in any social or political project and adopted what they referred to as a 
“non-political” or an “anti-political” position and refused to engage in conversation about 
politics all together. (This was a contemporary incarnation of a well-documented Soviet 
attitude of isolating oneself from ‘the political world’; a position which became much 
more available when participation in political discourse was no longer necessary for 
everyday life) For them, any conversation about politics was a form of “prodigal speech” 
(slovobludie). 
In fact, many of the people who listened to Valdis’s lecture—who attended the Loyalists’ 
and the Humanists’ meetings—came from places where this position was dominant. They 
were surrounded by people—teachers, parents, and friends—who refused to talk about 
politics in Latvia. These people did not take kindly to Valdis’ refusal to speak 
“concretely” about the Latvian state. While they agreed with Valdis that their predicament 
was that of “spinning,” they did not think that it was impossible to talk about Latvian 
politics “concretely.” It was their commitment to find a “concrete” language that made 
them come out on a cold winter night to hear Valdis; 
During my fieldwork, the opposition between “spinning” and “concreteness” recurred. 
The Loyalists spent a great deal of time looking for a language which would be 
“concrete” and discussing the best ways to avoid spinning. As Pavel explained to me after 
Valdis’s lecture, his attempt to avoid spinning was laudable, yet ill conceived. According 
to Pavel, spinning was not a phenomenon endemic to certain events (like post-socialist 
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transformation in Latvia); it was also a phenomenon endemic to certain concepts. Three 
concepts were particularly liable to spinning and thus not suitable for a meaningful 
conversation about Latvian politics: “nationalism,” “party,” and “state.”
All aspiring politicians realized how endemic the concept of “nationalism” has become 
since the restoration of the Latvian independence. Yet, Pavel warned people attending his 
talk against describing politicians as “nationalist.” The party which was often described
—both by the Russian-Latvian as well as foreign press—as “nationalistic” was called 
“For Fatherland and Freedom.” Yet, for members of this party, nationalism was little 
other than a spin: public talk, a soap-box, a means to get heard. It was a matter of public 
record, Yulia and others insisted, that members of this party were, in the Soviet period, 
members of the Communist Party and, in the post-Soviet period, accepted money from 
Russia's business elite.5 “For Fatherland and Freedom” was juxtaposed with “All for 
Latvia,” —a party which at that point did not have any parliamentary seats. According to 
Pavel, members of this party could be legitimately described as “nationalist”: they were 
not afraid to voice positions which would cost them support of moderate voters; thus, 
“their words had weight.” This demarcation was hardly an empty lip-service. When Pavel 
established a mock city council, he insisted on inviting representatives from “All for 
Latvia” despite being told not to do so by his allies in the parliament. Here, the criteria 
was less of “ideological correctness” –i.e., the tension between ‘nationalist’ and ‘civic’ 
positions—than sincerity which was credited with giving words weight. 
As Pavel explained to the attendees of his own political school, it was difficult to have a 
meaningful conversation about the ‘state’ because the concept could be “spun” in any 
way that the speaker wanted. In fact, this was Pavel’s major complaint with respect to 
Valdis’s lecture. The immediate context for this point was the argument over whether or 
not “state” was a form that could be “interrupted.” This question arose in light of the 
Latvian parliament’s adoption of the doctrine of state continuity in the 1990s: i.e., the 
position that Latvian statehood was not interrupted; a position which legitimated non-
extension of Latvian citizenship to Russians. This position was reinforced by the recent 
debates over the statehood of Southern Ossetia and Kosovo. In this context, “what was a 
state?” was no less puzzling a question than “What was the nation?” Thirdly, this 
referenced a longstanding conversation—and obsession about—gosudarstvennost’ in 
Russian political discourse.  Trying to avoid spinning words, Pavel encouraged people to 
talk about “government regimes” rather than “states”: about the difference between 
parliamentary and presidential republics, unicameral and bicameral parliaments, etc. 
Another concept liable to being spun was “the party.” As Pavel explained, the “party” 
used to be the concept designating a group of people who came together based on a 
shared ideology—in this context understood as a conscious commitment to a particular 
5 Russia's business elite was suspected of having a vested interest in keeping the relationship 
between Latvian and Russian government (i.e., between Riga and Moscow) as tense as possible. These 
businessmen were suspected of keeping vast amounts of money in Latvian banks; treating Latvia as a 
“nearby Switzerland.” Fragility of diplomatic contacts was taken to be indicative of the Russian 
government's inability to reach this money.  
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vision of the world. However, the majority of today’s parties were not “ideological.” 
Instead, today’s parties were fragile conglomerations of people around the person of the 
leader.  If one hoped to have a “concrete” conversation about politics, then one could not 
focus on party programs. The programs were lifted from the internet, assembled at last 
minute, written by journalists. They were filled with “stock phrases” (iazykovye shtampy) 
and said nothing concrete.6  Having a meaningful conversation about politics required 
discussing party leaders: something that Pavel did with utmost scrupulousness spending 
two hours going over biographies. 
Despite being critical of one another, Valdis and Pavel shared the concern over 
“concreteness.” In both cases, this concern led to the disappearance of Latvia as an object 
of analysis. In the case of Valdis—due to his historical abstraction that explicitly aimed to 
talk about the state in general; in the case of Pavel—due to this encyclopedic 
particularism which focused on individual politicians. Students who attended Pavel’s 
lectures were just as unsatisfied as students who attend Valdis’s lectures. Yet, they kept 
coming: it was the only space where it was possible to have an honest conversation about 
the lack of ‘concreteness.’ 
In  Chapter 2, I discussed how aspiring politicians—a group of actors that are quite 
distinct from mainstream, easily identifiable political actors —avoid framing the problem 
of Russian noncitizenship as a matter of rights. They avoid this frame because they aspire 
not only to be elected into the parliament but to also to have a chance of participating in a 
governing coalition, something that mainstream political actors, particularly those who 
are keen on self-identifying as Russian and those who compel state to recognize Latvia’s 
“Russians,” have not accomplished. Furthermore, I argued that aspiring politicians come 
together insofar as they recognize that there is a contradiction between, on the one hand, 
desire to participate in formal politics—i.e., the desire to appeal to one’s constituents and 
one’s colleagues—and, on the other hand, the compulsion to either assert difference (by 
self-identifying as a minority subject) or to suppress difference altogether. Finally, I 
argued that their sociality speaks to this particular predicament—and a self-consciously 
articulated sense of being committed to politika—rather than to a particular identity or a 
goal. 
In this chapter, I turned from the question of noncitizenship to the question of language; 
and shifted focus from the Latvian state’s refusal to recognize many of its Russian 
residents as citizens to the Latvian state’s refusal to recognize Russian as an official 
language. Correspondingly, I attended to how various political actors engaging questions 
like: How can the government be compelled to recognize the value of Russian language? 
Why is speaking Russian important? How should Russian language be promoted?  
Actors, who assume fairly identifiable positions with respect to formal political 
institutions, answer these questions by turning to various idioms of value (which are 
distinct, albeit related, to the idioms of right explored in Chapter 2). Actors, whose 
6 When I was asked about my research methodology and needed to explain “participant 
observation,” I always contrasted it with interviewing. This always communicated my point.  
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positions are not very clear—young men and women to whom I refer to as “aspiring 
politicians”—do not approve of this turn; but, instead, partake in discussions about 
language by engaging the problem of politika. 
* 
In the first two sections of the chapter, I traced a conflict between two older Russian 
activists. Here, my protagonists are Leonid and Feodor — two men who share a grave 
concern over the effects of “Latvian nationalism” on Russian language; yet, at the same 
time, are unable to work together. In the eyes of many, they illustrate the problem of 
“Russian factionalism” that is so often blamed for the persistence of Latvian nationalism 
in the first place. Analyzing concerns with “factionalism,” I showед how matters, 
seemingly limited to issues of language, come to occupy a central role in much broader 
narratives about the aftermath of state socialism.   
   
In the third section of the chapter, I discussеd an attempt—spearheaded by young Russian 
social activists also concerned with the effect of Latvian nationalism on the Russian 
language—to reconcile the two diagnoses of the post-socialist predicament. Here, I 
looked at how young social activists appeal to the concept of “value” in order to 
emphasize a similarity and/or find a middle ground between “entrepreneurial” and 
“moral” positions; and, as a result to protect and/ or capitalize on the “value” of Russian 
in a period marked by Latvian nationalism.  
In the third part of the chapter, I analyzed how aspiring politicians—a set of actors who 
are not easily identifiable either as party- or parliamentary-politicians or political activists
—refuse to appeal to value.  As in previous chapters, I argueд that their refusal speaks to 
heir concern with politika. On the most immediate level, this concern has to do with 
electoral politics: unlike social activists, aspiring politicians are invested in the electoral 
system. On a deeper level, politika speaks to aspiring politicians' hesitance to run on 
promises of “limiting politics” (which, to recall, may paradoxically mean “extending the 
state apparatus” insofar as “the state” is imagined as a politically-neutral institution).  
However, even more significantly, at stake in politika is a longing for action in concert: 
acting with someone rather than acting on something.
*
My interlocutors' arguments about politics and language emerge from two analytically 
discrete concerns. The first set of concerns—characteristic of mainstream political actors 
(party politicians, political activists, public intellectuals, etc.) —draws on a very concrete 
understanding of language and revolves around the relationship between Russian and 
Latvian in contemporary Latvia. In this context, the central issue is the effect of Latvian's 
language policy on Russian language. Here two aspects of language policy are 
particularly important. The first is the attempt to make Latvian a dominant language of 
instruction in Russian schools by requiring that the general curriculum (Math, Physics, 
History) is taught in Latvian rather than Russian. The second is the attempt to promote 
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the dominance of Latvian in the consumer goods sector by requiring all front-line 
employees to have a certain facility with Latvian irrespective of what, where, and how 
they may enter economic transactions. In this context, language tends to be understood as 
a site of value and an object of policy; whereas “politics” tends to figure as a morally-
compromised and economically-shortsighted attempt to undermine the value of Russian 
(and Russians) in post-soviet Latvia. 
The second set of concerns—characteristic of actors who cannot be easily identified and 
to whom I refer to as “aspiring politicians”—revolves around a conceptual understanding 
of language.  In this context,  I am not talking about people invested in “Russian 
language” or “their language. ”  Instead, I focus on young men and women invested into 
the work of concepts, appropriateness of vocabularies, and availability of grammars. Here 
people are concerned less with the value of a specific language (Russian, Latvian or 
English) then with a political lexicon shared by multiple languages — lexicon which 
includes words like “nationalism,” “party,” and the “state.”   For this set of actors—who, 
once again, cannot be linked to clearly identifiable positions and to whom I refer to as 
“aspiring politicians”—language does not figure as a cultural marker, a matter of ethnic 
identity, and object of policy. Rather, language becomes construed as a vehicle for 
thought and action; and deterioration of language becomes cast as a matter of political 
impasse. In other words, whereas the first set of actors worries about the effect of 
nationalist politics on the Russian language; the second set of actors (young men and 
women to whom I refer to as “aspiring politicians”) worry about the effect of language, 
dominated by terms like “nationalism,” on politics. 
Unlike actors, who are often glossed as “liberal” or “pro-EU” activists, aspiring 
politicians do not compel the state apparatus to stop meddling with the labor market. 
Unlike actors, who are often glossed as “socialist” or “pro-Russia” activists,  aspiring 
politicians do not compel high school students to stop “selling out” to the highest bidder 
(sometimes figured as the state apparatus; sometimes as Western tourists). As in previous 
chapters, I struggle to define aspiring politicians’ positively—that is to say, independently 
of actors who have clearly identifiable positions.  Correspondingly, the relationship 
between politics and language comes to be configured less in the idiom of “freedom from 
politics” but rather in the practice of political education.
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CHAPTER IV
The Place of Culture
This chapter explores the significance of “culture” in narratives about Latvia’s Russian 
question.  Over the last two decades, “culture” emerged as a central object of debate—
distinct, yet closely related, to arguments about ethnic identification and language 
(respectively explored in Chapters 2 and 3).
 
Most of these debates approach “culture” as an site of policy intervention.  This approach 
reflects a socialist experience of state-mandated investment in aesthetic production and 
humanistic education. Furthermore, this approach reflects: a contemporary institutional 
configuration (similarly to other post-socialist states, Latvia has a “Ministry of 
Culture”)1; consequences of European integration (Latvia is involved in the EU 
Parliament, the Council of the EU, and the European Commission all of which are 
engaged in various forms of cultural programming); and the influence of the Russian 
Federation’s near-abroad / compatriot policy in Latvia (specifically, the “Russian World” 
Foundation).  
Debates concerning culture often revolve around involve arguments about the meaning of 
culture. Some actors take “culture” to stand for  a dimension of everyday life. Other 
actors limit it to the realm of arts & letters. Generally, the former are more sympathetic to 
cultural policies sponsored by the EU (which, at least on the level of explicit rhetorical 
formulation refuses to endorse a hierarchy of particular “cultures”).  The latter are more 
supportive of cultural policies sponsored by the RF (which does not shy away from 
placing Russia top of a cultural hierarchy). 
Below, I carefully attend to various academics’, artists’, and activists’ disagreements 
about the meaning  of culture and their debates about appropriate cultural policy.  Yet, at 
the same time, I seek to highlight many of these actors’ shared contempt for formal 
politics. Then, in the second part of the chapter, I juxtapose this contempt with aspiring 
politicians’ attempt to approach culture and politics in novel and, according to them,  
more productive ways.  
*
During my fieldwork, I repeatedly came across a claim that “the parliament was the only 
place in Latvia where one could find Latvians and and Russians sitting on the opposite 
sides of the same room.” Responding to my interest in Latvia’s Russian question, my 
informants urged me to get as far away from the parliament as possible—to  avoid what, 
in their opinion was a fundamental,  albeit all-too-frequent, reduction of the Russian 
1 Germany is an interesting site of comparison—not least because Eastern European approaches to 
culture have been profoundly marked by German (rather than British) approaches to the concept. 
Contemporary Germany does not have a “Ministry of Culture.” German hesitance to have a centralized, 
state-administered cultural policy reflects post-war institutional reforms: FDR sought to minimize state 
intervention in the cultural industry (GDR, however, had a Ministry of Culture up until its dissolution).
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question to the impasse of formal politics. 
The first half of the chapter discusses various actors’ search for an alternative to the 
parliamentary chamber.  These actors emphasize a disjunction between “politics” (which 
they cast as a site of Russian-Latvian disagreement and conflict) and “culture” (which 
they cast as a site of Latvian-Russian cooperation and harmony).  Depending on their 
understanding of “culture,” they compel me to go to the theater—so that I can observe 
Russians and Latvians sitting side by side enjoying the same play; or, alternatively, to go 
to a village—where I can see how Russians and Latvians find a common language as 
they seek to go about their everyday business. 
In the Section 1, I discuss my meeting with Prof. Rubins—a noted expert on Latvia’s 
Russian question. Here, I explore his claim that Riga has always been a privileged site for 
the production and consumption of Russian arts & letters; and follow his advice to go to 
the theater.  In Section 2, I discuss my meeting with Prof. Murniece—another noted 
expert on Latvia’s Russian question. Here, I explore her claims about the depth of cultural 
ties between Russians and Latvians in Latgale, Latvia’s easternmost region; and follow 
her advice to go to a Latgalian village. 
Most of my interlocutors interpret Prof. Rubins’ and Prof. Murniece’s approaches to 
culture—indexed by their respective enjoyment of “theater” and “village”—as opposing.  
Indeed, it is not unusual to find the “villagers” accusing  the “thespians” of profound 
elitism (as well as an implicit endorsement of the Russian Federation’s emphasis on a 
hierarchy of world cultures).  Similarly, it is not unusual to find the “thespians” accusing 
the “villagers” of naiveté, folklorization (as well as selling out to the European Union). 
However, while Prof. Rubins and Prof. Murniece draw on different concepts of  culture 
(possibly oriented towards opposing geopolitical projects), they both emphasize a 
fundamental separation between “politics” and “culture.” In other words, however 
different, the two sites of culture—metonymically indicated by “theater” and “village”—
have value precisely insofar as they indicate something different from “politics.”  
In the second half of the chapter, I shift my attention from academics, activists, and artists 
to aspiring politicians—young men and women who pursue elected political office; and 
who are expected to demonstrate their involvement with various Russian cultural causes 
as they seek out allies, and develop a public profile.  
In Section 3, I explore the aspiring politicians’  attempt to establish an alliance with youth 
activists involved with amateur theater.   Describing the pressures to create this alliance, I 
explore its breakdown following various participants' disagreement over a fitting name 
for the new venture.  It is possible to interpret this disagreement in terms of the 
participants’ different understanding of “culture”—the theater activists’ emphasis on “arts 
and letters” and aspiring politicians’ emphasis on “the everyday life.” This interpretation 
seems particularly justified by aspiring politicians’ explicitly articulated dislike of 
intelligentsia — a class of people who take it upon themselves to bring “culture to the 
people.” 
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Yet, as I show in Section 4, aspiring politicians’ dislike of intelligentsia is matched only 
by their dislike of “the common folk.” Exploring my interlocutors’ involvement with 
independence day celebrations, I analyze their unease with an attempt to look at Latgale 
as a model of “cultural harmony” that contrasts with “political strife.”  Thus, I come back 
to my earlier point that my interlocutors’ arguments about “culture” speak less to their 
commitment to a particular concept of culture than to their attempt to rethink the 
relationship between politics and culture.   Section 5 explores this attempt by analyzing 
their engagement with the work of Latvian national poet Rainis—who, at one point, 
proposed to introduce a new word allowing to distinguish between “ethnic” and 
“cultural” Latvians. Section 6 explores this attempt by analyzing their appreciation of a 
very particular Soviet-era TV show; and their turn to “game” or “play” as an alternative 
to “the village” and to “the theater” alike.
 
1. Moves and Movies 
One of the first people I talked with about Russian culture in Latvia was Prof. Rubins – a 
noted academic expert on the Russian question.  Prof. Rubins was quick to emphasize the 
“artificial” nature of this question. According to him, it was “a political invention”—
meant to agitate the public during election campaigns. In fact, it did not take much to see 
the groundlessness of this question. All one had to do is leave the vicinity of Old Riga—
where the parliament was flanked by historic buildings and not posters were permitted—
and look around the city center. It was filled with poster boards announcing Russian 
plays, concerts, and festivals. Even Kiev, which Rubins just came back from, did not 
have nearly as many Russian cultural events as Riga did.2  
I recalled Prof. Rubins's advice some months later when I came across posters advertising 
a Russian Film Festival.  The Festival was held at a multiplex cinema complex called 
Parex Plaza after a bank  was established by a Russian-Jewish entrepreneur in the 1990s. 
(The entrepreneur did not have to undergo naturalization; instead, he received his Latvian 
citizenship in virtue of his “services to the state”—yet another illustration of how 
Latvians and Russians got along on the economic level.) In 2008 Parex took a rapid 
2 Kiev (or Kyiv) is the capital of Ukraine—much of which was part of the the Russian Empire, 
particularly after the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth between Russia, Austria, and 
Prussia. After the October Revolution of 1917, it seemed as though Ukraine would follow suit of 
Poland's, Finland's, and the Baltic State's successful claims to independence. However, the Red Army 
occupied the city and Ukraine did not gain independence until 1991. In a common gesture, Prof. Rubins 
took Kiev to be (a now foreign) city “culturally closest” to Moscow. This gesture rested not only on the 
perception of Ukraine as “culturally closest” to Russia but also on understanding of Ukraine as 
“culturally polarized” by Kiev and Lvov. Kievan  Rus' is conventionally taken to be a birthplace of 
Russian Christendom and Russian statehood (the Rurik Dynasty—which ruled Russia until the 
installment of the Romanovs in he 17th century—begins in Kiev). Lvov (or L'viv) was a part of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Poland. It was only following 
World War II that it became a part of Ukraine. (Under Soviet regime, Ukraine gained a considerable 
amount of territory: in addition to Stalin's annexation of Eastern Poland; there was Khrushchev's 
transfer of the Crimean peninsula from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SFSR). 
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plunge: about to collapse, it was bought out by the Latvian government (which did not 
revoke its founder's citizenship even though there was now a shadow of doubt as to his 
virtues). The cinema complex remained standing (and not renamed). In a number of my 
conversations, it was used as an emblem of Russian-Latvian cultural harmony. Its 
stadium seats were used as much by Russians as they were by Latvians; its movies had 
two set of subtitles—Latvian on the top and Russian on the bottom; even the movie 
tickets were personalized based on the language that the customer used to place the order.
To get from the Old City (emblematic of “politics” as a site of conflict) to Parex Plaza 
(emblematic of “economics” and “culture” as a site of harmony) one had to go through an 
underground tunnel. The tunnel was lined with pensioners who asked for alms. Seeking 
shelter from the weather, they leaned against the the tiled walls which, during my stay, 
were plastered with advertising murals for a major cell-phone company called Zelta 
Zivtiņа—the Golden Fish. The Golden Fish is a staple figure of Russian literature—
incarnated in a fairy-tale titled The Golden Fish and The Old Man, written in verse by 
Pushkin.  The tale tells the story of an old poor fisherman who catches a golden fish 
which, begging him for her life, offers to grant him a wish. The fisherman says that he 
does not need much and lets the fish go. When his wife hears about this, she grows angry 
saying that she can't even afford to replace her broken laundry basin. The fisherman 
obliges and asks the Golden Fish for a new laundry basin. Yet, his wife grows hungry. 
Her hunger is for power rather than wealth: first she wants to be a noblewoman, then a 
tsarina, and, finally, an empress of the seas. The fish grants all but the last wish, upon 
hearing which, she takes everything away, leaving the old woman with nothing but a 
broken laundry basin. To this day, no Pushkin verse is as widespread as “to remain by a 
broken basin” (ostat'sia u razbitogo koryta)—an idiom of ruin which follows greed. In 
Pushkin's tale, the Golden Fish is an arbiter of just measure; yet, its contemporary 
incarnation—which playfully circled around pensioners leaning against the wall—
seemed to be anything but just.
The film which was the festival's centerpiece was Pavel Lungin's The Tsar, a historical 
drama set during the Livonian Wars (1558-1583).  The wars were fought among Russia, 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Sweden over the control of Livonian 
territories which included present-day Latvia.  As the film opens, the war is not going 
particularly well for Russia.  When Russian soldiers loose Polotsk to the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth—their battle takes place on the Polota river, Daugava's 
estuary—they come to Moscow. There, they hide with Metropolotian Filip, Ivan's one-
time childhood friend who now heads the church. Ivan finds out that Filip harbors 
escapees and has them tortured and executed. As Filip protests Ivan's cruelty he is himself 
starved and strangled. When monks faithful to Filip refuse to give up his body to Ivan's 
henchmen, they are burnt alive.  The film's ends with a scene in a torture game park 
commissioned by Ivan from Heinrich von Staden, a German engineer, a spy and an 
amateur ethnographer. Ivan, who ordered people of Moscow to come to the park, is 
shown alone in a gray snowy twilight. His last words are a question, “Where are my 
people?” 
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On an important level, The Tsar is a film about political tyranny; or, to be more exact, 
about tyranny as the only kind of politics that is possible in Russia. (Lungin indicated 
something like this during his remarks prior to the screening: according to him, we were 
about to witness something that Russians have been living with for the last 500 years). 
The “other” of political tyranny (embodied in Ivan) is not religious belief. In fact, Ivan 
spends far more time praying than Filip. (And, in addition to this, there's a crucial meta-
theatrical element structuring the film: the actor who plays Ivan became famous after 
playing a holy-fool in Lungin's The Island ; the actor who plays Filip became famous 
after playing a church-defying Baron Munchausen in the film of the same name which 
ends with a shot of the Baron  climbing up a ladder thrown down from the sky). The 
conflict central to the film is between political tyranny (supported, rather than opposed, 
by Europe: it is the German ethnographer who designs implements of torture) and some 
sort of humanism (very much grounded in Russian cultural tradition). In other words, the 
conflict is between “politics” and “culture.” 
  
The film's ending is darkly utopian for almost no one deserts historical Ivan. Yet, in 
Latvia, this ending has a different hue.  As visitors to Cesis, or Koknese, or Bauska—to 
name just a few of Latvia's towns famous for their medieval castles—quickly find out 
Ivan failed to get to the Baltic; Russia lost the Livonian Wars. In other words, when seen 
in Riga, The Tsar plays on a historical imaginary in which Latvia connotes “freedom” and 
Russia connotes “tyranny.” 
I have heard this imaginary developed in a variety of ways. Some stuck to the medieval 
period and contrasted the fate of Livonia with that of Novgorod—a Russian medieval 
republic which was crushed by Ivan.3 Others moved to the early-modern period and 
situated Latvia as a place of refuge to Russia's Orthodox Old Believers who fled from 
religious prosecution following Patriarch Nikon's reforms.4 Yet others moved onto the 
Soviet period and discussed how Riga's location—distance from Moscow, ports on the 
Baltic Sea, proximity to the West—made it a place where one could have a comparatively 
unencumbered access to foreign consumer goods (particularly jeans), music, samizdat, 
and so on. 
 
Seen in Latvia, The Tsar serendipitously illustrated Rubins' point that Latvia offered a 
unique place for the production and consumption of Russian arts & letters.  Therein lay 
the basis of the argument that “culture was a space of Russian-Latvian harmony.” It did 
so by drawing forth a well-established narrative of Latvia as a place of (relative) freedom 
when it came to all spheres of life—which in addition to “culture” could include 
3 Novgorod was the only Russian principality which was not conquered by the Tartar-Mongols in 
the 12th century (although it did pay the tribute to the Golden Horde); and one of a few that was ruled by 
a council. Like Riga, Novgorod was the member of the Hanseatic League. The fall of Novgorod 
coincided with the rise of Muscovy and the latter's subjugation of / freedom from the Tartar-Mongols in 
the 15th century. 
4 Beginning in 1652, Patriarch Nikon sought to bring Russian liturgical practices in line with what 
he understood to be the Greek originals. Among his reforms were a new spelling of “Jesus”; a 
reformulation of the Nicene Creed (which has been a subject of much contention since the split between 
the Roman and the Byzantine Church in the 11th century); and various modifications of rituals. 
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“government,” “religion,” “fashion” and so on. The reason that some of my interlocutors 
turned to “culture” as a pivot of freedom had to do with the fact that it was much easier 
for them to claim a position of a “cultured person”—a member of intelligentsia—than, 
say,  a position of a religious practitioner. While offered in a response to a set question 
about “culture,” Rubins's methodological advice—to look at the posters rather than listen 
to political babble—nevertheless drew upon this general imaginary of “freedom from 
politics.” position. My other interlocutors performed a similar move, albeit through a 
poetic recitation rather than a methodological imperative. 
When, at the beginning of my fieldwork (at the time when my set goal was to “study 
Russians in Latvia), I inquired as to the particularity of Latvia's Russian experience, one 
interlocutor responded by quoting from Brodsky's poem Letters to a Roman Friend, 
citing a verse which praised the freedom of the seaside hut over the seat of the empire.5 
Another informant shared a verse from Grebenshchikov's ballad Crème and Caramel to 
make a similar point: to position Russia as an empire which leads to slumber and 
passivity and Latvia as a place of unencumbered creativity.6 The stakes of the poetic 
citation could not be reduced to the contrast between free Latvia and servile Russia; 
rather, they very much involved the contrast between Culture (as a sphere of freedom) 
and Politics (as a sphere of domination); as well as to locate oneself within the sphere of 
Culture—to position oneself as a member of intelligentsia.  
2. The Village Folk 
The narrative of “culture” as a space of Latvian-Russian harmony had another side. In 
addition to those who took kul'tura to be a space of arts & letters, there were those who 
took kul'tura to be a dimension of the everyday life. The latter was even more distant 
from the Old Town then the former: to get a dose of arts & letters, one could always walk 
from the Old Town to a theater; however, to get a dose of the everyday, one had to take a 
train and go a village—preferably somewhere in Latgale.
The first person who advised me to go to a village was Prof. Murniece, a noted Latvian 
ethnographer. We met in the Old Town, at a place called The Galric Pub. The pub's chef 
expanded the use of garlic—typically used in a butter-spread on fried rye-bread served 
with beer—to the entirety of Latvian cuisine. To make after-dinner conversations 
palatable, waiters brought out complementary bouquets of parsley with the bill. “You 
chew on it,” Prof. Murniece  explained, sensing my confusion. 
During our meeting, Prof. Murniece told me what I've heard before and was to hear again 
5 The literal translation of the line is: “If you're destined to born in an empire/ It is better to live in a 
far-away province, by the sea” (Esli vypalo v Imperii rodit'sia / Luchshe zhit' v glukhoi provincii u 
moria). In the poem, Brodsky  speaks with the voice of exiled Martial writing a letter to Postumus who 
continues to reside in rome. 
6 The literal translation of the line is “There's no news in a good empire / Leave some vodka by the 
bedside of the northern barbarians / And not a single one will desire change” (A v khoroshei imperii net 
novostei / Daite severnym varvaram vodki v postel' / I nikto iz nih ne stanet zhelat' peremen).  
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and again: Latgale was a place where Russians, Latvians, and Jews lived peacefully for 
centuries. (The Baltic Germans and the Poles were not mentioned; in contemporary 
context, neither was “a sensitive issue.”) Their harmonious co-existence was a 
consequence of their shared past and their shared tie to the land: it was to be found in 
language, songs, and material culture—all of which were currently studied by 
ethnographers. 
*
In the spring, I made a point of following up on Prof. Murniece advice and went out in a 
search of village  harmony. The first place I visited was a small town called  Alūksne 
which lay very close Vidzeme – Latgale border.  Alūksne's claim to fame is two-fold. It 
was a town where a German Lutheran pastor, named Ernst Gluck, was the first one to 
translate the Bible from Latin to Latvian. Gluck is revered as the founding figure of 
Latvian lexicography. It was also a town where Count Sheremetiev, Russian field-
marshall in The Northern War–  which saw the transfer of Latvian and Estonian territories 
from Sweden to Russia –  found a woman who was to become Peter The Great's wife. 
The woman, at that point known as Marta Skawronska, was Ernst Gluck's adopted 
daughter or a housemaid. The pastoral romance between Peter and Marta—shortly to 
become baptized as Catherine in the Russian Orthodox Church—was the stuff of 
harmony fairy-tales. 
Raisa took me to The Gluck's museum. The museum turned out to be a one-room stone 
house, located in the yard of a Lutheran kirkha,7 where Gluck is purported to have 
worked. In the region, the museum is known for its collection of bibles in many of the 
world's languages. I was greeted by the museum's curator, who, upon finding out that I 
am an anthropologist, asked me to identify the language of one of the Bibles. Unable to 
do this, yet no longer attempting to explain that “over there ethnography is different,” I 
took a picture of the Bible and promised to try and find an expert who could figure out 
the language. 
The curator, a full-bodied woman in her early 30s, was glad to show me around the 
church. We spoke Russian, although I, as always, inquired in my token Latvian, whether 
or not she would prefer me to speak Russian or English; and Raisa offered to translate. 
There was no need, the curator said, she was happy to practice her Russian.  When we 
went out to the courtyard, she pointed to the rooster atop of the kirkha. Most of Latvia's 
kirkhas have roosters who remind the parishioners of Christ's prophecy that Peter would 
betray him three times before the cock crows. The curator said that there was a problem 
with their rooster. According to her, when Russians pushed out the Germans in 1944, they 
used the rooster as a target practice. Not repaired since then, the rooster gradually filled 
up rain water; and the church needed the money to drain it. I gave the little change I had. 
7 Kirkha is a Russian transliteration of Swedish kirka (church.) Many of my interlocutors reserved  
tserkov' (Russian for “church”) to  talk about Russian Orthodox houses of worship, and used kirkha  to 
refer to Lutheran houses of worship and kostiol (Russian transliteration of Polish kościół) refers to 
Catholic houses of worship. 
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As we were driving back to Raisa's farm, she grew upset.  “Why did you give her your 
money?” she asked. “Last month, when I took my friends from Russia to the museum, 
she told them that the Germans shot the rooster!” Yet, this comment was not followed up 
by a fairly standardized account of how Latvians supported the Nazis rather than the Red 
Army. Instead, after a pause, Raisa added, “These Lutherans...They swayed from the 
Church. You know, they are the ones with the political agenda of promoting 
homosexuality in Europe.”8 
Before having a chance to think about the stakes of Raisa's comment, we arrived to her 
family farm. Right by the entrance gate, we were greeted by hissing from a gaggle, 
formed by two gray geese and  a row of goslings behind them. “Be careful!” Raisa said, 
her face suddenly beaming with a smile. “They can be a little aggressive towards 
strangers. It turned out that we slaughtered a goose last fall,” she added. “This left us with 
two ganders—something we found out this spring, when neither one laid eggs. So, My 
father got some goslings, and the geese really took to them. Two ganders are definitely 
better than a goose and a gander, when it comes to parenting,” she concluded. “They are 
really defensive: not a single gosling has disappeared!” 
*
During my next trip to the village, I had to work hard to abstain from inquiring into 
politics of gay ganders and did my best to confine myself to questions of citizenship.  
Most of my interviewees said that they did not know anyone who had problems restoring 
citizenship. “Is it because everyone lived here before 1940?” I asked. “This too,” they 
responded. Indeed, many of Latgale's Russians lived in Latgale before 1940. However, 
there was a wryness in the reply which referenced something in excess of a legal basis for 
citizenship. It referenced a personal connection that was not less important than a legal 
justification if someone wanted to get something accomplished. In addition to having a 
practical dimension, this connection made naturalization and language accreditation 
procedures more welcoming than they would be in the large city. In other words, there 
was a sense that in Latgale, people could always “reach an agreement.” Yet this 
agreement was not to be construed in an image of inter-cultural harmony, propagated by 
Prof. Murniece,  or even a “purely personal level” mentioned by many of my Latgalian 
informants. Natalia.  
When I spoke with Irina, a member of the Loyalists, who was also from Latgale,  she also 
told em that “the Russian question” is specific to Riga; and that, in Latgale “everything 
was fine.” However, it was fine neither because of intercultural harmony or a purely 
personal relationships. This became quite evident when I asked Irina what went on in 
8 In the Latvian context, which, as one of the Loyalists's leading members was intent on reminding 
everyone, was the European context, Raisa's point was quite problematic. The head of The Latvian 
Lutheran Church, after purging his opponents from power, was happy to join his counterparts in The 
Russian Orthodox Church and The Catholic Church in order to fight the geopolitical threat of 
homosexuality.  
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Latgale in 2004, during the protests against the education reform. In Riga, the protests 
resulted in a virtual shut down of schools: students joined the teachers in a massive walk 
out. Irina said that she did not know anyone who took place in the protests. “A person 
from municipal government would call the school principle,” she explained, “and ask 
him, nicely, as a friend, to make sure that nobody leaves the school. If this didn't work, he 
hinted that there could be problems with funding.” Like in Soviet times, school principles 
are more often delegated from above rather than nominated from below. However, what 
is specific to Latgale is that, unlike in Riga, “above” and “below” are very lose to each 
other; hierarchy is intimate rather than impersonal—hence, “the economy of favors” (c.f. 
Ledeneva 1998). 
3. Culture to the People!
Some time after the ambassador's address at the Russian Compatriot Conference 
(described in Chapter 2), I took part in a meeting of several youth groups. Most of youth 
in attendance heard the ambassador's speech; and, in fact, got together with a hope of 
founding some sort of a consortium which would remedy the problem which was referred 
to as “factionalism.” Yet, the meeting began with a remark which, in retrospect, offered 
an analytical explanation of the rift within a group of people which was consistently 
referred to as “Russian youth.” A young man took the floor and urged everyone present to 
acknowledge the fact that people in attendance were from two very different types of 
organizations—“cultural” and “political.” 
The meeting proceeded with a discussion about the name for the proposed consortium. 
Everyone present took it for granted that the name should not have the word “Russian.” 
(The possibility of using terms “Russian Compatriots” and “Ethnic Minorities”—the 
former advocated by policy-makers from the European Union; the latter advocated by 
policy-makers from the Russian Federation—was not even discussed.) One of the people 
in the room articulated a widely held view that if an organization had the word “Russian” 
in its title, many people would think that its members have “a national preoccupation” 
(nazional'naia ozabochennost'). At that point, Marc, who represented one of 
organizations which identified as “cultural,” suggested using the world razhnochitsy as a 
part of the consortium's name. 
Raznochintsy means “people of different ranks.”9  This word appeared in the Russian 
language following Peter the Great's attempt to rationalize Russian statecraft in the 17th 
century: to formalize the relationship between state authorities and state subjects based on 
rank (or estate). This term designated members of an uncertain estate—people who did 
not belong to the nobles, the clergy, the merchants, the city-dwellers, or the peasantry. 
The term was in active use up until the disintegration of the Russian Empire. In the 
aftermath of the Communist Revolution, nationality (natsional'nost') gradually replaced 
9 Raznochintsy is the plural form of raznochinets—a neologism which consists of the adjective 
razlichnye (different) and the noun chin (rank). 
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estate as a central mechanism of identification on state documents.10  One did not need to 
be a historical connoisseur to recognize that raznochintsy communicated a predicament 
of difference. However, archaic, it shared its root with everyday words for difference and 
different—razlichie, razhnitsa, raznye. 
This term was particularly appealing because it did not have a clear reference point (i.e., a 
point which made it possible to ascertain difference). First, raznochintsy indicated 
difference between two or more distinct groups—that is, a group of people with a 
determined rank and a group of people without a determined rank. On the other hand, 
raznhochintsy indicated difference within what was supposedly a group—difference 
among individuals who were habitually referred to as a coherent social unit yet did not 
share much.  Marc had an investment in both of these meanings insofar as they were 
quite resonant with the predicament of Latvia's Russians. Insofar as the term 
raznochintsy sought to compensate for the failure of usual categories, it was taken as 
analogous to nepilsoniba (noncitizenship)—the term that sought to perform a similar task 
in post-Soviet Latvia. Insofar as as the the term raznochintsy did not seek to hide a lack 
of a common ground among its designated subjects, it posed a counter-example to the 
term “Russian” which (among other reasons) was unsatisfactory because it hid this lack.  
However, when Marc proposed using raznochintsy as a part of a name for a new 
organization, he drew not only on the term's connotations of (ambiguous) difference, but 
also on its connotation of intelligentsia (intelligentsia). The 18th century marked the 
emancipation of Russian nobles from mandatory state service. Young nobles who sought 
a vocation outside of state institutions and pursued academic education coalesced into a 
social form which later became known as intelligentsia (Raeff 1966).11 By the middle of 
the 19th century the ranks of intelligentsia expanded as more and more young men 
pursued formal education and were no longer bound to repeat their fathers' careers 
(whether in the clergy, the military, or the trades).  It was at this point raznochintsy and 
intelligentsia started to be used interchangeably—in part, to describe a particular 
demographic; in part, to connote an egalitarian ideal. Intelligentsia's commitment to 
something that, over the 19th and early 20th century began to be called kul'tura , captured 
an alienation from state institutions, an idealization of education, and a pursuit of 
equality.  
When Marc suggested using raznochintsy for the consortium's title, he explicitly drew on 
a concept of kul'tura, saying that raznochintsy were “those who brought culture to the 
people.”  His suggestion was immediately rebuked: it drew on a concept of “culture” as a 
10 In addition to natsional'nost', klass (class) was indicated on all personal identification papers. 
However, klass was dropped in the mid 1930s after Stalin proclaimed that the class war was over; and 
(the remaining) members of formerly antagonistic classes were readmitted into the general franchise. 
Natsional'nost' remained in active use throughout the Soviet period. (See Fitzpatrick's Ascribing Class 
and Slezkine's The Communal Apartment).
11 It was only as a result of Catherine the Great's decision to grant Russian nobility a charter of rights 
that civil service ceased to be a compulsory obligation. Prior to the introduction of the charter, the 
relationship between the emperor (or the czar) and the nobles was analogous to the relationship between 
a master and his serfs. 
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domain of arts and letters and “culturedness” as a commitment to self-cultivation, 
necessary to become a part of this domain. For most people in the audience, this concept 
was not palatable. First, it rested on a hierarchical distinction between intelligentsia and 
obyvateli (the common-folk). Second, it involved a hierarchical distinction between 
“world cultures” (mirovaia kul'tura) and small cultures.  Both distinctions were troubling; 
the latter one especially so because it resonated with Soviet and post-Soviet discourses on 
cultural difference that were highly criticized.  
To explain this criticism, it is necessary to make a historical aside. In the 1920s, the 
Soviet government was highly critical of Russian chauvinism which was buttressed by a 
claim to the superiority of Russian culture. This was part and parcel of the Soviet 
commitment to ethnic federalism. However, by the 1930s and 1940s the situation 
changed.12 Russian culture was taken to be as “greater” than any other Soviet culture; and 
national poets were increasingly called upon to praise Russian culture's greatness.13  In 
the post-Soviet period, this narrative was perpetuated by a concept of “the Russian 
World” which, by the mid 2000s, emerged as a central aspect of Russia's foreign policy in 
the near-abroad. At stake in the word “world” was not a claim to some underlying unity 
among all the Russians who happened to live outside the Russian Federation but rather a 
claim to a particular kind of global / historical significance. 
Over the course of my fieldwork, I witnessed a number of rebukes to people suspected of 
drawing on this notion of culture. Some bemoaned “the reduction of cultural complexity 
to Pushkin.”14 Others argued that every culture had its own Pushkin—Rainis in Latvia, 
Shevchenko in Ukraine, Rustaveli in Georgia, etc. Some questioned the credentials of 
those who propagated this concept by describing them as people who just recently 
nashtukul'turis (something like “got whitewashed”).15 However, the great majority drew 
on an alternative concept of culture—a quasi-anthropological concept that took “culture” 
to refer to to everyday life. This concept was widely available. It had historical 
antecedents in Soviet ethnography which used a concept that can be translated either as 
12 Multiple factors contributed to this development: disintegration of the Communist International in 
the 1930s; Stalin's Russophilia; and, in the 1950s, mass editions of the 19th century Russian writers who 
fell outside of Stalin's favor—Tolstoy, Dostoyevski, Chekhov.
13 National poets were increasingly called upon to praise the greatness of Russian culture. For an 
illustration, consider the verses of Tanzila Zamakulova (from Kabardino-Balkaria): My native tongue! 
It's tender, strong, eternal / And needs no textbook, for it makes me grow /With sweetness of its words... 
And there is Russian tongue! Its mine forever / Like native tongue, it flows right through my heart... 
(Родной язык! В нём нежность, вечность, сила / Я с ним росла: и не по букварю / Сладчайшие 
слова произносила – / Сначала «мама», а потом «люблю»... Но русский есть язык! И он навеки / 
Мне близок и понятен, как родной. / Две речи в моём сердце, будто реки, / Звучат, текут, 
становятся одной.)
14 Aleksandr Pushkin (1799-1835) is poet venerated as a wellspring of literary Russian. It was only a 
century earlier—during the reign of Peter the Great— that secular Russian became differentiated from 
the Church Slavonic. 
15 Nashtukul'turilis' is a neologism composed of the verb shtukaturit (“to apply plaster”), modified 
by a reflexive ending, which results in a logically impossible shtukaturit'sia (“to self-plaster”), and 
further modified by combining shtukaturka (plaster) with kul'tura (culture)--resulting in something like 
“to get culture-pastered.” 
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“everyday culture” or “material culture” (bytovaia kul'tura). More significantly, it was 
implicit in a variety of practices placed under the sign of kul'turnost' —a word which 
simultaneously denoted the importance of personal hygiene and weekend visits to the 
theater.  Even more significantly, it was implicit in the EU-sponsored discourse on 
cultural difference which, on the level of explicit ideological utterance, refused any sense 
of cultural hierarchy and—to give one example—took Cork and Patras to be no less 
“cultured” than London and Paris.  
Marc's remark was indeed rebuked. However, it was not rebuked by drawing on an 
alternative concept of culture. The rebuke came from Pavel who exlcaimed, “Better 
dekabristy than raznochintsy!” Dekabristy—translated into English as “Decemberists”—
was a group of Russian noblemen who revolted during the interregnum in December of 
1825 and refused to pledge allegiance to Nicholas I.  They hoped that their revolt would 
lead to a replacement of tsarist absolutism with constitutional monarchy and bring an end 
to serfdom.16 To this day, Decemberists embody the ethos of just opposition to political 
tyranny—an opposition closely associated with the ideal of intelligentsia. Pavel's 
proposal to use dekabristy instead of raznochintsy was made with an ironic tone; and, in 
fact, elicited giggles across the room. Marc, however, was not giggling. According to 
him, dekabristy was one of the most “political” names that one could use; and, as such, 
clearly indicated Pavel's inability to attend to the need to distinguish between “politics” 
and “culture.” 
After the meeting, I spoke with Pavel and Kristina about Marc's attempt with keeping 
“politics” and “culture” separate. Neither Pavel nor Kristina thought much of this attempt
—albeit for different different reasons. According to Pavel, it would be better if concerns 
with kul'tura would  disappear all together. He did not do much to hide this position. 
Several times, I heard him address the Loyalists with a verse, which he explicitly 
attributed to Pushkin, “One does not need to be a poet; but one must be a citizen.”  The 
felicity of this address lay less in his audience's vocal agreement then in their inability to 
correct him: to point out that it was Nekrasov, rather than Pushkin, who wrote the verse.  
His opinions on intelligentsia were far from favorable. “Intelligentsia is incapable of 
doing anything besides criticizing the state,” he explained. “It's not even a class!” he 
continued. “It's nothing but some sort of a social layer!” Pavel's remark drew on a variety 
of sources. First, it indexed the Soviet definition of intelligentsia as a “layer,” following 
the officially-proclaimed end of the class-struggle and the triumph of the proletariat and 
16 The Decemberists' rebellion ought to be located in the pan-European aftermath of Napoleonic 
Wars. In 1815 (following Napoleon's defeat), the monarchs Russia, Austria, and  Prussia created the 
Holy Alliance, based on the pledge to curb the revolutionary enthusiasm and to protect the divine right 
of kings. By 1818, they were joined by France and Germany in a Quintuple Alliance—famous for 
curbing German, Italian, and Spanish republicanism and nationalism  (Carlsbad Decrees outlawed 
student fraternities in 1819, the Carbonari Revolt was suppressed in 1820, Trienio Liberal was ended in 
1823). The Alliance disintegrated following the French Revolution of 1830 and the rising tensions 
between Russia and Britain over control of the Ottoman Empire. In 1848, Austria drew on Russia's 
assistance in suppressing the Hungarian Revolt; Prussian authorities squashed the March Revolution 
without any outside help. The Alliance between Russia and Austria came to an end when the latter did 
not support Russia during the Crimean War (1850-56) with Britain. 
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the peasants. Second, it relied on a Marxist-Leninist understanding of class as a formation 
characterized by a privileged relationship to history (rather than defined by its means of 
production). Third, it rested on a contrast between the importance of intelligentsia during 
glasnost (Gorbachev-led liberalization) and its near-oblivion in the wake of an almost-
total withdrawal of state-funding from universities and research institutes following the 
collapse of socialism (Buck-Morss 2002, Gessen 1997). 
Like Pavel, Kristina did not think much of Marc' suggestion. Yet, her reasons where quite 
different. Whereas Pavel criticized intelligentsia for its refusal (or fear, or lack) of power, 
Kristina criticized intelligentsia it for what she interpreted as a withdrawal from the 
world.  According to her, intelligentsia was driven less by a sense of “duty” (springing 
from a concern with “the people”) than by a sense of entitlement (springing from a 
hierarchical vision of kul'tura). Kristina's position was shared by most of the Humanist' 
rank-and-file members. Unlike the Loyalists, the Humanists did not disavow kul'tura; 
rather, they searched for a way to think about kul'tura differently. To begin with, they felt 
that  reduction of kul'tura to the world of arts & letters underwrote a claim to an 
exclusive expertise. The problem with this claim was not that it established a hierarchical 
relationship between intelligentsia and obyvateli (the common-folk), but, rather, that it 
isolated intelligentsia from the present moment. According to the Humanists, the defining 
characteristic of intelligentsia was not its commitment to kul'tura but, rather, the social 
form that this commitment produced: conversations around a kitchen table (kukhonnye 
razgovory). This diagnosis led the Humanists to distinguish between intelligentsia and 
intelektualy (intellectuals). Unlike the former, the latter searched for new questions: 
precisely because they lacked a commitment to a particular canon and wanted to get out 
of their kitchens. 
The Humanists' argument that configuring kul'tura around arts & letters inevitably 
resulted in kitchen-talk had an obverse side. They were quite cognizant of the fact that 
this configuration was fairly central to the Russian World Program; and they did not 
hesitate to describe this program as “paternalistic.” Whereas intelligentsia was likely to 
reduce kul'tura to arts & letters, the participants of the Russian World Program were 
likely to locate it Russia. No place could compete with Moscow when it came to cultural 
production. According to Kristina, this legitimated the Russian government's claim to 
“seniority” and reduced Latvia's Russians to a position of “a younger brother.” As far as 
many Humanists were concerned, this position was no better than the one implicit in the 
EU's integration program—that of a “social problem” or  “a social remnant” (ostatki 
obshchestva). 
Given Kristina's and Pavel's different positions on intelligentsia and kul'tura, it is 
tempting to interpret their negative response to Marc as based on a shared or strategic 
opposition rather than a common position. Below, I argue against making this 
interpretation.
4. Milking Cows
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The narrative of Latgalian harmony became a focus of a heated argument between Pavel 
and Natalia during one of the Loyalists' meetings.  Natalia was new to the Loyalists; she 
began to attend meetings not long before I began fieldwork. She was born in a small town 
in a northern part of Latgale. Unlike Pavel (and most of the Loyalists' members), Natalia 
did not have to undergo naturalization process in order to receive citizenship: she could 
trace her family genealogy to the period of interwar independence.  
Natalia came to Riga after she finished high school and gained admission to a highly 
competitive program at the University of Latvia, the state's most prestigious university.17  
Like most of my acquaintances, Natalia paid university tuition herself; however, she also 
had to pay for room and board at the university dorm. To make ends meet, Natalia 
worked practically full time. Often, she came to meetings right from work and, not 
infrequently, wore a business suit. One night, after the Loyalists' meeting drew to a close, 
I accompanied Natalia as she hurried to catch the bus to her dormitory. I wanted to find 
out what compelled her to join the Loyalists; but, like most young people to whom I 
posed this question, she could not give an answer. As we stepped from a paved sidewalk 
onto a cobbled street of the Old City, she shared a concern. “My best friend is spending a 
year studying abroad,” she said, casting a look over a young female tourist who (in vain) 
tried to avoid getting her heels stuck between the cobblestones. “I'm certain she'll think 
that I've gone mad when she finds out that I became involved in politics.”
   
In October, Natalia took on a leading role in organizing the Loyalists' observance of 
Latvian War Memorial Day (known as the Day of the Bear-Slayer—the hero of the 
Latvian national epic composed in the 19th century) and celebration of the Latvian 
Independence Day.  The Memorial Day was fairly easy to plan: in Riga, there is an old 
tradition of placing lit candles around a wall of the Old City. Someone suggested that the 
Loyalists arrange their candles in a way that would trace Latvia's map; and the suggestion 
was quickly adopted.18 
17 State-run post-secondary institutions are generally considered to be more prestigious than private-
run institutions. These institutions offer instruction in Latvian, which is the state language, and, 
increasingly in English. The introduction of English has to do with an attempt to recruit international 
students; its use is legitimated on the grounds of English being an official language of the EU (even 
though quite a number of foreign students are not from the EU). State-run post-secondary institutions do 
not offer instruction in Russian (which does not have a recognized status). This is not to say that state-
run institutions don't offer instruction of Russian (at the Faculty of Philology and Russian Literature) or 
rely on Russian-language materials (throughout different—but, I suspect, particularly engineering-
related—programs). Students who wish to pursue their post-secondary education in Russian may do so 
in a privately-run institution.
18 This suggestion was more difficult to implement than it was assumed; but, nonetheless, proved to 
be quite felicitous. The wall that is candle-lit on the Day of the Bearslayer faces the embankment of 
Daugava which, by mid-fall, becomes increasingly windy.  To make sure that the wind does not 
extinguish the candles, they are typically placed in glass containers (or, more likely, bought  already 
encased in glass). However, the Loyalists bought tea light candles—since it was too costly to buy 
enough glass-contained candles to make the map.  This made it quite difficult to keep the fire going. 
However, passersby were eager to get involved—both relighting candles and filling the map with towns 
and cities.  
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However, plans for the Independence Day proved to be more contentious. There were 
few volunteers: some of those present in the room called the holiday nationalist 
(natsionalisticheskii) rather than national (gosudarstvenniy). Moreover, there was no 
easily  available template for the kind of activity that the Loyalists could organize. Those 
who were invested in celebrating the holiday wanted to put forth an activity which would 
emphasize friendship (druzhba) among Latvia's people—that is, Latvians and Russians. 
However, this idiom invariably drew on the Soviet-era internationalist imaginary which 
heralded the “friendship of the people” (druzhba narodov). While this connotation was 
clearly undesirable, its post-Soviet permutation—the discourse around integratsia 
(integration)—was even less desirable.  As an acquaintance put it, ten years after 
Integration Program started, no one knew what integration was; but everyone was 
convinced that it did not work out. 
It was at this point that Natalia exclaimed that she could not understand why people in 
Riga were always so intent on dividing everyone into “Russians” and “Latvians” (a 
division perpetuated equally—albeit with different valences—by the idiom of 
“friendship” and by the idiom of “integration”). In Latgale, she added, nobody did so; 
instead, people related to each other “on the personal level” (na lichnom urovne).  
Pavel, who grew increasingly irate, erupted in anger: “They milk cows in Latgale, rather 
than think about politics!” Natalia held her cool and, in a measured tone, replied, “Do you 
think Latvia is an office? Have you ever been to the regions?” Not missing a beat, Pavel 
exclaimed, “Kant did not travel anywhere!19 And he was the smartest man of his time! 
Riga is the seat of political power. We must talk about Riga!” 
Following that meeting, Pavel's opinion of Natalia changed. He as well as as his allies 
began to refer to her as kolkhoznitsa—a female worker on a collective farm. The term 
functioned in a number of ways. On the most explicit level, it pointed to someone's rural 
origins. Yet, whoever used it was himself invariably marked not as “urban” but as “non-
native.” Given that Riga was dominated by Germans until 1918 and by Russians until 
1941, most of my Latvian-speaking acquaintances were well aware of their “rural 
origins.” as much as my Russian-speaking informants20  On a more subtle level, 
kolkhoznitsa pointed to a someone's understanding of politics  or, in Pavel's opinion, a 
lack of thereof. When Natalia lamented the fact that people did not relate to each other on 
“a personal level,” Pavel took this to be an indication of Natalia's “delusional” 
understanding of power.   The figure of a female farm worker was central to the 
19 As I was shortly to hear from another informant, Kant, in fact, did travel; and Riga was one of a 
few places that he went to from Konigsberg (today's Kalingrad). While I could not verify Kant's 
itinerary, I did (to my surprise) found that that the Critiques were all first published in Riga: the Hackett 
edition contains a facsimile of the title page which lists Riga as the place of publication. Baltic Germans 
dominated Riga from its founding in the 12th century until Latvian independence in 1918.  
20 I suspect that this awareness was also a consequence of Soviet-led deportations of Riga's residents 
in 1940 and after 1944. While the deportees were eventually allowed to return to Latvia, many of them 
were not allowed to live in Riga. Another factor contributing to Latvia's configuration of the urban/rural 
divide has to do with Latvia's geography: a small territory and a flat topography—all of which made the 
capital city quite accessible.
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iconography of Soviet power—most famously materialized in Vera Mukhina's sculpture 
The Worker and the Peasant.21  Calling someone kolkhoznitsa amounted to pointing to 
their Sovietness, which, in this context, had to do with what would be described as a 
naïve expectation of equality, emancipation, and progress. 
Pavel's opinion about Natalia was by no means hegemonic. A number of people 
complemented Natalia's ability to maintain a cool composure—a quality that the 
Loyalists took to be of fundamental importance for overcoming politics of injury (obida). 
In other words, Natalia was complimented—if not for her political philosophy, then on 
her ability to conduct herself in a “political” way. In other words, while there was no 
consensus on whether or not Pavel and Natalia's argument illustrated a naïve 
understanding of politics of demonstrated good political conduct, their argument was 
interpreted  as a matter of relating to politika.
*
Despite his response to Natalia, Pavel was actually quite keen to talk about Latgale or, 
rather, “Latgalians.” On occasion, the adjective “Latgalian” could be heard as part and 
parcel of stories about Latgalian harmony between “Russians” and “Latvians”—the 
stories that Pavel dismissed. In that context, this adjective claimed a collectivity for a 
people who, on a different occasion, would be differentiated in Latgale's Russian and 
Latvian residents.22 More frequently this adjective was used to draw a distinction between 
“Latgalians” and “Latvians”; Pavel adopted this latter usage. The distinction between 
Latgalian and Latvian rested on a historiography which emphasized Latvia's “fractional 
past”: specifically, the fact that much of modern-day Latgale was once a part of the Polish 
Lithuanian Commonwealth (rather than The Kingdom of Sweden) and, following Polish 
partitions, a part of the Russian Empire's Vitebsk Province (as opposed to a part of the 
Livonian province which was won from the Swedes).  
More significantly, the distinction between “Latgalians” and “Latvians” functioned to 
reiterate claims to cultural autonomy which, since the 1990s, were made by Latgale's 
intellectuals. These intellectuals argued that there was a distinct Latgalian language,23  
which, given Latvia's political imaginary, amounted to arguing that there was a Latgalian 
21 In Russian, there is a distinction between krestianka (a female peasant) and kolkhoznitsa (a female 
collective farm worker). The former word is etymologically derived from “Christian”; the latter is a 
derivation of kolkhoz an abbreviated form of kollektivnoe khoziaistvo – a phrase that has been translated 
as a “collective farm.”  (This translation is not entirely felicitous—it forgoes a crucial dimension 
implicit in the Russian phrase: khoziain is “landlord” or “master” or “administrator”; furthermore, it 
does not attend to a very different valence of khoziastvo (an old and semantically rich term) and ferma 
(Russian transliteration of English “farm” which is a comparatively new word).  Cf. Rogers 2006.
22 I met a number of people who would usually be described as Russian but who identified as 
Latgalian. 
23 My informants compared the relationship between Latgalian and Latvian to the relationship 
between Ukrainian and Russian—i.e., closely related and mutually comprehensible. While this 
comparison drew on the juxtaposition of Russian and Ukrainian, it reversed this juxtaposition's usual 
valence—i.e., positioning Ukrainian to be a lesser form of Russian.  
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nation.  These claims have never been entertained by the Latvian government.24 My 
Russian activist acquaintances—particularly those who were not proponents of the 
Latgalian harmony narrative—took this as “self-evident”: according to them, any official 
recognition of Latgalians would set a precedent for and clear the path to recognizing 
Russians. While Pavel happened to share these activists' dislike of Latgalian harmony, he 
did not partake in conversations on Latgalian uniqueness. When he talked of Latgalians, 
he did so only because he felt that they would be more amenable to forming a party 
coalition with “adequate” Russian politicians (i.e., politicians who, in contrast to Russian 
activists, did not proclaim their ethnic identity). In other words, if Pavel cared about a 
conflict between “Latvians” and “Latgalians,” then, he did so in a very circumscribed 
manner—staying away from framing this conflict as a matter of cultural difference which 
could be transposed from one set of relations onto another; and, instead, emphasizing 
“political alliances.” 
5. Waiting for a J
The Loyalists' dislike of kul'tura was most dramatically illustrated by their attempt to 
disassociate culture from any discussion of political action. This attempt was most 
dramatically illustrated by their attempt to promote the word latviets (and latvijetis—a 
word which they claimed to be its Latvian equivalent). In Russian, “Latvian” can be 
rendered in two ways: latysh and latviets. The first is a cognate of the Latvian adjective 
laviešu, frequently used in the phrase laviešu valoda (Latvian language). The second is 
by the adjectival noun latviets.  Latviets is a cognate of the Latvian adjective Latvijas, 
frequently used in the phrase Latvijas Republica (Latvian Republic).25  In contrast to 
Russian, Latvian has only one word for “Latvian”: latvietis. During the interwar republic, 
this was recognized as a problem—most notably by the Latvian national poet Rainis.26 
Rainis offered to distinguish between latvietis  and latvijetis: the first denoting ethnic 
Latvians, the second—Latvian minorities (Germans, Russians, and Jews). Rainis' 
suggestion was not taken up; however, some nine decades after it was first made, it found 
new advocates. A young woman who was in charge of the Loyalists' Ideological Division 
repeated over and over again the importance of inculcating the broader use of “latvijetis 
with a j.” (This was to be done through “work with consciousness” (rabota s soznaniem)
—an activity which characterized political schools I describe in Chapter 3).
6. Culture Games 
Even though Pavel and Kristina were quite critical when it came to the dominant ways of 
talking about kul'tura, they nonetheless felt that they had to demonstrate their 
24 Since the 1990s, the Latvian government recognized only Livs as Latvia's other autochthonous 
people.  Livs, who give medieval Livonia its name) are speakers of a Finno-Urgic language. The Soviet 
Union did not recognize Livonians or Latgalians as nations separate from Latvians. Ironically, today's 
Russian Federation does recognize “Latgalian” as a separate nationality. 
25 Latvijas is a possessive noun. It is better translated into English with a possessive adjective 
“Latvia's.”
26 Rainis is a pen-name of Jānis Pliekšāns (1865-1929).  
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engagement with “the cultural question.” In this section, I am interested in how they did 
that; in their attempt to associate themselves with a very specific kind of activity that was 
recognizable as “cultural.”  During my fieldwork, they took interest only in two such 
activities—colloquially referred to by acronyms ChGK and KVN. Their turn to “a game” 
as a site of kul'tra contrasted starkly with social activists' turn to the theater or to the 
village. Here, kul'tura was neither a matter of aesthetic enjoyment nor of grounded 
interaction. Instead, it was a site of fruitful disagreement. 
ChGK—an acronym of Russian words Chto? (What?) Gde? (Where?) Kogda? (When?)--
is something like a trivia competition originally developed for Soviet television in the 
1970s. Its protagonists are two teams: a team of knowledge-bearers (znatoki) and a team 
of television-viewers (telezriteli). The knowledge-bearers are a group of six people, 
chosen on the basis of their expertise in various fields—rather than institutional affiliation 
or personal connections—and headed by a captain whom they themselves appoint. The 
knowledge-bearers are physically present in the television studio: they are seated at a 
round table with a spinning top.  As for the television-viewers, strictly speaking, they are 
not a team at all. They are people who mailed-in questions—represented by original 
envelopes placed along the perimeter of the game table—that were judged to be 
appropriate for the game.  While criteria for “appropriateness” are not explicit, there is a 
shared understanding that “good” questions are somewhere between a test and a riddle; 
i.e., they require some factual knowledge yet not reducible to knowing a particular fact.27 
Each round begins with one of the knowledge-bearer pressing onto a spinning top which 
points to one of the envelopes. Then, the anchor (who is not shown on the screen) 
announces the name of the television-viewer associated with the envelope, specifies his 
or her place of residence and occupation, displays his or her picture, and reads the 
question. The team of knowledge-bearers spends a minute in a heated debate over the 
right answer. This debate has a dialogical quality: while the knowledge-bearers frequently 
propose different answers, they formulate them in response to provocation of their 
teammates rather than in an attempt to reiterate previous knowledge. More often then not, 
they do not reach an agreement: the captain is charged with choosing among possible 
alternatives. Typically, the choice is made on the basis of a “hunch” rather than as a result 
of formal adjudication; and, not infrequently, the hunch turns out to be wrong, in which 
27 Here are a few notable questions: (a) When a sports commentator introduced the Greek soccer 
team, which was due to play a match with the Russian team, he named two players who, despite having 
been expected to play, were absent for two unrelated reasons.. As he did so, he also mentioned the 
names of two mythical heroes. One of the Greek players was absent because his club—Amsterdam's 
Ajax— refused to lend him for the match.  Why was the second player absent? (b) Once Mark Twain 
loaned $500 to a friend who promised to pay it back in a month if he were not dead. What did Twain do 
when this friend failed to meet this obligation? (c ) Most of THEM fall without having undergone a 
hoped-for metamorphosis. According to Jack Tresidder, the author of The Complete Dictionary of 
Symbols, a growing consciousness of THEIR importance in the 18th century coincides with the 
development of mass politics. What are THEY? (d ) What did a famous Russian jurist call “an artwork 
which always has two authors”? (e) An entry in  the  dictionary of Russian phraseology about THIS 
word mentions three people—a middle-eastern king, a Russian grand duke, and an American slave 
owner. What is THIS word?  
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case, the team of television-viewers gains a point because of a weak captain rather than a 
weak team. Whichever team gains six points—i.e., answers six questions during what 
could be as many as eleven rounds—wins. At the end of the game season, teams of of 
knowledge-bearers that have lost a game to a (virtual) team of television-viewers are 
ranked based on their relative scores; the the team which places at the bottom loses its 
legibility to participate in future games.  
ChGK achieved immense popularity during the Soviet period. Beginning as a television 
show, it became a game that people—particularly young people—played in their schools, 
universities, houses of culture, and city pioneer palaces.28 Adapted to “real-life,” ChGK 
changed in important respects. Teams of knowledge-bearers were composed of people 
who shared an institutional affiliation albeit not the same institutional niche (for example, 
a team of knowledge-bearers which represented a particular school could have members 
from different grade levels and grade classes; in other words, people who would not 
otherwise interact).29 Teams of television-bearers became even more virtual: the game 
table still had envelopes with contained questions; but these questions were 
selected/chosen/authored by a person responsible for organizing the event. Crucially, 
criteria for a “good” question remained the same: the good question had to be as much of 
a riddle (to be solved through argumentation) as it was a “test” (of preexisting 
knowledge).   
In the post-Soviet period, the broadcast ChGK not only kept but increased its viewership. 
In the Soviet period, teams of knowledge-bearers and television-viewers mostly received 
rare books as a prize for winning a round. In the post-Soviet period, the game re-branded 
itself as an “intellectual casino.” Everyone in the studio was clad in a black-tie attire. The 
program's anchor (televedushchii) was referred to as a croupier (krup'e); his assistants 
wore uniforms quite similar to the ones worn by card-dealers in an actual casino.  
Everyone was clad in black-tie attire. The table around which the team of knowledge-
bearers sat was stylized to look like a roulette table.  Most importantly, each question was 
assigned a monetary value. This value was extraordinarily high—the money was supplied 
by newly set up commercial banks or telecommunication companies who were anxious to 
showcase their opulence. Instead of being acknowledged during commercial 
interruptions, these companies—or rather their senior representatives (frequently CEOs)
—were explicitly addressed by the croupier who not only acknowledged their 
28 Houses of Culture can be compared to “Community Centers” (in particular, Community Centers 
that offer an array of educational programs). Palaces of Pioneers can be compared to “Youth Centers.” 
29 I n Soviet schools, the student body was classified in two ways. The first was grade level—
beginning with Grade 1 (which started after the kindergarten) and ending with Grade 10 (which made 
one eligible to pursue post-secondary education). Each grade level had two classes—typically referred 
to as “Class A” and “Class B.” These classes did not typically reflect academic standing. Sometimes, 
they reflected a particular emphasis—for example, an emphasis on sciences rather than humanities; or 
an emphasis on one foreign language rather than another. Typically, a student who began his/her 
education in “1A” (Grade 1, Class A) would finish in “10A” (Grade 10, Class A): the same group of 
people studied together for ten years (typically, under the same primary school teacher—who taught all 
subjects— from grades 1 to 3; and, then, under the same secondary school teachers—who specialized in 
specific subjects—between grades 4 and 10).   
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sponsorship but asked for their opinions as to the quality of the questions and answers, 
dynamics of team discussion, capacities of the team captain, etc. If there was a technical 
dispute—for example, if the croupier accused someone present in the audience of trying 
to communicate an answer to one of the players sitting at the table—the sponsors were 
asked to arbitrate.  
The post-Soviet transformation of ChGK was remarkable given the fact that most of the 
institutions which supplied its main players entered a deep crisis in the 1990s. Following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, research institutes as well as universities30—places 
where quite a number of knowledge-bearers worked—lost state funding. Unable to attract 
private capital (not to mention existing in such an economically tumultuous climate that 
no capital was secure), these institutes closed down. While some  of the former staff 
members found employment in newly emergent business ventures, most did not: the 
1990s were marked by the stories about professors of humanities working as sales clerks 
in outdoor markets and physicists moonlighting as construction workers. The common 
wisdom was that the post-Soviet period was even less hospitable to the life of the mind 
than the Soviet period. However (politically) restrictive, the Soviet government was 
predictable. However (economically) free, the post-Soviet period was hostile to 
everything that could not be monetized. ChGK was the only (fairly) mainstream example 
of the opposite case: a place where abstract knowledge received a monetary reward. This 
was reflected in ChGKs post-soviet motto: “the intellectual casino is the only place where 
it is possible to earn money with one's own mind.” That was reflected in the show's self-
promotion as a place for intellectuals rather than for the intelligentsia: the former, unlike 
the latter, mixed with the elites. 
30 In the Soviet Union, research and teaching did not typically coincide: scientists working at 
research institutes did not have students.  
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CHAPTER V
The Time of Youth  
Several months after beginning fieldwork, I met Irina—a young mother heavily 
involved in Russian activism. When told her that my project was shaping around 
questions of  youth politics, she reacted with a feigned surprise.  “Youth politics?” she 
asked, moving aback with a sarcastic smile. “Do you mean to say that not only do we 
have politics, but also youth?” 
Over the course of the coming months, I came across similar remarks which, in one 
way or another, suggested “a lack of youth.” These remarks contradicted what seemed to 
be the very condition of my research: hanging out with people in the early 20s—a 
demographic group classified as “youth”  by various institutions in the EU, Latvia, and 
the Russian Federation. Furthermore, these remarks seemed to ignore a rise of youth-
oriented programming—spurred on by well-publicized anxieties about young people’s 
levels of substance abuse, unemployment rate, and outmigration.  
Irina’s question—her attempt to unsettle my ease with the category of “youth”—
followed an evening at a youth documentary festival. In fact, my interlocutors’ thoughts 
about “lacking youth” typically emerged in response to particular representations of 
young people.  In addition to Irina’s response to a film titled Arrhythmia, I explore my 
informants’ response to a late-Soviet Latvian documentary titled Is It Easy to Be Young? 
as well as to a Russian youth theater group’s  production of Tenneesse Williams’ play The 
Glass Menagerie.  
While my interlocutors’ reflections on “youth” do not reflect a particular agenda 
or a shared set of assumptions, they nonetheless gesture towards a particular generational 
consciousness.  Furthermore, these reflections offer a perspective which is fairly different 
from—although, no doubt, at the same time, resonant with—dominant representations of 
youth. Most of these representation revolve around imagery of “the crisis,” which 
proliferated as Latvia experienced a global financial downturn. This imagery played into 
decade-long anxieties about, on the one hand, young people’s supposed pursuit of 
economic rewards at the expense of familial, friendship, and political ties; and, on the 
other hand, young people’s particular vulnerability to economic downtown. Yet, as I show 
below, my interlocutors reflections of “youth” seek to cast their predicament less in terms 
of moral or economic crisis than in terms of a historical impasse.  
Master Narratives: the Year of Youth and Youth in Action
Much of this chapter discusses how variously positioned actors rely on the category of 
“youth” as they reflect on specific representations of youth. These representations—two 
documentary films and a play— need to be situated with respect to two master narratives 
about youth in the Soviet Union and post-soviet states. 
In the first narrative, socialist states offer a crucial infrastructure (sometimes explicitly 
identified with communist youth organizations) for making a smooth transition from 
childhood to adulthood. Post-socialist states, on the contrary, leave young people to fend 
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for themselves which, effectively, leads them to delve into the life of organized crime, sex 
trade and substance of abuse. 
During my fieldwork, this narrative was most powerfully represented in a video clip 
announcing (or responding to) the Kremlin’s designation of 2009 as “the year of youth.” 
It was rumored that the video was scheduled to be broadcast on television before being 
censored for its excessive pessimism. Yet, it found its way to the web, and, quickly 
gaining notoriety as “the informational bomb of Russian internet,” circulated through 
social networking sites, blogs, media portals, etc.  
Figure 1
Stills from “The Year of Youth”
You don't do anything; you only exploit The only thing that will be left after you are gone is a
plaque with 16 numbers
You create nothing That's your freedom – the freedom to be a criminal or
a prostitute 
The video is set to а contemporary remix of “The Wondrous Far-Away” (Prekrasnoe 
dalioko), a song originally written for a movie titled “The Guest from the Future” (Gostia 
iz budushchego)—by far the most popular children’s film of the perestroika.1  First heard 
1  The film was based on a science fiction novel for young adults  titled “One Hundred Years Ahead” 
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in the film’s concluding episode, the song revolves around a hope that the future (the 
eponymous Wondrous Far Away) won’t be cruel to a person who is starting out their life 
journey.2  The video sets out to show that this hope has come to a naught.  Beginning with 
the historical footage of  Soviet soldiers and shock-workers, it locates all the wonder 
squarely in the past and then calls on its young viewers to recognize that they do nothing 
and value nothing; that they destroy themselves and their country; and that, unless they 
want to disappear without a trace, they should find out more about the year of youth.   
In the second narrative about youth and socialism, centrally-administrated social welfare 
programs are suspected of being disconnected from everyday needs of young people (or 
outright harmful). Democratic principles demand an attentiveness to young people’s own 
views, goals, and hopes incompatible with generational and bureaucratic hierarchies still 
prevalent in post-socialist states. These states must ensure that there are institutional 
channels that young people can use to communicate their concerns, educational and 
technical means necessary for them to make use of these channels, and, most importantly, 
opportunities and means for self-organizing and peer-learning.
 
Associated with EU-sponsored youth policy, this narrative was represented in a variety of 
promotional materials associated with Youth in Action program loosely administered by 
the European Commission. While these materials were easily accessible, their circulation 
was limited. In contrast to Kremlin-sponsored Year of Youth, Youth in Action program 
did not involve a centralized media campaign. In fact, the program called for youth to 
make their own media (film videos, publish newsletters, create websites, etc.). 
My emphasis on the tension between EU- and RF-sponsored discourses on youth 
resonates with the previous chapters' emphasis on the tension between EU- and RF-
sponsored perspectives on ethnic identification, language values, and cultural production.   
As before, I emphasize this tension because I seek to foreground my informants'  attempt 
to challenge its perniciousness effects before engaging a scholarly apparatus which 
challenges it epistemological validity.
(Sto let tomu vperiod). written by  Igor Mozheiko under the pen name of Kir Bulychev. (It is rumored 
that Mozheiko, who was a distinguished ethnographer and historian of Burma, was concerned that his 
colleagues won’t take his seriously once they find out about his literary proclivities). Set in Moscow in 
1984, the novel (and the film) focuses on a girl who comes back from the future while being pursued by 
space pirates (from her own timeline) and helped by Soviet students (from the reader’s timeline).
2  The text of the song is as follows: I hear a voice from the wondrous far-away / it is filled with 
silver dew / I hear the voice, and a seducing road / Makes my head spin like a merry-go-round [Refrain: 
Wondrous Far Away /Do not be Cruel / Do not be Cruel /Do not be Cruel /Do not be Cruel / I start my 
journey innocently] I hear a voice from the wondrous far-away / It calls me to incredible places/ I hear 
the voice which strictly asks / What did I do today for tomorrow? [Refrain] I swear that I will become 
more pure and more kind / And that I will never abandon a friend who's in trouble / I hear the call and 
hurry / Down a road that has not been travelled [Refrain]. There is some debate about the song’s second 
stanza. The version most often played on the radio has the voice calling the protagonist to “incredible” 
(prekrasnye) places. However, the film version has the voice calling the protagonist to “unheavenly” 
(neraiskie) places. Lyrics by Yuri Entin; music by Yevgenii Krylatov; translation is mine.
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Is It Easy To Be Young?
In 1985, Juris Podnieks, a Soviet-Latvian filmmaker, completed a documentary called Is 
It Easy To Be Young (Vai viegli būt jaunam?). The film focused on what would become a 
major object of glasnost' cinema: troubled youth.3  When the film premiered in Moscow a 
year later, the cavalry policy was called in to manage the crowds of people wishing to see 
it.  The highly negative reviews in Pravda (a newspaper most closely associated with the 
Communist Party) only added to its growing popularity. 
 
Dedicated to “those who seek their place in life,” Podnieks's film questions a central 
Soviet axiom – that every person has a place. Podnieks's youth are a foil for thinking 
about Soviet people as a whole: the opening scene shows a young man wearing reflective 
sunglasses. The film  begins with shots of an outdoor rock concert in a town of Ogre, just 
outside of Riga. Following the concert, a group of young men vandalized a car of a 
commuter train. Four teens that have been apprehended by the police shortly after the act 
of vandalism have been judged as if they were the sole perpetrators. As their sentences 
are read – one of them is sentenced to three years in a maximum security prison – the 
voice of the judge dissolves into the background and the atmosphere of general doom sets 
in.  The rest of the film expands – or purposefully loses – its focus. Among Podnieks's 
protagonists appear: a girl, hospitalized following a suicide attempt; an amateur 
filmmaker imagining a nuclear apocalypse and the kingdom come (which furnishes 
Podnieks' with his concluding shot); a young morgue worker; a Khare Krishna adept 
(something highly unusual in the mid-1980s USSR); and a group of Afghan veterans.
In 2010, as I was conducting fieldwork, there was a series of events celebrating the film’s 
25th anniversary both in Russia and Latvia.  One of the most publicly prominent 
discussions about the film was hosted by Dmitrii Bykov, a left-leaning post-Soviet poet, 
journalist, writer and, a talk show host on Russia’s Channel 5 (at that point not controlled 
by the Kremlin). Bykov invited more than a dozen of guests to his studio. Podnieks's 
friends and colleagues, from Latvia and Russia, were joined by contemporary filmmakers 
and (mostly silent) young people of uncertain provenance, described as “representatives 
of contemporary youth.”
3  Often “troubled” youth turned into “degenerate” youth. The most significant fiction film on the 
subject of degenerate youth was El'dar Riazanov's Dear Elena Sergeevna (1988). The film was based on 
Liudmila Razumovskaia 1981 play of the same title which ran in repertory across the USSR until 
censured by the Ministry of Culture in 1983. (Although, I was told that it ran for a longer period of time 
in Tallinn's Russian Theater since censorship regulations were less stringent in the Baltic republics). The 
film deals with a group of high school graduates who come to congratulate their teacher, Elena 
Sergeevna, with her birthday. As the scene unfolds, it becomes clear that they came in order to force 
Elena Sergeevna to give them access to the school's grade book, so that they could falsify their grades. 
Among their tactics is threatening to rape their classmate. The film ends with Elena Sergeevna's death 
or suicide.
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post-soviet crawled out (vse vylezlo) out of komsomol rather than non-conformist youth. 
“We thought,” he concluded, “that a wall came tumbling down, and that the future was 
behind that wall. But it turned out that it was the future that tumbled.” 
The talk show continued with an excerpt from the film’s sequel, titled Is It Easy…? (Vai 
Viegli), which traced the lives of the original film’s protagonists in the present.  The 
excerpt focused on one of the protagonists’ reflections on the post-soviet period. 
Similarly to Bykov, he did not think that the post-soviet period brought much good. In 
fact, he suggested that it did not bring much at all: the last twenty years, he said, passed 
like a closed circle—bringing everyone back to where they started.  Partly agreeing with 
the man in the except, Bykov nonetheless made a more pessimistic diagnosis.  “All that 
was interesting in [the original film’s protagonists’s] lives ended with the Soviet Union,” 
he said wrapping up the talk show.  
 
In a blog post published some time after the show, Bykov (2010) emphasized the 
bleakness of the current situation. Furthering his point about “everything post-Soviet 
crawling out of komsomol,” he referenced the original’s film’s concern with the impact of 
the Afghan war, and then lamented the dominance of Nashi—a pro-Kremlin youth 
organization—in youth politics, particularly during the year of youth:
Today’s youth has it significantly harder than youth of 1986. Yes, deployment to Afghanistan is no 
longer a threat. The [new] threat is Nashi, and while it may not be as traumatic, it is just as 
dangerous. 
It is possible to take Bykov’s concern about growing institutionalization  of youth as 
resonant with the EU-sponsored perspective on post-socialist youth. However, his 
frankness about (now admittedly unrealized) hope that non-conformist youth could have 
ushered in a new era of history speaks to a socialist perspective on youth as the historical 
avant-garde. This understanding is absent from the EU youth policy which casts “youth” 
as a demographic group characterized by a particular set of needs rather than as  class of 
actors capable of speeding up the course of history. 
Bykov’s approach to Podnieks’ film sits uneasily with both the RF- and the EU-
sponsored discourse about socialist and post-socialist youth. Much of this unease rests on 
a dismissal of formal politics—evident in his explicit distaste for komsomol and Nashi as 
well as in an implicit contrast between conformist politicians (equally present in late 
socialist and post-socialist states) and non-conformist artists (lamentably absent from the 
contemporary world). In fact, a similar dismissal characterized a fairly well-circulated 
response to the Year of Youth—another video clip, executed in the same style as the 
original. The clip gained wide notoriety for blaming politicians and bureaucrats for, if not 
for causing, then propelling, degradation of youth—visually represented by 
superimposing the tally of parliamentary elections onto a middle finger . 
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Figure 3
Year of Youth: An Alternative Clip
The bar graph shows the distribution of seats in Russian legislature. The middle finger—the largest number
of seats—is occupied by members of “United Russia” (a party closely associated with Putin)
Bykov’s antipolitics can be countered with a turn to recent scholarship on Komsomol 
(e.g. Yurchak 2006) and Nashi (e.g. Hemment 2012)—which offers plenty of evidence 
that young people have been and continue to be quite capable of working around 
officially-sanctioned programs of action. However, I aim to respond to his perspective—
particularly, to his dismissal of formal politics—by turning to ethnographic data. To this 
end, analyze some of my key informants’ reflections about “youth” following a screening 
of Podnieks’ film. 
Stas 
I met Stas at one of the Loyalists’ meeting. He was by far one of the most widely known 
of the group’s members—highly sought out by his colleagues whenever they needed help 
organizing something and frequently called on for advice. It was quite easy to take Stas 
as one of the beneficiaries of post-socialist reforms—a highly adaptive, independent, and 
entrepreneurial young man imagined by proponents of liberalization. Not yet in his mid 
twenties, he ran an advertising agency, drove a Mercedez, regularly travelled across 
Europe, and had no shortage of romantic entanglement.  Indeed, even those who were 
highly critical of the new economic order, took Stas as someone thoroughly capable of 
overcoming its characteristic difficulties in a morally uncompromising fashion. 
Apparently, he could get a car through the Russian border in about an hour  —a near 
miraculous feat considering that it was not unusual to wait more than eight hours in 
customs-related traffic; and, furthermore, to do so without bribing the guards. In fact, 
whenever there was a need to deal with the police during public events, Stas would be 
turned to in a (rarely disappointed) hope that his air of authority would lead to a favorable 
resolution. 
Like most of my interlocutors, Stas was not particularly given to self-reflection in a 
confessional mode.  Whenever he came over, our preferred late-night activity was that of 
“philosophizing” – a genre of speech not reducible to “sharing” or “commiserating” 
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(Clowes 2004, c.f. Ries 1997).5  Yet, after we watched Is It Easy to Be Young? he made a 
quizzical remark.  At the end of the film, Podnieks interviews a group of young Latvian 
men drafted to serve in Afghanistan6 and focuses the camera on a young man who, 
talking about his experience in the military, says, “I’ve heard that people are supposed to 
grow up in the war. This is wrong. They get old.”7  “If I were to do so something 
autobiographical,” Stas said reflecting on the young veteran’s insight, “I’d call it An 
Unrepentant Confession.” 
On the one hand, Stas’s remark indexed Podnieks’s refusal to shy away from his 
protagonists’ unscripted, often unclear and elusive, language—indeed, in some sense, 
reminiscent of confessional speech.8  Yet, on the other hand, Stas’ remark indexed not 
only a particular style of speech but also a very specific content: his turn to “confession” 
made sense insofar as Podnieks’s protagonist spoke of “growing old.”9 However, neither 
link shed light on the paradoxical nature of the phrase. According to the Russian 
Orthodox tradition, to which Stas, in some sense, belonged, confession and repentance 
went hand in hand: Why would one want to confess, unless one could also repent?
I suggest that Stas’ musing about an “unrepentant confession” speak to challenges 
associated with an attempt to narrate one’s life or to offer a particular representation of 
self (be it to a film-maker, a friend, or an ethnographer). Here, the imagined narrative is 
both confessionary and repentant —terms that connote an attempt at sincerity, openness 
5  “Philosophizing” connotes a genre of speech which is sufficiently general so as to not be reflective 
of any personal / private concerns, yet not sufficiently grounded to denote a  scholarly discussion.  In 
Russian, the verb “philosophize” may be used as a synonym of verbs such as “thinking,” “discussing,” 
“blabbering,” “showing off.”
6  Military training/service was mandatory for men and could last up to 3 years (in the navy) or 2 
years (in the army). Most young men pursuing university education had a chance to undertake their 
military training in the summer; thereby, they could evade both the lengthy service term and minimize 
the possibility that they’d be required to partake in active military operations. This, however, was 
conditional on their ability to gain admission to a university / program with an internal “military 
division” (voennaia kafedra). In fact, availability/access to this division was a major factor in 
influencing young men’s choice of profession.
7  The response should be contextualized in Soviet narratives about World War II—particularly, 
stories about children who, mature far beyond their years, are more courageous in the face of death than 
many of their older compatriots. These narratives were preceded by accounts of children’s  involvement 
in the Civil War of which Gaidar’s “The Tale of the War Secret, Malchish Kibalchish and Keeping 
One’s Word” (anthologized in Balina et al 2004) is, perhaps, the most famous (Steiner 1999 and Kelley 
2007 offer a thorough discussion of Soviet children’s literature).  A cinematic work which, in some 
sense, puts this narrative on its head—as it questions the very trope of war-time heroism—is Larisa 
Shepitko’s 1977 film “The Ascent” (Voskhozhdenie).  A less aesthetically sophisticated critique is 
offered in Aleksandr Atenesian’s 2006 film “Bastards”  (Svolochi).   
8  It is possible to interpret Podniek’s emphasis on unscripted speech as running counter both to the 
prevalence of voice-overs and well-rehearsed/ formulaic remarks in Soviet documentary cinema. 
However, this interpretation would be shortsighted since much of fairly mainstream and officially-
sanctioned late-socialist aesthetic production emphasized instability / impossibility /difficulty of verbal 
communication & clarity.
9  The (assumed) correlation between aging and confessing draws both on grounded sociology — an 
observation that most people who go to church (and partake in the ritual of confession) are the elderly; 
and on a literary / historical imagination — which frequently casts confession as an end-of-life ritual.
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and truthfulness as well as an hope for response, forgiveness, and recognition.  Yet, at 
stake in repentance is also a possibility of retrospection—an ability to judge one’s life by 
placing it in a broader context and evaluating one’s actions in light of possible 
alternatives. Youth (molodost' ) is a retrospective vantage point which makes this 
judgement possible. It is imagined as a period when “one enters life” : when, through a 
series of actions and choices one becomes a moral agent capable of taking responsibility. 
In this context,  molodost’ is less of a liminal space where one experiments with social 
taboos than a site where one is able to hear and, for the first time,  respond to a call from 
a future. 
The line from Podnieks’ film which spoke of growing old rather than growing up 
resonated with Stas because he, like many of my other interlocutors, sensed that his youth
molodost’ never happened. Making sense of this sentiment—a longing for “youth” as 
something that never happened rather than as something that has been lost—requires a 
biographic turn. 
Like most of my interlocutors, Stas was born in the mid 1980s. When he was in high 
school, around 2005, Latvia's credit craze has not entered its ultimate stage. Agents in the 
informal sector still competed with banks for offering finance capital.  Stas had a head on 
his shoulders, was dependable, and had interpersonal skills, of which being a seven feet 
tall amateur-boxer was an important part.  This made him a sought-after associate.  As 
Stas graduated high school, the informal sector lost out its credit business to the banks 
almost entirely. Stas opened his own business, specializing in shipping between the EU 
and Russia. At that time, the mechanics of border crossing were favorable both for formal 
and informal transit. However, as Latvia entered the Schengen zone, this changed.  Stas's 
third venture revolved around advertising and promotions. During the economic boom, 
everyone sought to advertise. Self-advertising was thought to be a “reinvestment” bound 
to increase future returns.  Yet, as I began my intensive fieldwork in 2009, Latvia's 
advertising industry went belly-up. 
Whereas Stas's financial situation was tangibly better than his peers', he was was quite 
hesitant to attribute his success to his business acumen: to an entrepreneurial ability to see 
particular trends and make calculated risks. Over the period of 8 years, Stas had three 
successful businesses; yet, by 2010, he had little to show for his success. Here, at stake is 
more than “material evidence” of one's previous success: i.e., “economic capital” that one 
was able to accumulate. American idiom of “experience” – which speaks to a kind of a 
“materiality” which persists as other, more tangible, economically-dependent forms of 
materiality disintegrate – has limited resonance. Like Bourdieu's forms of capital, 
“experience” presupposes convertibility which does not always exist in post-socialist 
setting. Simply put, the kind of experience that is needed to navigate the intersection of 
formal and informal economy at a specific border cannot be translated to other settings.10
10  Here, I am implicitly drawing a parallel between a situation that Stas and many of his 
contemporaries found themselves in 2008-2010; and a situation that many of late-socialist 
“businessmen” found themselves after the collapse of Socialism. International economists interpreted 
black-market transactions as indicative of entrepreneurial potential bound to erupt in 1991. However,  
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Yet, interpretations of the current predicament as that of “the crisis” implicitly assumed 
that a return to a normal state of affairs would be possible—that insights gained in the 
period “before” could be of use in the period “after.” Yet, as Stas's career path—and more 
importantly, his hesitance to interpret it in terms of individual achievement—suggested 
otherwise.  
Many of my informants shared Stas's longing for “youth”— imagined to be a time when 
one can hear and respond to a call from the future. For these young men and women, 
Podnieks' film was not an archive of Soviet repression.   At the same time, from their 
perspective, the film was hardly a celebration of late-socialist non-conformism.  In fact, 
both interpretations of Is it Easy to Be Young?—the one expressed by Bykov's guests and  
drawing on a liberal critique of socialism, the other articulated by Bykov—did not 
resonate with my informants. In part, this lack of resonance had to do with a question of 
formal politics.   
From “Crisis” to Arrhythmia
One of my first acquaintances in Riga was Klim, a young jurist,11 who invited me over to 
his office for a cup of coffee. In his early 30s, he was slightly older than most of The 
Loyalists. He was married and had two children. In 2008, when his wife was expecting 
their second child, he decided to buy a bigger apartment. This was the point at which the 
real estate prices were most inflated. Klim and his wife decided to keep their old 
apartment – which was also mortgaged – as a form of investment rather than sell it. Not 
selling the old apartment, meant taking a larger loan. He and his wife borrowed around 
€175,000 for a 2-bedroom apartment in one of Riga's suburbs. By the time I began my 
fieldwork, the new apartment's market value was around €100,000. The old apartment 
could be sold for €75,000: which was €10,000 less than what Klim and his wife owed on 
their first mortgage. The market value of Klim's property was €175,000; yet, he and his 
wife owed €256,000 to the bank. In other words, their net worth was -€81,000. Since 
graduating from university in 2000, Klim worked like a dog and built up a successful 
small business. Yet, in 2009, all he had to show for it was -€81,000. 
After Klim shared his financial situation with me, he paused and added “Now they say 
that we have crisis. But what we have is a miniature train [paravozik] which keeps 
moving somewhere, and  all that can change is a machinist.” Here was a remarkable 
reversal of a classical socialist metaphor. In Soviet cinematography and fiction, the train 
these transactions depended on economic networks that did not survive the collapse of state socialism  – 
e.g. access to state-owned machinery to moonlight. For a sustained discussion, see Humphrey 2002, 
Verdery 2004. For an alternative account see Yurchak 2002, 2003.
11 In Latvia, there is a difference between “jurists” and “lawyers.” Like in most of post-Soviet republics, 
law is taught on the undergraduate level. The difference between “jurists” and “lawyers” is not so much 
a matter of education (although, lawyers typically hold master's degrees) but elected membership in a 
professional college. In terms of legal procedure, the substantial difference between jurists and lawyers 
is that jurists may not participate in criminal proceedings.
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was an ultimate symbol of progress.12 The railcar and the railway – as contrasted to the 
American automobile and the road – indexed progress precisely insofar as they were pre-
set: i.e., insofar as the course of history was known. The reason for Klim's remark was to 
highlight his impotence at being able to hear the future—something that made direction 
gravely uncertain and, furthermore, turned the real train into something akin to a child's 
toy.  
The image of the train recurred during my conversation with Yulia, a key member of The 
Loyalists. Like Klim, Yulia was sharply critical of using the trope of “crisis” to 
emphasize the particularity of the present moment. As we were preparing for a Young 
European Federalists Exchange Program (of which I spoke in Chapter 1), she sad, “This 
talk of the crisis is nonsense. Our politicians have always lived in the present, in the 
moment.” This was not particularly surprising, she continued. Over the last century, 
Latvia has seen multiple regime changes. Consequently, Yulia continued, nobody thought 
anything was forever. “Just look at the independence period!” she exclaimed. “The 
average government lasted for 10 months!”13  “And now,” Yulia concluded, “There is not 
even a foundation on which you can fall. We're just in a free fall: we can't even start 
anew. We are stuck in timelessness [bezvremen'e].”  
 
My informants'  unease with “the crisis” —evident their ruminations about growing old, 
riding on the train to nowhere, being stuck in timelessness—resonated with  Svetlana's 
Strel'nikova 2009 documentary titled Arrhythmia. In Riga, the film screened as a part of 
Youth Documentary Night—an event loosely linked with the 25th anniversary of Is It 
Easy To Be Young? Interweaving fiction and nonfiction, Arrhythmia follows several days 
in the life of a 25-year old cardiologist.14 On the one hand, these days revolve around the 
clinic where he works. In these scenes, the camera focuses on the rows of tired patients 
waiting for their turn to see a doctor; on elderly babushkas who lament their lives and do 
not understand what is going on; and on emergency visits to dying patients. On the other 
hand, the doctor's days revolve around organizing parties and promotional events.  Here, 
the camera follows the crowds of young dancers covered in soap bubbles, laser light 
shows, and late-night contests and competitions.15  
12 Incidentally, the image of the train had a particularly charged character in Latvia since it played a 
crucial role in the history of Russian Imperial and then Soviet railways. Riga's Electric Railways 
Factory (Rīgas Vagonbūves Rūpnīca) manufactured a great number (possibly a majority) of Soviet 
trains.  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the factory went into deep decline. The collapse of 
industrial manufacturing wasn't unique to Latvia; yet, whereas railways were concerned, this collapse 
was felt particularly strongly – in part, because it was concomitant to a significant reduction of railway 
services throughout the republic as well as between the three Baltic states.  
13  Somewhat hyperbolic, this statement has a strong resonance with Latvia's post-soviet history. 
Since the restoration of independence, Latvia had 11 prime-ministers; given that 2 of them, held office 
twice non-consecutively, the number of post-soviet prime-ministerial changes stands at 13. In Estonia, 
the number is 10; in Lithuania – 11. Only the Baltic States were re-constituted as parliamentary 
republics following the disintegration of the USSR. Even thought the Baltic States have the presidential 
office, which provides a limited measure of continuity, it is largely ceremonial.
14 In Russia (and Latvia), medicine is taught on the undergraduate level. Consequently, it is possible to be 
a practicing physician by the time one is in his / her mid-twenties.  
15 One particularly poignant episode focuses on the protagonist's attempt to organize a vkladishi 
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On one level, the film's title emphasizes the difference between the protagonist's past-
times. Yet, the title also suggests that the protagonist's attempt to balance his demanding 
day job with a strenuous night life—or, rather, his inability to decide what life to pursue
—has a pathological effect.  Strel'nikova foregrounded this aspect of the film when she 
spoke about her peers' (the first post-soviet generation's) proclivity for living “a double 
life because while you want to do one thing, you have to make money” (Troepol'skaia 
2010). 
Figure 4
Stills from Arrhythmia
Talking to Patients Playing Vkladyshi Going to Work 
This perspective was shared by Irina with whom I attended the festival.  While Irina was 
no longer involved in any sort of activism, she still kept abreast of all political issues; and 
was a frequent guest at various political and community events. As I mentioned above, 
when I first told her of my interest in “youth,” she feigned surprise, asking whether or not 
I thought there was any youth to do research with.  Several months later, when we saw 
Arrhythmia, she yet again problematized “youth” as an object of research, “Youth is 
possible only for as long as you don't have to spin [krutitsia].”   In the everyday use of 
the word, “spinning” is primarily linked to the Russian concept of byt which is rendered 
in English as “the everyday.” Byt has a negative connotation: it speaks of a life which, in 
its banality and repetition, stands outside of the historical process (Boym 1994). Insofar 
as over the past century and a half, history has been understood in terms of “progress,” 
spinning also bespeaks to an impossibility of a cumulative movement necessary for 
progress.16  
competition. Vkladishi – literally, “inserts” – are inner wrappers for individually-wrapped chewing gum. 
In the early 1990s, as non-Soviet chewing-gum became accessible, many children became avid 
collectors of vkladishi. (Even though seemingly novel, this practice drew on a long-standing Soviet 
tradition of collecting postage stamps: perhaps most famously commemorated in Sofia Mogilevskaia's 
1958 novel Marka Strany Gondelupy / The Stamp of Gondelupa.) One of the rituals around collecting 
vkladyshi revolved around an eponymous game. Contenders of the game tried to hit a stack of several 
waged vkladishi with a palm of their hand in such a way so that some or all of vkladishi would flip 
sides.  Whoever succeeded, got the flipped vkladishi.  
16 The negative connotation of byt can be traced to the pre-revolutionary period. The Russian Orthodox 
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A longing for history permeated Arrythmia.  To begin with, it characterized its very form 
of a partly fictionalized documentary. Sharing her preference for plot lines driven by 
events, she suggested that that fictional elements were necessary to compensate for the 
documentary tendency to forgo action in favor of portraiture.  At the same time, she 
foregrounded a very contradictory nature of this form when she described her 
protagonist's impasse in terms of reflection rather than action.  According to her, the film 
was much more about the young doctor's inability to ask “What kind of a shithead am I?” 
than “Am I a doctor or do I organize parties?” (Troepol'skaia 2010:6).  In another 
interview, Strel'nikova emphasized that  that she did not want to make a film about a 
young man who thinks that he has time to experiment with different life styles, while, at 
the same time, recognizing that one day he'll have to do something seriously. According 
to her, if that were the case, then the film would have been about time passing by an 
indecisive young man. However, Arrhythmia was “not about the time that's passing him” 
but, rather, “him passing the time” (Borovik 2012). 
Among my interlocutors, the person who talked about “passing the time” most 
passionately was Renars whom I met at one of the Loyalists' meetings.  Over the course 
of the year Renars came to The Loyalists only several times; but he kept in close touch 
with Pavel since, like Pavel, Renars also ran and planned to run for the city council and 
the parliament. Renars's father passed away when he was in high school, at which point 
Renars started working to support his younger brother and mother. When I met him, he 
was working full time at a bank and studying full time at The University of Latvia. As it 
was impossible to get a budget spot17 in Finance, he paid for his education out of pocket. 
His younger brother was about to start university and, given the crisis, could not get a 
job; so, Renars was paying for his brother's education as well. 
Renars and I had a conversation after The Loyalists' Political School meeting, as he 
walked towards the train station: to go back home to Sloka, a town a 30 minute train ride 
away from Riga. He began by talking about the problems with education: its low quality, 
its lack, its commercialization. Soon, however, he moved onto talking about the crisis. 
“Crisis” is a misnomer, he argued. “Crisis” implies the presence of an economic cycle a 
presence of certain horizons of possibility; but Latvian economy isn't cyclical at all, it is 
wild; instead of curves there are peaks and plunges. Trying to exploit the peak as long as 
possible, people run from one place to another and cannot see beyond their immediate 
moment. Regular people “spin” trying to make ends meet.  As for politicians, they “run” 
from one idea to another idea, from one party to another party.  During The Loyalists' 
meetings “running” was seen as emblematic of Latvia's political problems. All of Latvia's 
tradition condemns daily sueta (“fuss” and “bustle”) and directs the faithful to focus on bytie rather than
byt: a word which shares the same root, but denotes something very different, such as “being” or 
“existence.”
17 Like other state universities, The University of Latvia has a certain number of “budget spots” in all of 
the programs of study. A student occupying one of these spots  – which are “given out” based on 
academic achievement in the final year of study – does not have to pay for education. The intensity of 
the competition for these spots depends both on the university and the program of study. 
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politicians were perebezhchiki and perevertyshi. Perebezhchik may be translated  as a 
“defector”; but, in Russian, its etymologically linked to beg – running and begun – 
runner. Pervertysh may be translated as “turncoat”; it's etymologically linked to vertet' – 
to turn and spin. “Everyone wants to be as close to the feeding trough (kormushka),” 
Renars explained. “So they spin and run.”
The Glass Menagerie
The problem of spinning and running—interlinked with the problem of “youth”
—permeated the production of The Glass Menagerie, staged by a Russian youth theater 
troupe.  The troupe, called The Free Actors Society, used to be housed in an attic in the 
Old City, but, shortly before I arrived to Riga, moved to a new home on Čaka street. 
Although still in Riga's center, the street is not frequented by tourists. Its Jugenstil 
buildings are still unrestored, their caryatids – veiled in grime. The air  is dense with a 
web of cables for trolleybuses, which thin out the sidewalks. A twenty-minute walk up 
the street, there is a six-story building. Not very noticeable, it is nonetheless well known. 
It is a palimpsest of sorts. For some, it is the place where the first post-Soviet nightclub 
opened its doors in 1991. For others, it is the place where one could see arthouse 
European cinema in the late 1990s. For yet others, a place where people tried their 
fortune playing roulette. Today, it's a home for about twenty Russian actors.
 
The Glass Menagerie was one of the first plays produced by The Free Actors Society. 
During my fieldwork, the play emerged as one of the main sites for talking about the 
question of youth.  The plot of the play frequently revolves around Amanda Wingfield. 
Longing for gentleman callers of her youth – a youth spent in the carefree turn-of-the-
century American South – Amanda tries to find a suitor for her daughter Laura. This is 
difficult since instead of going out, Laura spends most of her time taking care of her glass 
collection. Laura's brother, Tom, is a poet who works in a warehouse. One night, Tom 
brings home Jim, Tom's work colleague and a former classmate. Amanda and Tom hope 
that Laura will like Jim, and indeed, Laura does. But it turns out that Jim is already 
engaged. This leads to Laura's complete breakdown and Tom's escape to the sea. 
The contemporary resonance of Williams's play seems striking. First, it is set during the 
aftermath of America's Great Depression. In the course of my fieldwork, the Great 
Depression became a benchmark against which international press situated Latvia's 
economic collapse. (In fact, shortly after I arrived, I found city announcement boards 
covered with posters announcing a film festival dedicated to cinema of the Great 
Depression, yet, paradoxically adorned with Audrey Hepburn as Holly Golightly). Yet, 
Riga's Menagerie does not stage a resonance between the Great Depression and Latvia's 
economic crisis. Instead, it uses the economic crisis as a foil for meditating on “a crisis of 
conscience.” Second, in light of Amanda's longing for an easy past, Glass Menagerie 
invites a meditation on nostalgia for socialism. However, in Riga's production it is Jim, 
rather than Amanda, who serves as a focal point of nostalgic yearning.  Let me elaborate 
on both of these. 
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*
I'll begin with conscience. “Conscience” is offered as a frame for the play in the 
production notes: 
How to remain true to yourself, not to lose your unique self in the merciless 
maelstrom, and how to leave everything, beloved and dear, in search of a fantom 
happiness? [This is] a play about sick conscience which pushes through memories and 
wounds the soul like fragments of glass. [We can] try and run away, to scream in an 
attempt to somehow muffle this pain. But [the conscience] catches up [with us] again 
and again. Tugging at the soul's wounds with the familiar melody, the screams of the 
seagulls, and the noise of the surf, [the conscience] reminds you of the life that, 
having been shattered, pierced [your] heart with broken pieces of glass. Is it possible 
to put these pieces together into a mosaic of happiness?
Figure 5
Production Photographs of The Glass Menagerie
On the most rudimentary scale, this may be a comment on the transition from socialism 
to capitalism. However, here the object of melancholia is not a failed promise of 
capitalism. What haunts Tom is not the specter of a possibility envisioned in the 90s; 
what is mourned is a particular relationship to time.  When I interviewed Gleb Belikov, 
an actor who played Tom, he reiterated the centrality of “conscience” in OSA's 
interpretation of the play. “There are problems with conscience [sovest'] now,” Gleb said. 
“It is not that the time we live in is difficult. Rather, it's wicked [podloe].” 
Today, both words that Gleb uses – conscience [sovest'] and wickedness [podslost'] – 
sound anachronistic.  Conscience has been replaced by “psyche” or “individuality.” At 
stake in the difference  between, on the one hand, “conscience,” and, on the other hand, 
“psyche” or “individuality,” is a conception of a subject. The subject of conscience is a 
subject who has a relationship with the flow of History. He is, to use a word that appears 
several times in The Big Soviet Encyclopedia's definition of “conscience” a person 
[lichnost'] rather than an individual [individ]. In other words, he understands himself vis-
a-vis a transcendent historical processes. This subject has a Marxian historical 
consciousness rather than a Freudian unconscious. Thus, to speak of “sick conscience” is 
to speak not so much of an individual psyche but of a time in which a person finds 
himself.  To repeat, according to Gleb, this time is not so much as “difficult” as it is 
“dastardly” or “wicked.”  
*
Now, I would like to switch registered and talk about Jim. I do so in order to come back 
to a point that I made earlier: that the failure in the center of The Glass Menagerie is not, 
in any simple way, a failure of the capitalist promise. 
I saw The Glass Menagerie with my friend Ludmila, a leader of The Humanists. While in 
high school, Ludmila trained to be a professional ballet dancer; yet, it did not work out. 
When we got acquainted, she was finishing a degree in journalism in St. Petersburg, 
where she would go several times a year for exams. When there, she would cram in as 
many theater outings as she could. Riga's Menagerie was her second or third. “This time 
around,” she said as we were making our way back to the center, “I kept thinking of Jim. 
Now, all the men are like Jim,” she added. “They used to be successful, but now they lost 
everything. All they can talk about now are there former days of glory. It's like dating 
elderly men.” 
As Ludmila said this, I thought of Stas. Stas was always reticent to speak of the days 
gone by. Furthermore, compared to many – for instance, Klim – he was still doing well. 
This said, the men of Ludmila's story were easy to come by.  A character who made a 
regular appearance in  crisis-themed stories shared with me by my interlocutors was a 
young man with a Mercedes (bought on credit), but no gas money. This man would hang 
out near the train station by day and next to dance clubs by night in an attempt to 
moonlight. However hard I looked, I searched for this man in vain. As I realized towards 
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the end of my fieldwork, by 2009 all the cars that were bought on credit were repossessed 
by the bank. Settled with enormous debt (stringent legislation made personal bankruptcy 
nearly impossible), these men left in search of better fortunes in Ireland or England. 
Emigration of youth was a widely discussed indication of the crisis. However, 
discussions of emigrating young men was a particularly salient sign of how serious the 
situation has become. 
Less than a month after Ludmila and I saw The Glass Menagerie, I was invited to 
participate in The Loyalists' school outreach program. The program was run by Feliks, a 
sophomore at The University of Latvia. As we met in the city center to go to the school – 
it was located in an outlying borough – Feliks was telling me how difficult it was to 
secure invitations. Teachers and principles alike, he said, were biased against political 
organizations.  To remedy the bias, The Loyalists downplayed their affiliation with the 
party and emphasized their “social” rather than “political” nature. What was offered as a 
part of The Loyalists' outreach program was not political education with an implicit aim 
of recruiting members, but rather, advice regarding university education in Latvia. I was 
invited along as an “expert” and charged with the task of emphasizing the quality of 
Latvian education to prevent people from leaving to study abroad. (Given that the costs 
of studying in Denmark were comparable to the costs of studying in Riga, a lot of 
students tried to go abroad). 
Feliks and I were joined by five other men (Pavel among them): one for each of Riga's 
universities. Each one extolled their respective experiences and downplayed any potential 
benefit from studying abroad. “So imagine you get a degree from London School of 
Economics,” Pavel said brusquely. (Given how competitive admissions are, this is a near 
impossibility).  “It's not like you'll want to work as a bank clerk afterwards. At the same 
time, no matter how good your education is, you won't be hired without having any 
experience. You should stay here and do what I did: study and work at the same time.” 
Everyone listened intently. As the bell was about to wring, the female teacher addressed 
the class. “Girls! Look in front of you,” she exclaimed. (In the class of 20, there were 3 
male students). “There are six self-actualized men right here.  Trust me, it would be 
difficult to find men like this abroad!”
Conclusion
What do Latvia’s Russian youth activists—specifically, young men and women to whom 
I refer to as “aspiring politicians” —want? How can their desire for politika be 
concretized?  What are the stakes of their investment in practices which make politika 
possible? Why do they turn to late-socialist forms of identification, communication, and 
cultural production? What is the ethos underlying their attempts to “keep ethnicity 
nearby,” to “speak concretely,” to be “culturally inventive”? 
This chapter—offered as a coda to a more sustained discussion of aspiring politicians’ 
engagement with debates on ethnic, linguistic and cultural policy—offers a somewhat 
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paradoxical answer: youth activists do what they do because they long to be young. As 
the object of their longing, “youth”  speaks neither to a particular age bracket nor to a set 
of roles associated with a particular age group. Rather, longing for youth recalls a 
socialist dream of being in the avant-garde of historical progress. In this context, “youth” 
is a consciously developed character trait (which speaks to one’s relationship to History) 
rather than a chronological attribute (which indicates one’s age); something that is 
emphasized by my interlocutors’ persistent differentiation between molodezh (a word 
which connotes a group of young people who share generational consciousness) and 
molodniak (a word usually used to describe a group of young animals).18  
My immediate context for asking “What do young people want?” is the financial crisis of 
2008-2010.  The crisis, which had global proportions, had a particularly negative effect 
on Latvia.  Salaries, pensions, and social services were cut; unemployment tripled; and 
out-migration reached previously unseen levels. As the crisis unfolded, “youth” became a 
crucial topic of conversation among politicians, policy-makers and journalists. 
Parliamentarians, activists, and public intellectuals alike expressed concerns about young 
people’ heightened vulnerability to the financial downturn.  
Widely articulated concerns about “youth” in “crisis” rested on (fairly reasonable) 
18  To appreciate this distinction further, it is useful to recall several features of its cultural-historical 
context. The first concerns the importance of concepts like “consciousness” and “History” for Russian 
practices of self-interpretation and political organizing. In this context, it is worth recalling that the 
German philosophers’ “idealistic” interpretations of the French Revolution (which put an early modern 
understanding of man as someone who “makes” history on its head — making “History” and “Spirit” 
forces in and of themselves) had a profound influence on Russian intellectual culture. (For a succinct 
account of thinking about “History” from antiquity to the present, with a particular emphasis on the 
contrast between Vico’s humanism and Hegel’s idealism, see Arendt (2006); much of Arendt’s work on 
totalitarianism explores the implications of this paradigm. Some of the classic accounts of the German 
idealists’ influence on Russian intelligentsia—and the revolutionary tradition—include  Berlin 2008, 
Raeff 1966, Walicki 1979. The persistence of German idealist’s influence during the Soviet period is 
suggested by Hellbeck’s (2009) study of Bukharin’s engagement with Hegel’s Phenomenology and 
History during his 1938 show trial.)
The second factor that further elucidates my informants’ investment in a particular understanding 
of molodezh has to do with their attempt to use “generation” (pokolenie) as a category of self-
interpretation and political organizing. This attempt reflects the importance of horizontal or 
associational ties—and a concomitant critique of / unease with vertical or filial ties—which is often 
associated with contemporary and modern politics; most recently—the importance of “youth” in Color 
Revolutions (e.g., Nikolaenko 2007); and, speaking more broadly, the influence of the 19th century 
youth movements on nationalism and bureaucratization (c.f. Mannheim 1952). Lovell (2008) offers a 
provocative account of Russian (and, in part, Soviet) historiography’s investment in “generation” as a 
category of interpretation.  
The third factor that elucidates my interlocutors’ investment in generational identity has to do with 
Leninist emphasis on “youth” as the avant-garde of communist movement (perhaps, most famously 
outlined in Lenin’s 1920 speech titled “The Tasks of the Youth Leagues.”  In the 1920s and the 1930s, 
Soviet cultural policy explicitly appealed to generational identity—describing the first Soviet generation 
as vydvizhentsy (the ones who have been pushed forward); here, the classic account is provided by 
Fitzpatrick (1992). The Communist Youth League (KOMSOMOL) promoted generational identity since 
its establishment in 1918—frequently in opposition to kinship-based systems (associated with the 
peasantry); and, incidentally, referencing Nietzsche (Tirado 1993, 1994).
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assumptions about what young people want and need: education, employment, and, most 
importantly, the family. Indeed, building a family was understood to be the ultimate goal, 
or, alternatively, the reason for, of getting a college diploma and finding a job. This 
emphasis on the family—and concerns over anything that would prevent young people 
from getting married and having children —reflected widespread anxieties about 
“demographic catastrophe” (the dramatic decline of the population during the 1990s and 
higher rates of mortality / morbidity); as well as a general sense that  young people’s 
(supposed) drug abuse, alcoholism, promiscuity, abortions, sexual perversion, etc.19 — 
were to blame for the catastrophe in the first place.  
My interlocutors were keen to interrogate assumptions about personhood and temporality 
that made the discourse of “youth in crisis” so prominent. Above I explore how they did 
so by analyzing my informants' response to three aesthetic representations of youth that 
punctuated my fieldwork. I turn to these aesthetic representations for two reasons. First, 
neither one of them was as politically charged as the official discourse on youth; as a 
result, they led to unsolicited reflections on the problem of youth—made in an off-beat, 
somewhat philosophical, key.  These reflections reveal young people's attempts to frame 
their predicament as that of a historical impasse rather than that of an economic downturn
—a frame that is missing from most public discussions of youth politics in Latvia. 
Second, I turn to these pieces in order to emphasize a representational (and, in some 
sense, aesthetic) aspect of my own work; and to suggest that ethnographic writing may be 
evaluated based on its ability not only to trace effects of particular representations but 
also to unsettle them by opening up a space for reflection.  
19 Concerns over degeneration (in biological rather than moral sense) were already fairly prominent 
in the 1980s, particularly following the Chernobyl catastrophe. Quite likely drawing on earlier forms of 
popular science (e.g. Beer 2008), these concerns went against the officially-sanctioned emphasis on 
nurture (over nature)—most dramatically illustrated by Lysenko’s criticism of “bourgeois genetics” 
(Graham 1993). In the late 1990s, concerns over (biological) degeneration gave rise to a variety of 
aesthetic forms thematizing perversity, monstrosity, and violence — sometimes opening up spaces of 
critique (Yurchak 2008a, 2008b, c.f. Gololobov et al. 2014, Pilkinton 1994 and Markowitz 2000); 
sometimes providing source material for the newly emergent media and entertainment market  
(Borenstein 2007); sometimes furnishing particular ideological projects (Khapaeva 2008 and Etkind 
2013); sometimes resonating with/ informing health activism (Rivkin-Fish 2005). 
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